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Abstract 
 
Research on psychological interventions for worry and rumination is limited, in spite of the 
prevalence of these cognitive processes across clinical disorders, and their role in the onset 
and maintenance of depressive and anxiety disorders in particular. The two studies which 
comprise this research programme sought to explore the effectiveness of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy in the treatment of worry and rumination as transdiagnostic 
psychological processes.  
In Study One, a case study design was used to explore the outcomes of a group ACT 
intervention delivered in a community setting for one individual experiencing worry and 
rumination in the context of anxiety and minor depression. The intervention involved seven 
2-hour sessions and one 4-hour session. The participant completed quantitative outcome 
measures assessing worry, rumination, psychological symptomatology, ACT-related 
variables, and functional impairment at baseline, post-treatment, and 3-month follow-up. An 
interview was also conducted with the participant following the completion of the 
intervention. Data indicated that following the intervention the participant experienced 
significant reductions anxiety and rumination, which were maintained at 3-month follow-up. 
There were also improvements in mindfulness and functionality, however these were not 
maintained. There was no significant change in the participant’s worry, nor was change 
observed in the ACT constructs of experiential avoidance and valued living. The interview 
data revealed that the mindfulness and values aspects of the ACT intervention had the 
strongest and most lasting impact on the participant, and that she used mindfulness to manage 
her rumination. Furthermore, the interview data highlighted potential differences between 
worry and rumination, and suggested that an individual’s engagement with ACT may be 
mediated by their prior experience with CBT.  
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In order to expand on the findings observed in Study One and to explore the effectiveness of 
ACT for worry and rumination with a larger sample, Study Two utilised a within-subjects 
repeated measures design to explore the research questions amongst individuals with a range 
of transdiagnostic psychological problems. The intervention was delivered through the 
outpatient service of a private psychiatric hospital, and consisted of 10 sessions which were 
4.5 hours each in duration. Forty individuals (11 male, 29 female; M = 42.58, SD = 11.45) 
completed baseline measures of worry, rumination, psychological symptomatology, ACT-
related variables, and quality of life. Eighteen of these participants (6 male, 12 female) 
completed the same measures at post-treatment, and 4 completed the measures for a third 
time at 1-month follow-up (1 male, 3 female).  
Data revealed that following the intervention there were significant reductions in participants’ 
worry, rumination, depression, anxiety and stress, experiential avoidance and cognitive 
fusion, and improvements in participants’ mindfulness, valued living, life satisfaction, 
personal wellbeing, and functionality. Follow-up data indicated that changes in worry, ACT 
constructs, and personal wellbeing were maintained, however depression, anxiety and stress 
increased at 1-month follow-up (although scores remained reduced from baseline levels).  
The present research provides preliminary support for the effectiveness of ACT for worry and 
rumination. Explanations of the clinical implications of the findings in addition to the 
discrepancies between the two studies are discussed. The author proposes a theoretical model 
of ACT for worry and rumination along with an intervention framework to better target the 
application of ACT in the treatment of these cognitive processes.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction and Overview 
Worry and Rumination 
Worry and rumination are cognitive processes which are closely implicated in the 
onset and maintenance of a range of psychological disorders (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; 
Holaway, Rodebaugh, & Heimberg, 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, 
& Lyubomirsky, 2008; Papageorgiou, 2006; Purdon & Harrington, 2006; Siegle, Moore, & 
Thase, 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2007; Watson, 2005). Worry involves 
anxious apprehension for future negative events and catastrophic thinking about potential 
outcomes (Barlow, 2002). While previously viewed as a symptom of anxiety, worry is now 
seen as an important construct in its own right (Borkovec, 1985; Purdon & Harrington, 2006). 
Ruminative thought is focused on the causes and consequences of internal states, such as 
mood, and external states, such as problems (Kuhl, 1981; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). 
Rumination can have adaptive, goal-oriented functions and is not necessarily aversive 
(Carver & Sheier, 1982, 1990, 1998; Martin & Tesser, 1996; McLaughlin, Borkovec & 
Sibrava, 2007), however this construct is generally examined in the context of negative 
mood, where it is seen as involving repeatedly and passively focusing on the symptoms of 
distress, in addition to themes of loss, self-worth and meaning (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991). In attempting to understand the function of worry and rumination, researchers have 
suggested that these processes operate to allow individuals to avoid emotional distress by 
distracting them with cognitive-verbal activity (Borkovec, 1994; Borkovec et al., 1998; 
Giorgio et al., 2010). An avoidance model of worry and rumination has also been supported 
empirically (Borkovec and Hu, 1990; Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993; Cribb, 
Moulds, & Carter, 2006; Delgado, et al., 2009; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995).  
18 
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The role of worry and rumination in a range of psychological disorders is increasingly 
being recognised. Heightened levels of repetitive negative thinking are present in a large 
number of Axis I disorders (Ehring & Watkins, 2008), suggesting that worry and rumination 
are transdiagnostic processes prevalent across diagnostic categories. Worry and rumination 
have been identified as risk factors for multiple psychological disorders (Harvey, Watkins, 
Mansell, & Shafran, 2004), and have been linked to mood and anxiety disorders in particular. 
Throughout the literature, worry has been most closely associated with anxiety; however 
there is also research to suggest that worry is also associated with depression (Andrews & 
Borkovec, 1988; Brown, 2001; Starcevic, 1995, cited by Papageorgiou, 2006). Similarly, 
while researchers have traditionally focused on the relationship between rumination and 
depression (Teasdale et al., 2000; Watkins, 2008), it is now known that rumination is present 
in the anxiety disorders, and has a unique role in mixed depression anxiety presentations 
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000;Watson, 2005).  
In light of their role in the onset and maintenance of emotional disorders, it is 
important to identify effective treatments for pathological forms of worry and rumination. 
Researchers have recognized that repetitive negative thinking may be a promising target in 
the treatment of depression and anxiety (Topper, Emmelkamp, & Ehring, 2010). At present, 
however, the research literature on effective clinical interventions for worry and rumination is 
small and inconclusive. Common to interventions which have shown to be effective in 
treating worry and rumination is a focus on the process-related rather than content-related 
aspects of these constructs, with intervention efforts aimed at shifting attention away from 
maladaptive cycles of repetitive negative thought and onto adaptive action, as opposed to 
attempting to change or eliminate cognitive content. In light of this, a psychological 
intervention which may be effective in the treatment of worry and rumination is Acceptance 
19 
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and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). ACT is an acceptance 
and mindfulness-based therapy, which has been found to be efficacious in the treatment of 
depressive and anxiety disorders, in addition to transdiagnostic psychological problems (e.g. 
Arch et al., 2012; Clarke et al., 2012; Eifert et al., 2009; Forman et al., 2007; Lappalainen et 
al., 2007; Roemer & Orsillo, 2007).  
Rationale and Aims 
There is a clear need for the establishment of effective, empirically-supported 
psychological interventions for worry and rumination, and there are strong theoretical reasons 
for exploring the application of ACT in the treatment of these cognitive processes. ACT is 
highly relevant to the treatment of worry and rumination, as conceptualisations of these 
constructs as mechanisms of experiential avoidance are theoretically consistent with the ACT 
model of psychopathology. Furthermore, ACT encompasses a number of the therapeutic 
components which individually have been found to be effective in reducing worry and 
rumination. Researchers have highlighted the relevance and potential value of treating worry 
and rumination with ACT (Arch and Craske, 2008; Borkovec, 2002; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002; 
Twohig, 2012), however this has not previously been explored empirically. Therefore, the 
present research aims to contribute to the body of literature on worry and rumination 
interventions, in addition to the empirical research on ACT, by exploring whether ACT is a 
viable psychological intervention for pathological worry and rumination.  
This thesis is structured in the following way. The first part of this document 
(chapters two to five) will establish a rationale for the application of ACT to worry and 
rumination by reviewing theory and research pertaining to these constructs. Chapter One 
began by introducing worry and rumination and outlining the important characteristics and 
theories of these cognitive processes. Chapter Two will review the empirical research on 
20 
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psychological interventions for worry and rumination, highlighting the need to improve upon 
the current treatment options, and will suggest ACT as a viable option for the treatment of 
these processes. Chapter Three will then provide a detailed theoretical outline of ACT, and 
will review the current body of research on ACT for depression, anxiety, and transdiagnostic 
psychological problems, in order to establish the empirical status of ACT. Following this, 
Chapter Four will integrate the previous chapters by presenting a rationale for the application 
of ACT to the treatment of worry and rumination. Chapters Six and Seven are focused on the 
empirical examination of the central argument of the thesis, through studies One and Two. 
Finally, Chapter Eight will summarise the findings of both studies, outlining their clinical 
implications and suggesting directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2. Worry and Rumination: Definitions and Theory 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides an overview of the theory and research on worry and 
rumination. The chapter begins by reviewing the definitions, characteristics and measurement 
of worry and rumination as individual constructs. The theory on worry and rumination will 
then by integrated via an outline of the relationships between these cognitive processes, and 
their similarities and differences will be highlighted. The second part of this chapter will 
focus on the role of worry and rumination in psychopathology, emphasizing the 
transdiagnostic nature of these concepts and their prevalence across a range of psychological 
disorders, namely anxiety and depression. The final part of the chapter will review the 
theories of worry and rumination which have been suggested to explain the occurrence and 
function of these constructs. Particular attention will be given to avoidance models of worry 
and rumination, and the growing body of empirical support for these theoretical accounts.  
Definitions and characteristics of worry and rumination 
Worry and rumination are perseverative, repetitive, self-focused cognitive processes, 
which have been closely implicated in the onset and maintenance of psychological disorders 
throughout the empirical literature (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988; Holaway et al., 2006; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Papageorgiou, 2006; Purdon & 
Harrington, 2006; Siegle et al., 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2007; Watkins, 
2008). While worry and rumination have unique features, they also have significant 
commonalities, so much so that new research suggests that there may be a single construct 
representing negative thought (Ehring & Watkins, 2008).  
22 
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Worry. 
The phenomenon of worry has become increasingly of interest to researchers since the 
1980s. Prior to this time, worry was viewed as merely a symptom of anxiety, as opposed to a 
key construct of interest in its own right (Purdon & Harrington, 2006). However, based on 
Borkovec and colleagues’ pioneering research (Borkovec, 1985; Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinzky, & DePree, 1983), worry is now viewed as the cognitive component of anxiety, 
intrinsically related to the behavioural and physiological components, which may actually 
play a causal role in the onset of anxiety. As a consequence of Borkovec’s theory and 
research on worry, it is recognized that worry cannot simply be treated in the same way as 
anxiety, and interest in understanding this phenomenon has grown rapidly. 
A widely accepted definition of worry offered by the pioneers of research in the area 
of worry is that it is:  
a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and relatively uncontrollable; 
it represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-solving on an issue whose 
outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or more negative outcomes; 
consequently worry relates closely to the fear process (Borkovec et al., 1983, p.10). 
More recent conceptualizations of worry have extended this definition by incorporating 
individuals’ reports of what they do when they worry. Worry is now also commonly 
described as “anxious apprehension” for future, negative events (Barlow, 2002), which 
involves questions of ‘What if…?’ and catastrophic thinking about future outcomes and 
potential threats. Worry is vague rather than concrete in nature, and verbal rather than 
imaginal in form (Purdon & Harrington, 2006). Borkovec and colleagues (1983) propose that 
worry is a predominately verbal activity, such that when we worry, we are effectively talking 
to ourselves about hypothetical negative, threatening future events. Borkovec and Inz (1990) 
23 
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found empirical support for the verbal nature of worry in that when individuals with 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) – the psychological disorder with which worry is most 
closely associated – and non-clinical controls were exposed to either a worry or self-
relaxation induction, nonanxious controls reported little thought and mostly positive imagery 
during relaxation, while GAD participants reported equal amounts of thoughts and images, 
both of which were negatively valenced. Furthermore, when participants were asked to worry 
about a current situation, both groups experienced a clear predominance of negative thought 
over images. 
In order to better understand worry and why it occurs, researchers have examined the 
occurrence of worry empirically. While the majority of empirical evidence on worry is based 
research with nonanxious control groups (Holaway et al., 2006), this research provides an 
insight into what actually occurs when people worry, how often they worry, and what 
specifically they worry about. In one of the few direct explorations of the phenomenology of 
non-pathological worry, Tallis,  Davey, and Capuzzo (1994) asked a mixed sample of 128 
university students and working adults to report how often they worry, and how long their 
worry episodes last. Thirty eight percent of the sample reported worrying at least once per 
day; 19.4% reported worrying once every 2-3 days; 15.3% reported worrying about once a 
month; and 27.3% were unclear. Furthermore, 27% of the sample indicated that their worries 
lasted less than one minute, 38% described a typical worry duration of 1-10 minutes, and the 
remainder reported longer durations of worry. Participants reported that their worries 
commonly occurred in response to impending matters, such as upcoming events or 
interpersonal interactions, with the most commonly cited worry topics being competence at 
work, academic performance, health issues, financial circumstances, and intimate 
relationships. It appears that for the most part, normal worry is thought to take on a problem-
24 
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solving process: Szabó and Lovibond (2002) found that 48% of naturally occurring worry 
episodes reflected a problem-solving process, and 17% primarily involve the anticipation of 
negative outcomes. Recent research suggests that normal and pathological worry represent 
opposite ends of a continuum, rather than discrete constructs (Ruscio, Borkovec, & Ruscio, 
2001). In light of this finding, Ruscio and colleagues suggest that theory and research on 
worry should be broadened to include an exploration of the causal and maintenance factors 
associated with varying levels of worry severity and associated disturbances, rather than 
simply focusing on worry extremes and the presence or absence of pathological worry.  
 The relative consistency in conceptualizations of worry throughout the literature is 
reflected in the consistency in the measurement of worry. While there are a number of 
psychometric measures of worry, the bulk of the empirical research on the subject has relied 
on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). 
The PSWQ is designed to assess the pervasiveness, excessiveness and uncontrollable nature 
of worry, and has been used with both clinical and non-clinical populations, in research and 
clinical contexts (Molina & Borkovec, 1994; Startup & Erickson, 2006). The PSWQ 
correlates significantly with anxiety and depression as measured by the State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, 1983) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) respectively. Other measures of worry include the 
Worry Domains Questionnaire (WDQ; Tallis, Davey & Bond, 1992) which measures of the 
content of worry; and the Anxious Thoughts Inventory (AnTI; Wells, 1994), a multi-
dimensional measure of worry aimed at distinguishing between content domains of worry and 
non-metacognitive and metacognitive concerns.  
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Rumination. 
In comparison to worry, the literature on rumination is far less unified and consistent 
in its definitions of this concept. Researchers have offered a diverse array of alternative 
accounts of rumination, some of which conceptualise rumination as an adaptive process, and 
others which see rumination as a negative and unhelpful construct which is associated with 
psychological distress. A definition of rumination which cuts across all of the different 
theories of this construct is that it is a form of repetitive, analytical and self-focused thought 
which involves thinking about the causes and consequences of internal states, such as mood, 
and external states, such as problems (Kuhl, 1981; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
A key aspect of the diversity in conceptualisations of rumination is that researchers 
have focused on both the positive and negative functions of this construct. According to 
various theorists, rumination serves adaptive, goal-oriented functions. Martin and Tesser 
(1996) see rumination as a generic term, involving repetitive thoughts around a discrepancy 
between the individual’s current state and desired goals or outcomes, which serves the 
function of facilitating progress towards goals. Grounded in control theory (Carver & Sheier, 
1982, 1990, 1998), this conceptualization is known as global rumination, and is supported by 
a body of literature linking rumination with goal discrepancy (see Watkins, 2008). Other 
positive accounts of rumination have described rumination as the tendency to think about a 
distressing event in order to recover from the event (cognitive processing theory of 
rumination, Horowitz, 1986); and as a way of searching for meaning in relation to negative 
experiences (Fritz, 1999). According to Kuhl’s (1981, 1994) theory, rumination is one aspect 
of a broader impairment in control called “State Orientation”, which involves a pre-
occupation with thinking about alternative plans and analysis and evaluations of past 
successes and failures.  
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For the most part, however, the literature has generally focused on rumination as a 
maladaptive cognitive process associated with negative mood (Rippere, 1977). The 
conceptualization of rumination that has received the most empirical attention is based on the 
Response Styles Theory (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), which suggests that rumination 
is a mode of responding to distress that involves repeatedly and passively focusing on the 
symptoms of distress and the possible causes and implications of these symptoms. Chains of 
ruminative thought involve themes of personal loss and failure, which are characterized by 
‘Why’ type questions, for example, ‘Why did it happen to me?’ and ‘Why do I feel so 
depressed?’ (Papageorgiou, 2006). According to the Response Styles Theory, rumination 
exacerbates and prolongs distress by enhancing the effect of depressed mood on thinking, 
such that individuals draw on their negative cognitions and memories (which are initially 
activated by depressed mood) to understand their current circumstances (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Davis, 1999). According to the theory, rumination perpetuates depression by interfering with 
effective problem solving and instrumental behavior, as ruminative cognitions are pessimistic 
and fatalistic, and eventually lead to a loss of social support (Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis). 
Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues use the term depressive rumination to describe this 
phenomenon. 
The diversity in accounts of rumination creates challenges in terms of furthering 
research and knowledge in this field. As a consequence, researchers have attempted to 
integrate the different theories of rumination in the aim of achieving a more unified 
understanding of this construct (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Treynor, Gonzalez & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). For example, it is now widely accepted that not all rumination is 
associated with negative outcomes, and researchers have differentiated maladaptive, negative 
ruminative thought content from the less emotional ‘reflection’, which does not appear to be 
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associated with negative consequences (Siegle, 2008). In a psychometric analysis of the 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), a self-report 
measure of rumination, Treynor et al. found support for a two factor model of rumination, 
comprised of ‘reflective pondering’, which involves analyzing and trying to understand 
situations and one’s thoughts and feelings, and ‘brooding’ which is associated with a 
repetitive and passive focus on one’s negative feelings, and is linked to depression. In another 
attempt to integrate approaches to rumination, McLaughlin et al. suggest that a way of 
amalgamating theories of global and depressive rumination is that global rumination may 
represent the foundation of the depressive cognitive process from which depressive 
rumination emerges. Thus, points of agreement within the field are that rumination may 
represent a relatively innocuous psychological process, but that in certain circumstances this 
construct can be associated with negative outcomes, including depression.  
Due to the diversity in conceptualisations of rumination, it has been noted that it is 
important for researchers to make the definition of rumination they are using explicit, and to 
ensure that the measurement of rumination is consistent with this definition (Siegle, 2008; 
Treynor et al., 2003). Much of the research aimed at furthering our understanding of 
rumination has been based on the Response Styles Theory’s operationalization of rumination, 
and has utilized the Ruminative Responses Scale of the Response Styles Questionnaire (RRS; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Research has noted significant support for the Response 
Styles Theory of rumination, a detailed review of which is presented by Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al. (2008).  
To summarise the findings of studies which have utilized the RRS to measure 
rumination, the research shows that  the tendency to ruminate is relatively stable in 
individuals; that people who ruminate in the context of depressed mood are more negatively-
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biased and self-critical in their cognitions about the past, present, and future than those who 
do not have depressed mood; that rumination leads to impaired problem-solving abilities and 
the ability to take adaptive action; and that the tendency to ruminate is associated with a loss 
of social support, as ruminators have been found to behave in ways that are 
counterproductive to positive relationship with family and friends (see Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008). Importantly, while much of the research has utilized the RSS, scores on the RSS 
have been found to correlate significantly with scores on alternative measures of negative 
rumination, including the Revised Impact of Event Scale (Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 
1979), Rumination on Negative Thoughts (Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999), Rumination on a 
Negative event (Luminet, Rime, & Alvarez, submitted), Multidimensional Rumination 
Questionnaire (Fritz, 1999), Emotional Control Questionnaire (Roger & Najarian, 1989), and 
Thought Control Questionnaire (Wells & Davies, 1994). The correlation between these 
measures of rumination suggests that while research findings on rumination have generally 
been based on the RRS, the relationship between rumination and depression has been 
consistently found across a range of alternative measures, which is indicative of the validity 
and reliability of this relationship. 
The relationship between worry and rumination. 
Rumination and worry have been linked in the research, and researchers have noted 
their important similarities. As cognitive processes, rumination and worry are comparable in 
nature in that they are both repetitive, perseverative, self-focused forms of thought (Nolen-
Hoeskema et al., 2008). They have also been found to share a number of parallel features: 
they are both associated with concerns about control and uncertainty; they represent an 
abstract, over-general thinking style; are associated with cognitive inflexibility and difficulty 
switching attention from negative stimuli; are linked to adverse consequences such as 
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performance deficits, difficulties in concentration and attention, poor problem-solving, and 
inadequate solution implementation; and are implicated with the onset and exacerbation of 
depression and anxiety (see Nolen-Hoeksema et al.,  for a review of the research). Given their 
significant common features, it is unsurprising that rumination and worry are significantly 
correlated with each other (Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; Muris, 
Roelofs, Meisters, & Boomsma, 2004; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Watkins, 
2004; Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). Fresco et al. submitted 784 undergraduate 
students’ scores on self-report worry and rumination scales (PSWQ and RSQ) to factor 
analysis, and found a strong positive correlation between the worry factor, ‘Worry 
Engagement’, and the rumination factor, ‘Dwelling on the Negative’, (r = .46). Muris and 
colleagues examined the relationships between self-reported rumination (Children’s 
Response Style Scale; CRSS; Ziegert & Kistner, 2002) and worry (Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire for Children; PSWQ-C; Chorpita et al., 1997) amongst a sample of nonclinical 
adolescents, and found that the CRSS rumination and PSWQ-C worry were substantially and 
significantly correlated (r = .55). Furthermore, Segerstrom et al.’s (2000) examination of the 
relationships between rumination and worry amongst a sample of 110 students and 40 
patients with major depression revealed that global rumination, depressive rumination and 
worry were all significantly correlated, with the highest correlation occurring between worry 
and global rumination (students, r = .52; patients, r = .55). 
Worry and rumination, however, also differ in a number of important ways, and represent 
statistically distinct constructs in that they load on different factors (Fresco et al., 2002; 
Hong, 2007; Muris et al., 2004; Segerstrom et al., 2000). Firstly, it is generally accepted that 
while ruminative thought is typically focused on past events and current internal states, worry 
is more concerned with the future (McLaughlin et al., 2007; Papageorgiou & Wells, 1999; 
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Watkins et al., 2005). Rumination and worry may also differ in terms of the content of 
cognition they give rise to: Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) suggest that while rumination is 
concerned with themes of loss, self-worth and meaning, worry thoughts revolve around the 
anticipation of threat. Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues summarise research which suggests 
that the drivers of rumination and worry are also distinct: whereas rumination is motivated by 
the need to understand events, gain insight and solve problems, worry is motivated by the 
need to prepare for the future. Researchers have also theorized about the function of 
rumination and worry, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.  
At an intuitive level it is not difficult to see how rumination and worry would often 
co-occur in the same individual, in the same situation. As a very basic example, an 
individual’s rumination about current symptoms of depression may rapidly transform into 
worry about whether they will continue to have depression for a long time in the future. 
Similarly, someone with anxiety may worry about an event in the future, in addition to 
ruminating over how their anxiety has affected them in past social situations. In these 
examples it is evident that worry and rumination are similar cognitive processes that are 
likely to fuel and maintain one another. In fact, the overlapping features between worry and 
rumination have prompted some researchers to theorise about repetitive negative thinking as 
a transdiagnostic process (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). Ehring and Watkins suggest that 
heightened levels of repetitive negative thinking are present in a large number of Axis I 
disorders, and are characterized by the same process across disorders which is applied to 
disorder-specific content. Furthermore, McLaughlin, Sibrava, Behar, & Borkovec (in press) 
argue that worry and rumination are comparable in that they are generative of each other, and 
are both likely to occur and interact with each other during a negative mood state.  
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The role of worry and rumination in psychopathology 
Research has implicated rumination and worry in a number of psychological 
disorders. Worry and rumination have been linked closely with mood and anxiety disorders, 
with researchers increasingly acknowledging the key role these cognitive phenomena play in 
the onset, exacerbation, perpetuation, and recurrence of depressive and anxious 
symptomatology. Consistent with the frequent comorbidity between anxiety and depression, 
research suggests that worry and rumination occur in both types of high-prevalence 
psychological disorders.  
Worry and psychopathology. 
Throughout the literature, worry has been linked with a host of negative psychological 
implications. In one of the first studies on the characteristics and processes of worry, 
Borkovec et al. (1983) found that self-labelled worriers were more anxious, depressed and 
hostile than non-worriers. Experimental inductions of worry have been shown to increase 
negative intrusive thoughts in the short term (York, Borkovec, Vasey, & Stern, 1987), in 
addition to anxiety and depression in non-clinical samples (Andrews & Borkovec, 1988). 
Worry has also been found to affect the process of recovery from stressful and anxiety-
provoking events (Wells & Papageorgiou, 2006).  
Undoubtedly, the negative correlate of worry most closely studied by researchers is 
anxiety. Throughout the literature on anxiety, worry and anxiety have been inextricably 
linked, and worry is a feature of most of the anxiety disorders (Barlow, 2002). The anxiety 
disorder most closely aligned with worry is generalized anxiety disorder (GAD). The 
hallmark feature of GAD is excessive, uncontrollable worry, which is present across all areas 
of life, and results in disruption to life and clinically significant distress (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). GAD is a highly prevalent disorder associated with a high 
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degree of impairment, and it typically has a chronic and unremitting course (Holaway et al., 
2006). Research comparing individuals with GAD and nonanxious controls has revealed that 
individuals with GAD spend more time worrying, report more worry topics, worry more 
about miscellaneous topics, and perceive themselves as having significantly less control over 
their worries than their nonanxious counterparts (Holaway et al.). There is high comorbidity 
between GAD and other anxiety disorders. Amongst a large, clinical sample of 1,127 
individuals, Brown, Campbell, Lehman, Grisham, and Mancill (2001) found that 20% of the 
individuals with diagnosis of either specific phobia, obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), or panic disorder with agoraphobia were also 
diagnosed with GAD. The comorbidity rate between GAD and panic disorder was even 
higher at 33%. 
Even aside from comorbidity with GAD, worry is a key symptom in the anxiety 
disorders. A key criterion of panic disorder is worry about the implications of the panic attack 
or its consequences (APA, 2000). Furthermore, individuals with panic disorder worry about 
when their next panic attack will occur, and whether they will be able to cope with it (Purdon 
& Harrington, 2006). Worry is also a component of social anxiety, in that sufferers worry 
about upcoming social and performance situations, whereby individuals anticipate 
embarrassing themselves in public (Papageorgiou, 2006). In health anxiety, worry occurs 
over the consequences of not taking further medical action, and about the cause of certain 
symptoms (Purdon & Harrington, 2006). Researchers have proposed that worry is a key 
perpetuating feature of OCD, and is related to checking and doubting in particular (Tallis & 
De Silva, 1992). Worry may be used by sufferers of OCD to manage anxiety over distressing 
thoughts (Freeston et al., 1994). Finally, worry occurs in PTSD in the form of worry about 
experiencing intrusive symptoms such as flashbacks and nightmares, or worry about being 
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exposed to trauma-related stimuli (Purdon & Harrington). There is strong evidence to suggest 
that worry predicts both anxious and depressive symptomatology in individuals with PTSD 
(e.g., Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 2001; Mayou, Ehlers, & 
Bryant, 2002; Murray, Ehlers & Mayou, 2002, cited by Papageorgiou, 2006).  
There is research to suggest that worry may also play a role in depression. Andrews 
and Borkevec’s (1988) induction of worry with normal participants elicited almost equivalent 
amounts of both anxiety and depression. Also, worry has been found to be elevated in 
individuals with depression (Starcevic, 1995, cited by Papageorgiou, 2006). In Brown et al.’s 
study (2001), 25% of individuals with major depressive disorder and 14% of individuals with 
dysthymia also suffered from GAD. 
Rumination and psychopathology. 
Over the last 10 years in particular, rumination has emerged as a key concept in 
psychopathology (Siegle, 2008), and has been linked to depression, anxiety, eating disorders, 
alcohol use disorders, pain disorders, and other physical conditions (Conway, Csank, Holm, 
& Blake, 2000; Fritz, 1999; Garnefski, Legerstee, Kraaij, van den Kommer, & Teerds, 2002; 
Gracie et al., 2006; Nolen-Hoeksema 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema and Harrell 2002; Tremblay et 
al., 2008). Correlates of rumination, which are implicated in a range of psychological 
disorders, include maladaptive coping styles including negative attributional styles, 
dysfunctional attitudes, hopelessness, pessimism, self-criticism, low mastery, dependency, 
sociotropy, neediness, and neuroticisim (see Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008 for a detailed 
review). 
The majority of research has consistently supported the existence of a relationship 
between rumination and depression. In a recent review, Watkins (2008) found that across 
numerous studies utilizing different populations, different measures, and different study 
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designs, rumination predicted both the onset and maintenance of depression. . For example, 
rumination predicted depression in studies with children (Abela et al., 2002), adolescents 
(Burwell & Shrink, 2007), undergraduate students (Butler & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1994; Calmes 
& Roberts, 2007; Ciesla & Roberts, 2007), gay males whose partners had recently died of 
HIV AIDS (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1997), patients with Major Depressive Disorder (after 
controlling for baseline symptoms; Raes, Hermans, Williams, Byers, et al., 2006) patients 
with Seasonal Affective Disorder (Rohan et al., 2003), and never depressed community 
members (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). This predictive relationship was observed across a range 
of different measures, including the Response Styles Questionnaire (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991), the Rumination to Sadness Scale (Raes et al., 2006), the Emotion Control 
Questionnaire – Rehearsal subscale (Rector & Roger, 1996), the Stagnant Deliberation and 
Outcome Fantasy subscales on the Measure of Mental Anticipatory Processes (MMAP; 
Feldman & Hayes, 2000), in addition to self-report (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & 
Fredrickson, 1993) and interview measures (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1997).  Finally, 
rumination was found to predict the onset and maintenance of depression across the 
prospective longitudinal studies discussed, in addition to experimental studies (e.g. (Lavender 
& Watkins, 2004; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), where rumination 
inductions lead to increases in participants’ negative affect. The fact that rumination was 
found to predict the onset and maintenance of depression across a diverse range of samples, 
measures and designs provides strong convergent evidence for the role of rumination in the 
development and perpetuation of depression.  
As previously discussed, Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues (2008) suggest that 
rumination exacerbates depression by enhancing the effect of negative mood on thinking, 
interfering with problem-solving, preventing instrumental behaviour, and eroding social 
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support. Siegle et al. (2004) found that in a survey of 171 individuals incorporating seven 
different measures of rumination, participants who were depressed ruminated more than 
individuals with a physical illness (lupus), who ruminated more than healthy adults. 
Rumination was consistently associated with dysphoria across measures, despite the fact that 
some measures were not intended to measure depressive symptoms, suggesting the presence 
of a moderately strong relationship between rumination and depressive symptomatology.  
Research on treating recurrent depression strongly suggests that rumination plays a 
key role in relapse following a depressive episode and future recurrence of depression. 
Watkins and colleagues (2007) suggest that rumination plays a key role in residual depression 
as it is a common residual symptom, is associated with less responsiveness to both 
medication and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) interventions, and prospectively 
predicts the onset, severity and duration of depression. Watkins et al. targeted the treatment 
of rumination in a case study of Rumination-Focused CBT with 14 individuals with residual 
depression. Following participation in a 12-week intervention that explicitly focused on 
ameliorating rumination, 50% of individuals achieved full remission from depression.  
Teasdale et al. (2000) suggest that the people who experience major depressive 
disorder (MDD) are vulnerable to relapse/recurrence of this disorder due to repeated 
associations between depressed mood and the patterns of negative, hopeless thinking which 
occur during episodes of major depression. According to this model, rumination is an 
intrinsic factor in the perpetuation of depressive episodes. Furthermore, Teasdale and 
colleagues suggest that individuals who have recovered from MDD differ from individuals 
who have never had depression in the pattern of thinking they experience that is activated by 
dysphoria (i.e. depressive rumination). By targeting this pattern of thinking – rumination – 
through mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT; Segal, Williams, & Teasdale, 2002), 
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Teasdale et al. found that amongst a sample of 145 recently recovered depressed patients, 
relapse/recurrence of depression was significantly reduced in patients with 3 or more 
previous episodes of MDD. This study suggests that rumination is a central component of 
chronic depression, and that addressing this cognitive construct has the potential to minimize 
the occurrence of future episodes of depression. A key limitation of this study, however, is 
that while the authors viewed rumination as fundamental to relapse and recurrence of MDD, 
this construct was not included as an outcome measure. Therefore, it is difficult to determine 
whether MBCT led to a reduction in rumination, and whether this was responsible for the 
reduced rate of depression relapse/recurrence.  
While the evidence that rumination is associated with depression is strong, the causal 
direction of this relationship remains ambiguous, and it is unclear what accounts for the 
relationship between rumination and depression. Siegle et al. (2004) question whether 
rumination plays a causal role in cognitive aspects of depression (as suggested by 
Lyubomirsky, Kasri, & Zehm, 2003, and Sposojevic & Alloy, 2001), or if it is the negative 
thinking and self-focus produced by depression that leads to rumination (as hypothesized by 
Ingram, 1990). Alternatively, the authors suggest that it is possible that the same neural 
mechanisms in the brain are responsible for both rumination and depression. The studies 
described above (Teasdale et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2007) show that there is a relationship 
between rumination and depression, however the results do not provide insight into whether it 
is rumination or depression that comes first. There are different theoretical and empirical 
perspectives on this issue. The Response Styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) 
views rumination as a response to depressed mood (thus necessitating the presence of 
depressed mood before the onset of rumination), and there is some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that among depressed individuals, rumination prolongs and exacerbates depressed 
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mood, whereas distraction improves mood (Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, & Fredrickson, 1993; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Conversely, however, more recent longitudinal research 
by Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) revealed that in a large community sample, rumination scores at 
time 1 predicted changes in depression one year later at time 2. This research suggests that 
rumination may in fact play a causal role in depression. It appears, therefore, that the present 
body of research on rumination and depression cannot provide an account of the exact nature 
of the relationship between rumination and depression. As such, Papageorgiou & Siegle 
(2003) suggest that further research on rumination is required in order to aid our 
understanding of mechanisms of depression as well as aspects of its onset, maintenance, and 
recurrence. 
While the majority of the research has primarily looked at the relationship between 
rumination and depression, recent evidence suggests that the tendency to ruminate also 
occurs in individuals suffering from anxiety disorders (e.g. Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Ehlers & Steil, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2000; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). This is not surprising, given the frequent 
comorbidity between depressive and anxiety symptoms (for reviews, see Mineka, Watson, & 
Clark, 1998; Hughes, Alloy, & Cogswell, 2008). Longitudinal prospective studies have found 
that people prone to rumination have higher levels of general anxiety and posttraumatic stress 
symptoms (Blagden & Craske, 1996; Fritz, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow; Schwartz & Koenig, 1996; Segerstrom et al., 2000), and rumination has been 
directly related to post-traumatic stress disorder (Ehlers et al; Ehlers & Steil). Rumination has 
also been found to play a role in social anxiety, where it involves repetitive thoughts about a 
recent social interaction, and is thought to contribute to social anxiety (Clark & Wells; Rapee 
& Heimberg). In large scale longitudinal study by Nolen-Hoeksema mentioned above, 1132 
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participants from a community sample completed questionnaires based on their depressive 
and anxiety symptoms, as well as their engagement in rumination (using the Ruminative 
Responses Scale of the Response Styles Questionnaire, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow). 
Participants completed the same questionnaires after a one-year interval, and a longitudinal 
regression revealed that Time 1 rumination was equally strong in predicting changes in 
anxiety symptoms as it was in predicting changes in depressive symptoms. In addition, 
Nolen-Hoeksema suggests that a ruminative response style may be particularly characteristic 
of people with mixed anxiety/depressive symptoms, as rumination was highest amongst 
individuals with mixed anxiety/depression. Thus, this research suggests that rumination may 
play a key role in the onset and maintenance of anxiety as well as depression, and that 
individuals with both anxious and depressive traits may be prone to rumination. The notion 
that rumination has a particularly significant role in the overlap between depressive and 
anxious symptoms was also found by Hughes et al., (2008).  
In addition to depression and anxiety, rumination has been associated with a range of 
negative outcomes in the literature, including binge drinking and/or symptoms of alcohol 
abuse over time (Nolen-Hoeksema & Harell, 2002; Nolen-Hoeksema & Larson, 1999), 
bulimia nervosa (Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & Bohon, 2007), lower behavioural 
inhibition (King, Emmons, & Woodley, 1992), increased fear (Davey, 1995), higher levels of 
aggression (Collins & Bell, 1997), impaired problem-solving ability (Lyubomirsky, Tucker, 
Caldwell, & Berg, 1999; Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), poor concentration on 
academic tasks and impaired work performance (Lyubormirsky, Boehm, Kasri, & Zehm, 
2007), and heightened negative affect (Lyubormirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; 
Lyubormirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, 1995; Lyubormirsky et al., 1999; McLaughlin, 
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Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1993; see review by Watkins, 2008).   
 Theories of worry and rumination  
The literature on the subject clearly indicates that rumination and worry are 
maladaptive cognitive processes that are associated with distress and impaired problem-
solving abilities, and can often precipitate and maintain psychological disorders. In light of 
their deleterious implications, researchers have attempted to understand why individuals 
engage in these forms of repetitive thought. The following section summarises four theories 
of worry and rumination. The intolerance of uncertainty model of worry is an independent 
theory or worry, while the metacognitive model has been used to understand both worry and 
rumination. The experiential avoidance models of worry and rumination represent a group of 
theories which arise from different theoretical traditions, but which all account for the 
occurrence of worry and rumination via their avoidant functions. An overview of the 
experiential avoidance models of worry and rumination will be provided, followed by a 
summary of the separate theory and research pertaining to each construct.  
The intolerance of uncertainty model of worry. 
Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur & Freeston (1998) propose a model of GAD and worry 
which suggests that worry is caused by intolerance of uncertainty, and is associated with poor 
problem orientation and cognitive avoidance. Dugas and Ladouceur (2000) conceptualise 
worry as a cognitive phenomenon that is concerned with uncertain and negative future events 
and is accompanied by feelings of anxiety. Research has shown that intolerance of 
uncertainty (IU) is highly related to worry, regardless of anxiety and depression levels 
(Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 1997; Freeston, Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 
1994), and that IU differentiates GAD patients from those with other anxiety disorders 
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(Ladouceur et al., 1999). IU is also related to erroneous beliefs about worry, for example, 
individuals may believe that “worrying protects loved ones” because they have difficulty 
dealing with possible future events which are threatening.  
Dugas and colleagues also suggest that worry and GAD are associated with poor 
problem orientation, which they describe as “a metacognitive process involving the operation 
of a set of cognitive-emotional schemas that describe how individuals think and feel about 
problems and their problem-solving ability” (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000, p.637). While 
patients with GAD have similar knowledge of problem-solving skills to non-clinical 
individuals, they have difficulty applying these skills due to their ineffective problem-solving 
orientation (Ladouceur, Blais, Freeston, & Dugas (1998). Dugas and Ladouceur’s model also 
includes a cognitive avoidance component, suggesting that IU contributes to cognitive 
avoidance as images of uncertain future threatening events are more difficult to tolerate for 
individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty. Dugas and colleagues have tested this model by 
exploring the impact of treating IU in reducing worry. This research will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
The metacognitive model of worry and rumination.  
According to the metacognitive theory of emotional disorder (Wells & Mathews, 
1994; 1996), worry arises not from negative beliefs about the self and the world, but from a 
metacognitive knowledge base which controls the cognitive system and consists of positive 
and negative beliefs about thinking. Examples of metacognitive beliefs about worry are 
‘some thoughts are harmful’, ‘paying attention to threat will keep me safe’, and ‘worrying 
helps me cope’ (Wells, 2006). In summary, the metacognitive model of pathological worry 
and GAD proposes that there are two types of worry: Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 worry is 
triggered by an intrusive thought, such as a ‘what if?’ question or a negative image, and this 
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trigger activates positive metacognitive beliefs about worrying as a way of coping with the 
feared event or planning a response. Type 2 worry involves negative metacognitive beliefs 
about worry as harmful or uncontrollable. 
Research has found support for the notion that individuals understand their worry with 
reference to their beliefs about the function of worry. Borkovec and Roemer (1995) found 
that the highest rated reasons for worrying amongst GAD patients and nonanxious individuals 
are that (a) it helps them discover ways of avoiding negative future events and (b) it prepares 
them for the worst if they cannot avoid it. Ladouceur et al., (1998) found that individuals 
believed that worrying assists them in finding solutions to their problems and preventing 
negative outcomes, a belief that is reinforced when the feared event does not occur. Worry is 
also thought to be useful in helping individuals to find a better way of doing things, and to 
help the individual to avoid disappointment (Freeston et al., 1999). Furthermore, research 
also suggests that a high level of engagement in worry is also associated with stronger 
endorsement of such beliefs (Freeston et al., 1999; Ladouceur et al., 1998).  
Research has also explored metacognitive beliefs about rumination, and has revealed 
that there are similarities in people’s beliefs about the reasons why they engage in worry and 
rumination. Papageorgiou and Wells (2001, 2003) found that individuals believe that they 
ruminate in order to try and understand and solve their problems. In their 2001 study, 
Papageorgiou and Wells found that participants with recurrent major depression held positive 
and negative metacognitive beliefs about rumination: on one hand they felt that rumination 
helped them find answers to their depression and understand past mistakes and failures; yet 
they also saw rumination as uncontrollable and as resulting in negative social consequences. 
Other studies have reported that people who ruminate feel that they are gaining insight into 
their feelings, drawing connections between problems, trying to understand the reasons and 
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things happen to them, and attempting to make sense of unhappy memories (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002). Martin and Tesser (1996) highlight the 
fact that while individuals may feel that rumination serves an adaptive purpose, the attempt to 
gain insight into one’s feelings and problems often leads to a counterproductive cycle of 
thinking that intensifies negative thoughts and promotes despair. 
 Worry and rumination as experiential avoidance.  
Both rumination and worry have been conceptualized as forms of avoidance. Some, 
but not all, of the models and studies described below view avoidance through an Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy lens (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999), incorporating the 
concept of ‘Experiential Avoidance’, that is, the tendency to avoid contact with unwanted, 
internal private experiences, such as thoughts, feelings, sensations, memories, and urges 
(Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, and Strosahl, 1996). From an ACT perspective, 
experiential avoidance, which will be discussed in greater detail in chapter four is seen as 
fundamental to all psychopathology and emotional problems. While the theories and studies 
of Borkovec and colleagues (1990; 1993; 1994; 1998; 2006), Lyubomirsky et al. (2006), 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) are not associated with an ACT approach, their 
conceptualisations of the nature and functions of avoidance can be considered synonymous 
with experiential avoidance.  
Worry as experiential avoidance. 
Borkovec’s (1994) cognitive avoidance model of worry and GAD is the main 
theoretical model used to understand worry, and is well-supported by the empirical literature. 
According to this theory, worry is a cognitive-verbal activity that serves to distract 
individuals from deeper, more emotional topics, thereby allowing individuals to avoid 
emotionally distressing issues and perceived dangers. According to Sibrava and Borkovec 
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(2006), at the most basic level, worry serves an avoidant function in that it is focuses on non-
existent future threat which the individual has little control over, and because the perceived 
threat does not currently exist and there is no effective fight-or-flight response to avoid the 
threat, the individual must resort to mental problem-solving attempts to deal with this threat.   
The cognitive avoidance model of worry suggests that because worry is 
predominately verbal rather than visual, it prevents the activation of somatic and 
physiological arousal that is associated with imagery (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). 
Furthermore, worry may affect the processing of imagery as it is characterized by reduced 
concreteness, such that worrisome thought is associated with the activation of images that are 
less concrete and vivid, which evoke less emotional distress (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 
1998). If worry about a threatening event does not produce an emotional or physiological 
response – which Borkovec (1998) proposes is due to the fact that the verbal system operates 
in relative isolation from the emotional, physiological, and behavioural systems – the 
complete emotion underlying the imagined, threat-based event is unable to be processed. The 
psychological impact of this is that that distressing emotional meanings of potentially 
dangerous events cannot be fully tested or altered, which leads to repetitive processing of the 
feared stimuli.   
The conceptualization of worry as a form of experiential avoidance is congruent with 
the efficacy of exposure therapy, in that exposure necessitates full emotional contact with the 
fear-related stimulus (that is, the absence of strategies aimed at maintaining avoidance) in 
order for extinction to occur (Borkovec et al., 1998). Thus, the avoidance model of worry 
suggests that worry inhibits emotional processing, and that by dealing with emotional 
material by worrying, the negative emotional disturbance is maintained (Borkovec et al.). Just 
as behavioural avoidance of the feared stimuli maintains phobias, worry as a form of 
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cognitive avoidance is negatively reinforced and strengthened. Furthermore, worry itself is 
maintained as it provides a false and reinforcing sense of control over emotions (Borkovec et 
al.).  
Empirically, the avoidance model of worry has received strong support. Research has 
demonstrated that worry reduces emotionally distressing imagery (Wells & Papageorgiou, 
1995) and physiological arousal in the short term (Borkovec et al., 1993; Delgado, et al., 
2009). Borkovec and Hu (1990) tested this by priming speech-anxious individuals to think 
either worrisome or relaxing thoughts before giving a presentation, and found that individuals 
in the worry condition showed no cardiovascular response at all to the phobic image 
presentation, whereas individuals in the relaxation condition did show a response, which 
showed signs of extinction during repeated exposure. In another experiment, Borkovec et al. 
(1993) had individuals who were afraid of public speaking either worry or relax prior to 
imagining giving a public speech (exposure to feared stimulus). Individuals in the worry 
condition showed less heart rate response to this exposure than the individuals in the 
relaxation condition, suggesting that worry enabled individuals to suppress their heart rate 
response, meaning that they avoided the physiological reaction to the feared stimuli. 
Rumination as experiential avoidance. 
Given the similar properties and common psychological sequelae associated with 
worry and rumination, researchers have proposed that rumination may serve a similar 
avoidance function to worry. Giorgio et al. (2010) suggest that in light of the high rate of 
comorbidity between GAD and depression (60%; Brown et al., 2001) and the high 
correlations of measures of rumination and worry (r = .66; Beck & Perkins, 2001), 
rumination may serve an avoidant function as worry has been proposed to do. Giorgio and 
colleagues conducted three studies to test the experiential avoidance conceptualization of 
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depressive rumination, finding preliminary data to support the avoidance model of 
rumination. Phase 1 of the research involved exploring associations among questionnaire 
measures of rumination, experiential avoidance and fear of emotions amongst 138 
undergraduate students. Phase 2 examined 100 students’ performance on a dichotic listening 
task, which Giorgio et al. considered to be a behavioural index of avoidance that highlighted 
preferences for non-depressive material following a rumination, relaxation or depression 
induction. In addition, psychophysiological reactivity in response to an avoidance paradigm 
(discrepancy between self-reported emotional response and physiological response to a sad 
mood induction; Borkovec et al. 1993) was measured. Questionnaire measures confirmed the 
relationship between rumination and avoidance, with high rumination individuals reporting 
significantly greater experiential avoidance and fear of emotions than low rumination 
individuals. Interestingly, high ruminators reported greater fear of both positively and 
negatively valenced emotions, suggesting that high ruminators may experience discomfort in 
response to any intense emotion, regardless of valence. However, there were no significant 
effects for phase 2 of the study, which the authors suggest may be due to the fact that there 
was a low percentage of words correctly recalled overall, potentially preventing the detection 
of any differences in recall between the low and high rumination groups. Overall, therefore, 
this study lends partial support for an avoidance conceptualization of rumination.  
Cribb and colleagues (2006) investigated the relationship between rumination and 
experiential avoidance in depression. One hundred and one non-clinical undergraduate 
students completed self-report measures of depression, rumination, experiential avoidance 
and mood state. In addition, participants viewed a low mood emotion-eliciting video stimulus 
and completed a summary of the film, which was independently rated to determine whether it 
was abstract or concrete. Results revealed that rumination, depression and cognitive, 
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behavioural and experiential avoidance were all significantly correlated, and remained so 
even when anxiety was controlled for. Furthermore, reduced concreteness of film description 
was associated with experiential avoidance and depression. In reflecting on their findings, 
Cribb et al. propose that avoidance is associated with the maintenance of depression (e.g., 
Jacobson, Martell, & Dimidjian, 2001; Martell, Addis, & Jacobson, 2001), and that future 
research is necessary to further clarify the nature of this relationship. 
In attempting to understand the avoidant function of rumination, researchers have 
proposed that rumination can operate as a form of experiential avoidance via cognitive and/or 
behavioural pathways. Consistent with the avoidance model of worry, rumination has been 
conceptualized as a cognitive style that fosters avoidance by preventing the activation of 
emotional and somatic responses – that is, rumination allows the individual to avoid 
distressing emotions associated with more concrete, image-based thought content (Cribb et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, like worry, rumination is thought to be associated with reduced 
concreteness, such that thinking about problem causes, meanings and consequences in an 
abstract way may mean that the associated imagery and emotion is avoided. Watkins and 
Moulds (2004) found that depressed individuals generated less concrete descriptions of 
problems about which they were currently ruminating relative to remitted depression and 
control participants. In light of this finding, they suggest that the avoidant function of 
rumination may account for its persistence, just as worry has been thought to be maintained 
by experiential avoidance. 
Rumination is also seen as representing a form of behavioural avoidance in that it may 
prevent engagement in environmental events that may be responsible for the maintenance of 
depression. Within the behavioural activation model of depression (Jacobson et al., 2001; 
Martell et al., 2001) rumination is conceptualized as a problematic, avoidant behaviour, 
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functionally similar to other examples of overt avoidance (inactivity, social withdrawal). 
Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues (2008) suggest that at a nonconscious level, rumination 
serves the purpose of allowing the individual to avoid aversive situations and the 
responsibility to take action, in that they see more obstacles, are less willing to commit to 
solutions, and are more likely to disengage from real-life problems than attempt to solve 
them. Nolen-Hoeksema et al. argue that from a behavioral perspective, rumination helps 
individuals avoid engaging in environment by preoccupying their attention and time. To build 
on this, they suggest that rumination serves an additional avoidant function in that it involves 
collecting evidence to support the view that the individual is hopeless, thereby justifying 
withdrawal and inaction (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007). This is consistent with research by 
Lyubomirsky et al.  (2006) who found, in a sample of women who had previously received a 
diagnosis of breast cancer, that women who ruminated waited 2 months longer than non-
ruminators to report their initial symptoms to their health care professionals.   
Summary 
Rumination and worry constitute repetitive, perseverative cognitive processes, which 
are perceived as relatively uncontrollable, and are often associated with emotional distress. 
Research has established that there is much that these two processes have in common, 
including abstract thought, concerns with control, and cognitive inflexibility (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008), and they are likely to co-occur in the same individual, potentially 
representing a unified construct of negative repetitive thought (Ehring and Watkins, 2008). 
However, these cognitive processes also differ in important ways; namely in in their temporal 
orientation, and in the thought content they give rise to: where worry is focused the 
anticipation of future threat, rumination is more associated with trying to understand the 
meaning of past events and one’s present situation (Noelen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). While 
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rumination and worry are common experiences which occur in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations, they are also associated with a broad range of negative consequences, and been 
implicated in the onset and maintenance of a range of psychopathology to the extent that they 
can be considered transdiagnostic processes which cut across various psychological 
disorders.  
In light of the fact that these constructs are associated with such deleterious 
consequences, researchers have tried to explain their occurrence. The most prominent 
theoretical model of worry is Borkovec’s avoidance model, which suggests that worry 
facilitates emotional avoidance by occupying the individual’s attention with cognitive 
activity. In light of the close similarities between worry and rumination, researchers have 
more recently considered whether rumination also serves as an avoidance mechanism. Thus, 
both worry and rumination can be considered to be responses to a distressing emotion or 
psychological state, which function to allow the individual to temporarily avoid this 
experience. While Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) see rumination as existing as a response to 
depressed mood, based on the avoidance theories of worry and rumination, these cognitive 
processes occur in response to a range of difficult emotions and psychological states, such as 
sadness, fear, guilt, shame, uncertainty, confusion, and so forth. This approach is also 
consistent with the IU model of worry, which proposes that worry is associated with 
cognitive avoidance brought on by intolerance of uncertainty. Thus, an avoidance perspective 
of worry and rumination suggests that in ameliorating the distress associated with engaging in 
these cognitive processes, it is important to focus on their avoidant functions and help 
individuals to explore different ways of responding to psychological distress. This point will 
be expanded on further in chapters four and five, in a discussion of the viability of applying 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy to the treatment of rumination and worry.  
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As has been discussed in this chapter, researchers have begun to recognize the 
importance of focusing specifically on targeting rumination in treating depression and 
preventing relapse (e.g., Teasdale et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2007), however on the whole, 
the relevance of treating of worry and rumination has been under-recognised in the treatment 
literature, which is problematic given their deleterious psychological correlates. It is therefore 
necessary first to explore the range of interventions that have currently been explored in 
relation to rumination and worry.  
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Chapter 3. Treatments for Worry and Rumination 
Chapter Overview 
The previous chapter established a rationale for targeting worry and rumination via 
dedicated psychological interventions, based on the pivotal role these cognitive processes 
play in the onset and maintenance of a range of psychological disorders. This chapter will 
review the literature on the current range of psychological therapies which have been applied 
to the treatment of worry and rumination. The interventions for worry will be outlined first, 
followed by the rumination interventions. The review of the treatment literature will highlight 
the growing trend towards process-focused rather than content-focused interventions for 
worry and rumination. The final part of this chapter will summarise the limitations of the 
current suite of interventions for worry and rumination, thereby establishing the need for 
alternative psychological treatments to be explored. The chapter will conclude by proposing 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) as a viable and potentially valuable option for 
the treatment of worry and rumination. 
Psychological Interventions for Worry and Rumination 
In light of the relationship between rumination, worry and various forms of 
psychopathology, researchers are increasingly exploring ways to minimize the negative 
outcomes associated with their occurrence. Given the strong link that has been established 
between these forms of negative repetitive thought and anxiety and depression in particular, it 
is somewhat surprising that the body of empirical evidence looking specifically at treating 
worry and rumination is relatively small. A possible reason for this is that the key role of the 
processes of worry and rumination in the maintenance of depression and anxiety is under-
recognised by clinicians, who may focus generally on treating the broader psychological 
conditions with which they are associated. Nevertheless, researchers are recognizing the need 
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for psychological interventions to specifically target worry and rumination across diagnostic 
categories, in order to reduce the distress and broader psychological disturbances with which 
they are associated (Topper et al., 2010). 
Worry Interventions 
The treatment of worry has primarily been focused on in the context of GAD, as 
pathological worry is the defining symptom of this disorder. However, it is becoming 
increasingly evident that clinicians need to consider the role of pathological worry in the 
primary presenting issue, and to incorporate interventions specifically targeted at reducing 
worry as a means of improving the target symptoms (Purdon & Harrington, 2008). The 
treatment outcome literature for GAD is small relative to other anxiety disorders (Covin, 
Ouimet, Seeds, & Dozois, 2008), and researchers have suggested that the success rate of 
psychological therapy for GAD and worry is unsatisfactory (Ballenger, 2001; Fisher, 2006). 
Given that conceptualizations of GAD have been highly variable historically, assessment and 
evaluation of these models have lagged behind relative to other anxiety disorders, which has 
had implications for identifying and measuring effective treatments for this disorder (Covin, 
et al., 2008). Thus, the optimal treatment for GAD remains under debate, despite strong 
advances in the treatment of other anxiety disorders (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000).  
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. 
There are a range of different CBT-based protocols for the treatment of GAD. 
Components of a CBT intervention for GAD and worry may include worry awareness and 
self-monitoring, relaxation techniques, cognitive techniques (such as the completion of a 
worry outcome diary, letting go of predictions and expectations, cognitive restructuring), 
behavioural experiments, imagery rehearsals of coping strategies, stimulus control treatment, 
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exposure therapy (imaginal and in-vivo), systematic desensitization, and behavioural 
activation.  
Covin and colleagues (2008) conducted a meta-analysis of CBT for pathological 
worry amongst clients with GAD. This meta-analysis, which included 10 studies, was the 
first quantitative review to examine the efficacy of CBT in reducing worry specifically, rather 
than overall anxiety. As such, only studies which used worry rather than anxiety as the prime 
outcome measure (i.e., the Penn State Worry Questionnaire; Meyer et al., 1990), and those 
that included both cognitive and behavioural components in their interventions were included 
in the analysis. Meta-analytic calculations revealed a large effect size for CBT that was 
moderated by age and modality of treatment: the largest gains were reported for younger 
adults and individual treatment, however all effect sizes were significant. Mean PSWQ scores 
at post-treatment and follow-up were well within the normal range, suggesting that CBT is 
effective in reducing pathological worry in individuals with GAD. The authors note that the 
effect sizes reported in their study were greater than those reported in previous analyses, 
suggesting that this could be due to the possibility that worry demonstrates greater overall 
change relative to the composite anxiety variables used in previous studies. Alternatively, 
they propose that their results could be explained by differences in study selection criteria, or 
by the fact that only very recent studies were used. They also highlight the fact that given the 
small number of studies included in the review, it should only be considered to be a 
preliminary analysis.  Furthermore, their findings revealed that GAD may be less effective 
for older adults, indicating that there is room for improvement in CBT for worry in this 
population.  
While the study by Covin et al. (2008) provides preliminary evidence that CBT is an 
effective treatment for worry, CBT is less efficacious for GAD than for other anxiety 
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disorders, and the benefits of exposure techniques have been questioned for this disorder 
(Ballenger et al., 2001). While exposure therapy is an established intervention in the 
treatment of anxiety disorders, the application of exposure is less straightforward for GAD. 
Given that the anxiety-provoking stimuli associated with GAD are thoughts and mental 
images, which are intangible, covert and largely uncontrollable (compared to the anxiety-
provoking stimuli associated with specific phobias, social phobia, or panic disorder), the 
development of an exposure hierarchy and completion of exposure therapy with individuals 
experiencing GAD is far more difficult. In some cases where generalized anxiety is 
associated with particular situations, images or with anxiety symptoms, situational and 
interoceptive exposure may be used in the treatment of GAD, however, these techniques do 
not deal with the cardinal symptom of GAD, worry. To rectify this, worry exposure, a 
specific form of imaginal exposure (Craske, O’Leary, & Barlow, 1992), has been introduced 
in recent GAD protocols as a means of explicitly targeting anxiety associated with the 
experience of worry about situations which the individual cannot exert control over (Dugas & 
Ladouceur, 2000).  
Worry exposure. 
Worry exposure requires the client to visualize their most feared image, in addition to 
coping strategies and alternative outcomes. Hoyer, Beesdo, Gloster, Runge, Höfler & Becker 
(2009) examined worry exposure in the attempt  to identify which treatment components of 
CBT were most effective in reducing worry in GAD. In one of the few studies looking 
specifically at the effectiveness of worry exposure,  Hoyer and colleagues explored whether 
worry exposure (WE) was as efficacious as applied relaxation (AR) – an empirically-
supported stand-alone treatment for GAD – amongst a sample of 73 outpatients meeting 
DSM-IV criteria for GAD as a primary diagnosis. In this randomized clinical trial, 
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individuals participated in 15 sessions of either WE or AR. The WE intervention involved 
psychoeducation about GAD using concepts of avoidance, and incorporated imaginal 
exposure (exposure in sensu) to worry-related thoughts and images. AR involved 
psychoeducation on the role of body arousal in the maintenance of GAD, and participants 
were taught techniques and instructed to use them in everyday life when signals of tension, 
worry and anxiety occurred. Outcomes on self and therapist rated measures of 
symptomatology, worry and thought suppression indicated that the interventions did not 
differ with regards to treatment effects or dropout effects: the proportion of patients reaching 
high end state functioning was 48% in the WE condition and 56% in the AR condition. 
Furthermore, worrying, negative metacognitive appraisals of worrying and thought 
suppression were reduced, and gains were maintained at the 6-month and 1-year follow-up 
for both treatment conditions.  
This study by Hoyer et al. (2009) provides support for the importance of treating 
worry, in that focusing on worry alone can lead to significant improved in overall anxiety. 
Importantly, the results also indicate that it is not necessary to change or suppress thoughts in 
order to reduce worry – while the WE condition incorporated a cognitive focus in that it 
required individuals to focus their attention on worry-related imagery, the AR condition was 
equivalent in effectiveness and did not incorporate any emphasis on cognitions at all. Given 
that worry is a cognition phenomenon, this result is somewhat surprising, and it may be that 
the effectiveness of AR in reducing worry can be partially accounted for by an additional 
mechanism. Given that AR requires the individual to focus their attention on sequentially 
relaxing parts of their body – thereby shifting their attention away from their thoughts and 
onto the present moment – this exercise can be considered as being a form of mindfulness. It 
is possible, therefore, that the mindfulness aspect of AR (which was not measured by the 
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authors of this study) was a contributor to the effectiveness of this treatment, which would 
lend further support to the notion that worry can be reduced without engaging with the 
content of worry-related cognitions at all. This said, while this study yields support for the 
use of both WE and AR in the treatment of worry, it appears that in their present form or used 
in isolation these techniques are not effective enough to treat GAD, as the response and 
remission rates were only moderate and did not exceed the typical rates found in other studies 
(Hoyer et al.) 
Cognitive restructuring versus coping desensitization. 
The effect of cognitive restructuring, a core intervention in CBT, has also been 
explored as an isolated treatment component in the treatment of self-reported worry.  
Robinson (1989) compared cognitive restructuring to coping desensitization, a procedure 
which is somewhat similar to worry exposure in that it requires the individual to notice worry 
and see it as a signal to relax, and work through an imaginal exposure hierarchy while 
undertaking relaxation training. The cognitive restructuring intervention involved teaching 
individuals to recognize the unrealistic and unhelpful nature of their worries and to substitute 
them with more realistic thoughts. Participants in this condition also worked through an 
imaginal exposure hierarchy. As part of the different interventions, 48 participants received 8 
twice weekly, 60 minute group therapy sessions of either cognitive restructuring, coping 
desensitization, or the placebo, progressive relaxation. In the cognitive restructuring 
condition, participants were trained to realistically evaluate imaginally-presented worry 
situations. Participants in the coping desensitization condition were taught to use relaxation in 
response to worry images within a coping framework. Results revealed that there were 
significant worry reductions in both the cognitive restructuring group and coping 
desensitization groups, but that the cognitive restructuring group was more effective. There 
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was no change in worry and anxiety observed in the placebo and wait-list control groups. 
Subjects in the cognitive restructuring condition reported significant increases in attention 
and decreases in the frequency of thought intrusions.  
Based on these findings, Robinson (1989) suggested that the cognitive component of 
treatment for worry is most effective. However, this conclusion should be interpreted with 
caution for a number of reasons. Firstly, the cognitive restructuring technique utilized by 
Robinson was essentially a form of thought suppression: it did not involve assisting 
participants to restructure their beliefs, but rather simply required them to replace thoughts 
deemed unhelpful with more positive thoughts. This was clearly effective in the short-term, 
which is unsurprising given that thought suppression does reduce distress temporarily. 
However the study did not include a follow-up assessment of anxiety and worry, and 
therefore it is impossible to determine how well the intervention effects were maintained. It is 
possible that, as the thought suppression literature would indicate (e.g., Wenzlaff, Wegner, & 
Roper, 1988), the individuals’ worry-related thoughts rebounded in greater intensity a short 
period after the conclusion of the treatment. Second, worry was measured by participants 
recording the percentage of the day they spent worrying and how they felt at the end of the 
day. This is not a psychometrically-validated measure of worry, and while all self-report 
measures are subjective, asking individuals to make estimates about their entire day at the 
end of the day is likely to yield inaccurate and highly subjective outcomes. In line with this, it 
may be that the cognitive restructuring intervention gave individuals a false sense of control 
over their worry, in that by feeling like they were actively stopping or replacing their worry 
(however temporarily this may have been) they were more inclined to feel – in the short term 
– that they were able to reduce their worry, which may have impacted their assessment of 
their level of daily worry. Participants in the coping sensitization condition, however, were 
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not encouraged to focus on their thoughts at all, which, in light of the dominant view that 
worry is negative and should be stopped, may have caused them to feel less in control of their 
worry, leading them to perceive the intervention as less effective. Finally, the cognitive 
restructuring and coping desensitization conditions both resulted in significant improvements 
in worry rates, and only differed on one criteria used to class individuals as worriers: that of 
worrying at least 50% of the day. Thus, while this study appears to yield support for the use 
of cognitive restructuring in treating worry, its findings should be interpreted in light of its 
limitations and potential alternative explanations for the observed results. 
Metacognitive therapy. 
 Research has also explored the application of metacognitive therapy to worry. 
Metacognitive therapy for worry and GAD (Wells, 1995, 1997) differs from traditional CBT 
in that it focuses exclusively on metacognitive appraisals, beliefs and strategies. Treatment 
components include formulation of the problem (based on the metacognitive model); 
socialization to a metacognitive understanding of the presenting problem; challenging 
metacognitive beliefs about the uncontrollability of worry, the danger of worry and the 
associated emotion and the need to worry in order to cope; and relapse prevention strategies. 
The effectiveness of metacognitive therapy for GAD has been examined in two studies. Wells 
and King (2006) found that amongst a sample of 10 individuals with GAD, 3-12 sessions of 
metacognitive therapy resulted in significant reductions in anxiety, worry, and depressed 
mood. In a randomized clinical trial of applied relaxation versus metacognitive therapy 
(Wells et al., 2010), scores on the PSWQ revealed that 80% of participants in the 
metacognitive therapy condition had recovered at post-treatment, with a further 20% showing 
improvement (compared to the 10% recovery rate associated with the AR condition). These 
findings provide strong support for the notion that it is not necessary to engage with and 
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change the specific thoughts that occur during chains of worry, but rather that worry can be 
treated effectively by focusing on the cognitive process which it involves, and how the 
individual perceives and relates to this process. In metacognitive therapy the individual is 
encouraged to shift their attention away from and disentangle themselves from the specific 
content of their worry-related cognitions, and the strong improvement rates observed in these 
studies indicate that this is an important therapeutic intervention in the treatment of worry. 
Thus, these results provide a convincing argument for the importance of taking a process-
oriented approach to the treatment of worry, suggesting that interventions which attempt to 
target the specific content of worry may in fact be redundant.  
Mindfulness-based therapies. 
The focus on attentional shifting emphasised in metacognitive therapy is a key 
component of mindfulness based therapies. The body of research on mindfulness for worry is 
very small, and the studies that have been conducted have examined the impact of 
mindfulness on worry only within the context of GAD. Two studies have examined the 
effectiveness of mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for GAD (MBCT; Craigie, Rees, 
Marsh, & Nathan, 2008; Evans et al., 2008). MBCT is a group therapy program which 
represents an integration of CBT for Depression (Beck, 1979) and components of 
Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR; Kabat-Zinn, 1990), designed to teach 
individuals to become aware of thoughts and feelings as “mental events” rather than as 
aspects of the self or accurate reflections of reality. Thus, there is little emphasis on changing 
the content/meaning of thoughts.  In the study by Craigie et al., 29 individuals received nine 
weekly, two-hour sessions of MBCT. Findings indicated significant improvements in worry, 
stress, and quality of life at post-treatment and follow-up, however the rate of recovery for 
pathological worry at post-treatment was very small, with only 5% of treatment completers 
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achieving recovery status (n = 20). Evans et al. examined the effectiveness of MBCT for 
GAD amongst a sample of 11 participants, who completed eight two-hour group sessions. 
Analyses indicated that MBCT yielded significant reductions in worry, anxiety and 
depressive symptoms, however the authors caution against the generalization of the findings 
given the small sample size and lack of control condition. In evaluating the findings of both 
of these studies, Topper and colleagues (2010) highlight that while they provide support for 
the further exploration of MBCT for GAD, the results in both cases were weaker than those 
observed follow multi-component treatments for GAD. 
Treatment of worry as intolerance of uncertainty. 
The intolerance of uncertainty model of worry (IU; Dugas et al., 1998) proposes that 
worry is a cognitive phenomenon which arises from a trait-based tendency towards 
intolerance of uncertainty, which is associated with the avoidance of images related to 
possible future threat as well as erroneous beliefs about the worry (for example, that worry 
will protect loved ones). Dugas and Ladouceur (2000) explored the IU model of worry 
empirically, using an intervention aimed at helping individuals to become more tolerant of 
uncertainty. This treatment differs from other CBT interventions for GAD and worry in that it 
teaches individuals with GAD to discriminate between two types of worries – those that they 
have some control over and those that are uncontrollable – and to apply a different strategy to 
each type. Employing a multiple baseline across participants design, four individuals with a 
primary diagnosis of GAD received weekly one hour therapy sessions (14-18 in total based 
on the participants’ needs). Treatment involved presentation of the treatment rationale, 
awareness training, worry interventions (including re-evaluation of beliefs about worry, 
problem orientation training, and cognitive exposure), and relapse prevention. The results of 
the intervention indicated that three out of four participants achieved high end state 
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functioning at post-treatment and 6-month follow-up, however by the 12-month follow up, 
two of these individuals had reverted to moderate end-state functioning. Treatment was less 
effective for the fourth participant, possibly due to high comorbid OCD. Dugas and 
Ladouceur suggest that their results indicate that cognitive change was highly related to 
treatment outcome, but that it is unclear whether cognitive change preceded or followed 
change on symptom measures. In addition, changes in IU preceded changes in time spent 
worrying for three out of four participants. Given the very small sample size and the fact that 
IU was only associated with change in worry in three of the four participants, conclusions 
about the effectiveness of focusing on IU in the treatment of worry cannot be drawn from this 
study. However, the findings do lend further support to the notion that worry can be reduced 
without the modification of worry content, as the IU intervention did not include a cognitive 
restructuring component, instead focusing solely on increasing awareness of worry. While the 
intervention was associated with cognitive change, this was not targeted explicitly but 
occurred as byproduct of participant’ increased awareness of worry images and beliefs about 
worry.  
Summary of worry interventions.  
To summarise, the empirical literature on psychological interventions for worry is 
small, and findings are mixed. There is some evidence for the effectiveness of CBT for 
worry, however this is not applicable to all samples, and only examines worry in the context 
of GAD. It is evident in reviewing the treatment literature that a shift is occurring in the focus 
of worry interventions, with newer interventions omitting a focus on worry content 
altogether, instead taking a more process-oriented approach to the treatment of worry. 
Common to metacognitive and mindfulness-based interventions for worry is an emphasis on 
shifting attention away from worry, towards more helpful styles of thinking and behavioural 
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change. While worry exposure and IU interventions include a focus on worry imagery, there 
is no emphasis on changing thoughts or mental images in any way – rather, change occurs in 
relation to the impact the worry has on individuals. Furthermore, the only study which 
endorses cognitive restructuring in treating worry is dated (Robinson, 1989) and has several 
important limitations. Thus, the small number of worry intervention studies and the fact that 
the treatment effects observed across several studies are modest highlight the difficulty 
associated with treating worry, as well as the need for further research to explore treatments 
that target the process aspects of worry rather than the restructuring of worry content.  
Rumination interventions 
Siegle (2008) argues that rumination is a strong candidate for consideration in the 
development of personalized treatments. Like worry, however, the body of literature looking 
specifically at effective treatments for this maladaptive thought process is relatively small. 
Given the fact that rumination occurs across a broad range of different psychological 
disorders, there is a clear need to identify effective interventions for reducing the frequency 
and intensity of ruminative thought.  
Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. 
While there is very limited data on treating rumination with cognitive-behavioural 
therapy (CBT), it is likely that this therapeutic modality is used frequently in clinical settings 
as part of treatment for depression and/or anxiety. A CBT intervention for rumination would 
involve challenging the content of ruminative cognitions with the aim of reducing their form, 
frequency, intensity and believability (Harrington, 2008). Examples of commonly used 
treatments include: verbal challenges to beliefs, directed focus, distraction, and improving 
perceived control over distressing thoughts, among other methods (Alford & Beck, 1994; 
Bentall, Haddock, Slade, & Peter, 1994; Chadwick & Lowe, 1990,1994; Haddock, Slade, 
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Bentall, Reid, & Faragher, 1998; Himadi & Kaiser, 1991; Kingdon, Turkington, & 
John,1994; Sensky et al., 2000; Wykes, Parr, & Landau, 1999; as cited in Feldner, Zvolensky, 
Eifert, & Spira, 2003).  
In the only research to evaluate the impact of specifically targeting rumination in the 
treatment of depression, Watkins and colleagues (2007; 2011) conducted two studies 
investigating the efficacy of Rumination-Focused CBT (RFCBT) for individuals with 
residual depression. Within RFCBT, rumination is conceptualized as a form of avoidance, 
and treatment is focused on assisting clients to switch from rumination to more helpful styles 
of thinking. Therapeutic techniques used to facilitate this include functional analyses, which 
involves helping individuals to notice rumination warning signs, develop alternative 
strategies, and alter environmental and behavioural contingencies maintaining rumination; 
behavioural activation to assist participants to replace avoidance with approach behaviours; 
experiential/imagery exercises and behavioural experiments.  
In the first study on RFCBT, a case series, participants were 14 patients suffering 
from residual depression following pharmacological treatment. Participants were treated 
individually for 12 weekly, 60-minute sessions. As indicated by scores on depression 
outcome measures (Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression, Hamilton, 1960; Beck Depression 
Inventory-II; Beck et al., 1996) and on the Ruminative Responses Scale (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991), RFCBT resulted in significant improvements in depressive symptoms, 
rumination, and comorbid disorders. Seventy one per cent of the sample met criteria for 
treatment response, and half of the participants achieved full remission. Watkins et al. suggest 
that these results indicate that focusing on rumination may yield generalised improvement 
across depressive symptoms. In a recent RCT, Watkins et al., (2011) explored the efficacy of 
RFCBT versus treatment as usual (TAU) for residual depression. The findings revealed that 
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RFCBT plus TAU was more effective than TAU alone in reducing depressed mood and 
rumination, and change in rumination mediated the effects of treatment condition on 
reduction in depressive mood.  
These findings provide support for the effectiveness of RFCBT in treating rumination. 
Tellingly, RFCBT does not include any focus on changing cognitive content – rather, RFCBT 
encourages the individual to notice when they start to ruminate (and to be aware that this 
occurs as an avoidance strategy), and to then shift their attention away from their ruminative 
thought and onto more helpful thinking styles and adaptive actions. In light of this, RFCBT 
represents a significant departure from a traditional CBT protocol, and the omission of 
cognitive restructuring from the RFCBT intervention indicates that, as is the case with worry, 
researchers are recognising the futility of applying this technique to the treatment of 
rumination, instead focusing on more process-oriented strategies. While the RFCBT 
intervention approach does not explicitly incorporate mindfulness, it requires the individual 
to be aware (and thus mindful) of the thoughts entering their consciousness, in order to deal 
with the thought in a different way to how they would typically (i.e. through rumination). In 
this emphasis on attentional awareness and managing the process of thinking rather than the 
content, the RFCBT approach shares some basic similarities with Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy, a mindfulness and acceptance-based intervention (ACT; Hayes et al., 
2011).Attention Training. 
The value of mindfulness and attentional shifting in the treatment of rumination has 
also been explored in a study on Attentional Training (ATT; Wells, 1990). Practice of ATT 
involves external auditory monitoring exercises that require progressively greater attentional 
capacity. The therapist guides the individual’s attention to different sounds inside and outside 
of the consulting room through 3 specific phases: selective attention, attention switching, and 
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divided attention. Papageorgiou and Wells (2000) examined the effectiveness of Attention 
Training (ATT; Wells, 1990) for recurrent MDD. While not explicitly stated by the authors, 
this intervention clearly targets ruminative thinking, as it aims to reduce negative self-focus 
and increase attentional and metacognitive control in order to disrupt the activation of 
specific styles and dimensions of thinking. Utilising a single case-series methodology, four 
participants with recurrent MDD completed 5-8 weekly sessions of ATT. All participants 
showed clinically-significant reductions in depression and anxiety, negative automatic 
thoughts, rumination, and attentional and metacognitive factors, and treatment gains were 
maintained at the 12-month follow-up. Papageorgiou and Wells (2000) argued that it is 
unlikely that the observed effectiveness of ATT can be attributed to the effects of distraction, 
as there is little evidence to suggest that distraction alone can produce stable improvements in 
depression. In the fact that it is associated with focusing attention and staying present while 
not engaging with thought content, ATT shares common features with mindfulness. While 
mindfulness was not measured as part of this study, it is possible that the treatment effects 
can be accounted for by change in participants’ levels of mindfulness, such that they were 
more engaged with the present moment, more aware of their mental activity, and therefore 
better able to shift their attention away from maladaptive cognitive processes. Thus, this 
study may provide some support for the use of mindfulness techniques in the treatment of 
rumination.  
Mindfulness-based therapies. 
A number of studies have focused specifically on the application of mindfulness to 
rumination. Schmaling, Dimijian, Katon, & Sullivan (2002) suggest that as mindfulness 
promotes the development of a mindset that is aware yet not focused on grappling with the 
content of thought, it may be a more useful treatment for rumination than a behavioural 
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intervention such as problem solving. As described in the previous chapter, Teasdale and 
colleagues (2000) explored the efficacy of mindfulness in targeting the thinking patterns 
associated with relapse/recurrence of MDD: depressive rumination. In a randomized clinical 
trial, Teasdale et al. compared the efficacy of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT; 
Segal et al., 2002) to treatment as usual (medication and clinical management) amongst a 
sample of 145 recently recovered depressed patients. Participants in the MBCT condition 
received 8 weeks of therapy, and relapse/recurrence to MDD was assessed in both conditions 
over a 60-week period. Results revealed that MBCT significantly reduced relapse/recurrence 
for patients with 3 or more previous episodes of MDD (77% of the sample), but not for 
patients with only 2 previous episodes. In explaining these findings, the authors suggest 
MBCT may not be effective for acute MDD, as difficulties in concentration and intensity of 
negative thinking may inhibit attentional control skills which are central to the program. 
A more recent study by Kuyken and colleagues (2008) examined the effectiveness of 
MBCT compared to anti-depressant medication in preventing depressive relapse and 
improving quality of life. Sixty one individuals completed an 8-week program of MBCT 
while tapering off anti-depressants, while 62 others continued with maintenance anti-
depressant treatment. The results revealed that MBCT was more significantly effective than 
maintenance anti-depressants in reducing residual depressive symptoms and psychiatric 
comorbidity, and improving quality of life. Furthermore, rates of anti-depressant use in the 
MBCT group was significantly reduced, and 75% of participants in this condition ceased use 
altogether. At 15-month follow-up, 47% of MBCT participants had experienced a depressive 
relapse, compared to 60% in the anti-depressant maintenance condition. Taken together, these 
studies on MBCT for rumination in the context of residual depression provide support for the 
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use of mindfulness in the treatment of rumination, in addition to the effectiveness of targeting 
rumination in ameliorating recurrent and residual depression.  
In a recent study, Hilt and Pollack (2012) examined the impact of mindfulness for 
rumination with a sample of 102 young people (mean age=11.51). The mindfulness 
intervention was one of three brief interventions targeted at reducing rumination, the others 
being distraction and problem-solving. The participants underwent a negative mood induction 
before being randomly assigned to one of the three interventions, which involved 8-minute 
audio recordings of directions for the participants. The results revealed that mindfulness and 
distraction were associated with reduced state rumination compared to problem-solving, 
suggesting that even brief mindfulness interventions have clinical value for reducing 
ruminative thought.  
Three studies have explored the impact of mindfulness on the thought processes that 
occur during episodes of depression. While these studies do not involve testing specific 
interventions, they shed light on the relationship between mindfulness and rumination. In a 
study by Watkins and Baracaia (2002), 32 currently depressed, 26 recovered depressed, and 
26 never depressed participants were randomly allocated to one of three conditions and 
required to complete a problem solving task. In the state-oriented condition, participants were 
presented with questions commonly reported by depressive ruminators (i.e. “What am I doing 
wrong?” “What caused this problem?”) and were asked to bear these in mind while 
completing the task. The process-oriented condition was designed to increase awareness of 
the mental processes involved in problem solving (i.e. “How am I deciding on a way to solve 
this problem?”), and in the third condition no questions were shown. The results indicated 
that for the recovered depressed and currently depressed groups, thinking style during 
problem solving significantly influenced problem-solving outcome, and that process-oriented 
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thinking rectified the problem-solving deficit in depression. The findings of this study are 
highly relevant to a discussion of the effectiveness of mindfulness for rumination, as it shows 
that by increasing their awareness of mental processes (which is facilitated by mindfulness), 
participants were able to shift themselves away from ruminative thinking and towards more 
effective problem-solving strategies. The findings also highlight the impact rumination has on 
problem solving abilities in people with depression, which is further indicative of the 
importance of treating it effectively.  
Watkins and colleagues (Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Teasdale, 2004) also found that it 
was possible to change an individual’s focus during rumination to a more mindful state of 
being, and that this leads to improvements in quality of thinking. Watkins and colleagues 
distinguished between two types of rumination: the abstract analytical processing mode, 
which is focused on evaluating higher level causes, meanings, consequences and implications 
of self-experience, and the concrete experiential processing mode (or mindful experience), 
which is focused on lower level, specific and direct experience of one’s thoughts, feelings 
and sensations in the present moment. Research by Watkins and colleagues has shown that it 
is possible to induce different modes of focus during rumination, and that different modes 
have different implications for mood and depressive symptoms. Drawing on this theory, 
Ehring and Watkins (2008) found that abstract rumination resulted in slower recovery from 
negative affect than concrete rumination or distraction, while concrete rumination led to 
fewer negative intrusions than abstract rumination and distraction. This research suggests that 
interventions do not need to focus on eliminating rumination altogether, but that changing an 
individual’s focus during rumination may be sufficient in reducing negative outcomes.  
An additional benefit of mindfulness for the treatment of rumination is the impact it 
has on thought suppression. Research by Wenzlaff and Luxton (2003) suggests that 
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mindfulness may be a way of effectively targeting thought suppression, which has been found 
to be prominent in individuals with depression and is associated with numerous negative 
effects. Wenzlaff and Luxton found that in a sample of 225 undergraduate students, 
individuals who were high in thought suppression and stress ruminated the most and 
experienced the most dysphoria. They found that people who ruminated the most also 
initially devoted the most effort to suppression, and that thought suppression efforts can fuel 
depressive rumination (particularly when associated with high levels of stress, which 
undermines mental control). These findings led the authors to conclude that mindfulness 
meditation may be beneficial in the treatment of rumination, as thoughts are allowed to enter 
and leave consciousness without intent or deliberation.  
Competitive Memory Training (COMET). 
A relatively new intervention for rumination which is consistent with the trend in the 
literature towards dealing with thought process rather than content is Competitive Memory 
Training (COMET). COMET views the amount of involvement the patient has in negative 
thoughts and emotions as problematic, rather than the content of cognitions themselves. 
Consequently, COMET aims to reduce the negative effects of rumination through the 
installation and repetitive activation of an “incompatible emotional network” in the client, by 
countering distressing memories and encouraging the adoption of an attitude of indifference 
or acceptance.   
In two studies on the application of COMET to mixed diagnoses (Olij et al., 2006) 
and mixed psychological problems (Maarsingh et al., 2010), COMET led to reductions in 
depressed mood and increased self-esteem. However, it is difficult to gauge the effectiveness 
of COMET from these studies as they did not incorporate control groups. A recent controlled 
study exploring the impact of COMET with elderly depressed patients revealed that adding 
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COMET to care as usual was more effective than care as usual alone in improving depressed 
mood and reducing the frequency of rumination (Ekkers et al., 2011).  
Summary of rumination interventions.  
A review of the rumination intervention literature indicates that the trend in the 
treatment of rumination echoes the trend in worry interventions – that is, researchers are 
recognising the importance of focusing on the processes that underlie and are associated with 
rumination, as opposed to targeting therapeutic efforts at the modification of the specific 
content of ruminative cognitions. It is clear from the research that interventions which 
incorporate mindfulness, awareness, and acceptance components, in addition to a focus on 
the alteration of behaviour rather than cognition, show promise in the treatment of 
rumination. Furthermore, the studies reviewed lend additional support for the notion that 
focusing on rumination may yield generalised improvement across depressive symptoms.  
Limitations of current treatments for worry and rumination 
To summarise, the body of literature on interventions for worry and rumination is 
small, and current psychological approaches to treating pathological forms of these cognitive 
constructs are limited. While the need for effective rumination interventions has been 
established (Siegle, 2008), a response to this need in the form of effective, evidence-based 
psychological treatments for rumination has not yet occurred. Similarly, there is extensive 
room for improvement in the psychological treatment of worry. A review of 11 studies on 
psychological treatments for GAD, including individual cognitive therapy (CT), individual 
CBT, Individual applied relaxation, group CT (intolerance of uncertainty model), and 
individual metacognitive therapy, revealed that only 31% of the total sample of GAD patients 
from all studies recovered at post-treatment (N= 495). Furthermore, for worry specifically, 
only three of the 10 active treatments resulted in a recovery rate of at least 50% (Fisher, 
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2006). Evans et al. (2007) highlight that amongst GAD patients who respond to treatment, the 
persistence of residual GAD symptoms is a problem. While newer approaches to treating 
worry and rumination have shown some promising support (e.g. RBCT, Watkins et al., 2007; 
metacognitive therapy; Wells, 1995, 1997), these treatment frameworks do not account for 
the fact that rumination and worry often co-occur in the same individual, and are implicated 
in both anxiety and depression. Thus, an examination of the theory and research on worry and 
rumination and their role in the onset and maintenance of psychopathology highlights a clear 
need for the exploration of a unified approach to treating these processes, across a range of 
psychological disorders. 
There is currently no clear consensus regarding the most effective interventions to 
address these cognitive processes which are implicated in a range of psychological disorders. 
However, given its status as the current treatment of choice for anxiety and depression, it is 
likely that CBT is frequently used in clinical settings to manage worry and rumination. This 
may be problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, as is evident from the literature 
reviewed in this chapter, rumination and worry interventions are moving away from a 
traditional CBT approach, which would emphasise the engagement with thought content and 
cognitive restructuring, towards a more process-oriented approach. This shift in focus is 
consistent with the way in which worry and rumination and worry are understood 
theoretically – the models of these constructs described in the previous chapter emphasise 
that it is the processes associated with worry and rumination that are their most salient and 
defining features, whereas the specific thoughts that occur during chains of worry and 
rumination are far less relevant.  
Second, there are also important reasons why CBT may not be the most effective 
treatment for worry and rumination. One key reason is CBT’s emphasis on the reduction of 
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negative thinking.  This emphasis might encourage thought suppression and over-control, 
which have been shown to result in a paradoxical increase in negative thoughts (Hayes et al., 
1999; Wenzlaff et al., 1988). Hayes et al. (1999) suggest that cognitive restructuring, a core 
intervention used in CBT, not only focuses too much on cognitive content, but also 
communicates to the client that anxious and depressive thinking needs to be suppressed 
(Heimberg & Ritter, 2008). In addition, Arch and Craske (2008) suggest that cognitive 
restructuring may facilitate thought suppression by emphasizing the modification of thought 
content, and placing judgment on whether certain thoughts are good versus bad, helpful 
versus unhelpful, and so forth, which may increase the desire to suppress them. Arch and 
Craske also suggest that engaging in cognitive restructuring may result in rumination about 
whether the original maladaptive thought or the newly restructured thought has more 
supporting evidence, thereby incorporating the therapeutic technique into the rumination 
instead of countering it. 
If cognitive restructuring does facilitate thought suppression, as suggested by Arch 
and Craske (2008), this therapeutic technique may be particularly problematic for individuals 
who worry and ruminate excessively: a view that has been supported by empirical evidence 
(Beevers & Meyer, 2008; Hayes et al., 1999). In research with individuals with current major 
depression, those who had recently recovered from a depressive episode, and never-depressed 
controls, Watkins and Moulds (2009) found that thought suppression was positively 
correlated with rumination. Clearly, if cognitive restructuring can cause an individual to 
ruminate more, as has been suggested (Arch and Craske, 2008); this is going to be 
particularly detrimental for individuals who are already prone to engaging in repetitive, 
perseverative thought processes such as worry and rumination.  
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There are a number of other important reasons why CBT may not be the most 
appropriate treatment for worry and rumination. Firstly, the “why” and “what if” cognitions 
that characterize worry and rumination – for example, thoughts such as “what if my child 
doesn’t get home safely?”, “Why do I feel so depressed?”, “What is wrong with me?”, “What 
if I never feel better?” – are not easily amenable to cognitive restructuring, as they are 
difficult (and often impossible) to dispute via argumentation and logic (Arch & Craske, 
2008). While worriers and ruminators desperately seek certainty, clarity, and answers to their 
questions and problems, in most cases, this is just not possible to achieve, and because these 
cognitions cannot be disputed the individual is left entangled in their chain of thoughts. Also, 
because worry and rumination involve cycles of the same thoughts, even if an individual is 
able to successfully dispute a thought, it is more than likely that this same thought will 
continue to re-occur.  
Furthermore, not only is it likely to be futile for individuals to attempt to dispute 
thoughts that arise during chains of worry and rumination, it may also be detrimental; given 
that repetitive, uncontrollable and perseverative negative thought are the hallmarks of worry 
and rumination, is likely that closely engaging with the content of cognitions (which is 
required for cognitive restructuring) is likely to “add fuel to the fire”, and exacerbate the 
cycle of repetitive thinking. It is clear that worry and rumination are more than just the sum 
of the negative cognitions that occur during episodes; they are processes of thought, which 
are closely linked to the worsening of depression and anxiety symptoms. Worry and 
rumination are also often supported by a strong scaffolding of positive beliefs about engaging 
in these processes (Wells & Mathews, 1994; 1996), and therefore do not represent merely a 
collection of stand-alone thoughts. As such, interventions that focus solely on the content of 
worry and ruminative thoughts are not sufficient; a notion that has been recognized by the 
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more recent CBT-based interventions for rumination and worry, such as RFCBT. Rather, 
treatment needs to look at the context associated with the occurrence of worry and 
rumination, and to assist the individual to disentangle themselves from these repetitive, 
perseverative chains of thought.  
The empirical research indicates that CBT is not currently as effective as it needs to 
be in treating worry and rumination. As highlighted by Ballenger et al. (2001), CBT has been 
found to be less efficacious for the treatment of GAD (the key symptom of which is worry) 
than for any of the other anxiety disorders. Given the high prevalence of this disorder, it is 
clear that other therapeutic approaches need to be explored. Furthermore, the body of 
research of interventions for rumination is small and inconclusive at present. Clearly more 
widespread improvement is necessary, given that rumination is a key residual symptom of 
depression, and a mediator of the impact of CBT on depression (Teasdale, et al., 2000; 
Watkins et al., 2007, 2011). No study has looked at the treatment of rumination and worry in 
the same individual, which is problematic given that worry and rumination often co-occur in 
the same individual, and these disorders have been considered to be key transdiagnostic 
processes common to anxiety and depression (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Harvey et al., 2004; 
Topper et al., 2010)  
The need for a new treatment for worry and rumination: ACT 
To summarise, this chapter has outlined the current psychological interventions which 
have been applied to rumination and worry, and has established that at present, this offering 
is clearly limited. The importance of targeting worry and rumination and worry specifically in 
psychological treatment has also been established, based on the research which positions 
these cognitive constructs as important contributors to the development, perpetuation, 
exacerbation, and recurrence of depression and anxiety. It is therefore essential that 
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researchers and clinicians continue to explore and improve upon the offering of psychological 
interventions which can be applied to rumination and worry.  
One growing therapy which hasn’t been applied to the treatment of worry and 
rumination is Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT; Hayes et al., 1999). There are 
many reasons why ACT would be a useful and potentially valuable treatment of worry and 
rumination as transdiagnostic processes which occur across a range of psychopathology. 
Before discussing the rationale for using ACT to treat rumination and worry, it is necessary to 
establish a theoretical and empirical understanding of ACT. The next chapter will outline the 
theoretical basis and treatment components of ACT, and will review relevant empirical 
research on ACT interventions in the aim of establishing a context for the application of ACT 
to worry and rumination.  
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Chapter 4. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the theory and research on 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT). The chapter will begin by outlining the 
theoretical basis of ACT and the ACT model of psychopathology, which accounts for the 
occurrence of psychological distress via two key constructs: experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion, together which produce psychological inflexibility. The second part of the 
chapter will focus on the translation of the ACT model into clinical practice, by describing 
the core treatment processes of ACT: creative hopelessness, acceptance, cognitive defusion, 
mindfulness, self-as-context, values, and committed action. The third part of the chapter will 
outline the differences between ACT and cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), the current 
dominant psychotherapeutic modality, in order to further illuminate the unique theoretical 
features of ACT, and how these translate into clinical practice. The final part of the chapter 
will review clinical studies on ACT for depression, anxiety and transdiagnostic psychological 
problems in order to establish the empirical evidence base for ACT, and to support the 
application of ACT to the treatment of emotional disorders in particular. In the conclusion of 
this chapter, it is argued that there is a need for more research on the effectiveness of ACT for 
a range of psychological issues.  
Theoretical basis 
At a broad level, acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT; Hayes, Strosahl & 
Wilson, 1999) is a mindfulness, acceptance and values-based psychotherapy that is grounded 
in behavioural and cognitive theory (Hayes, Masuda, & De Mey, 2003). In contrast to other 
therapeutic approaches, such as cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT), ACT is somewhat 
unique in that it is built on a complex philosophical and theoretical foundation. At a 
76 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
philosophical level, ACT is grounded in functional contextualism (Hayes, 1993; Hayes, 
Hayes, & Reese, 1988; Biglan & Hayes, 1996), a philosophy of science which consists of a 
number of assumptions and rules used to construct and test theories.  
Functional Contextualism serves as a philosophical basis for Relational Frame Theory 
(RFT; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001), which is the theoretical foundation of ACT. 
RFT is a theory of language and cognition that attempts to explain how human beings infer 
relationships between arbitrary objects (Fox, 2006). A detailed discussion of RFT is beyond 
the scope of this thesis (see Hayes et al., 1999, for a comprehensive explanation of both 
functional contextualism and RFT), however the basic premise of RFT is that humans form 
relationships between stimuli via language and cognition, and that individuals respond to 
stimuli (or “verbal events”; Hayes et al.) based on these relationships. According to RFT, 
once the “relational frame” around two stimuli has been established it acts as a cue for how 
the stimuli will be responded to in the future, and once this frame has been created it is very 
difficult to break (Wilson & Hayes, 1996). For example, if an individual forms an association 
between a particular feeling (anxiety) and a specific situation (public speaking), it is likely 
that future encounters with the situation or even thoughts about the situation will elicit the 
feeling. Thus, according to RFT, the “events” themselves (anxiety; public speaking) are not 
what matters, it is the relationships that exist between these events that give them their 
meaning and their psychological functions.  
The ACT Model of Psychopathology 
On the grounds of RFT, ACT emphasizes the role of the context rather than the 
content of language and cognition in psychological distress.  According to this model, there 
are no thoughts, feelings, or other private experiences that are faulty or “wrong”, and 
psychological disorders and distress are not inherently pathological in themselves (Hayes et 
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al., 1999).  Rather, it is the way individuals relate to these private experiences through 
language and cognition that is potentially harmful, for example, through the assumption that 
these experiences must be controlled or suppressed in order to reduce distress, or through an 
over-reliance on beliefs, rules, fears, and judgments in the regulation of behavior.  
Within an ACT framework, there are two key processes which represent maladaptive 
ways of relating to private experiences: experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion. These 
constructs are seen as contributing to the development and maintenance of psychopathology 
via the effects of language. Experiential avoidance occurs when a person is unwilling to 
remain in contact with particular private experiences (e.g. thoughts, emotions, urges, bodily 
sensations, memories), and involves “mental and behavioural strategies aimed at changing 
the form or frequency of one’s current internal experience” (Orsillo, Roemer, & Holowka, 
2005, p.11). These strategies can include either suppression, which involves active attempts 
to control and/or eliminate the experience of negative private events; or situational avoidance, 
which constitutes the avoidance of or escape from contextual factors which are associated 
with the emergence of unwanted private experiences (Hayes et al., 2004). Hayes and 
colleagues (1999) suggest that experiential avoidance has evolved from the generalization of 
cultural rules which suggest that negative thoughts and emotional states can and should be 
controlled. For example, common phrases such as, “look on the bright side”, “boys don’t 
cry”, and “just forget about it”, for example, are seen as perpetuating the idea that one can 
achieve control over their internal experiences, which creates further distress for individuals 
when attempts at control are futile (Hayes et al., 2004). According to ACT, experiential 
avoidance leads to a long-term increase in the frequency and intensity of difficult private 
experiences, which then leads to the restriction of life activities (López, 2009).  
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A number of studies across different domains of research have demonstrated the 
negative impact of experiential avoidance. In the coping literature, emotion-focused and 
avoidant strategies have been found to negatively predict outcome in depression (De Genova, 
Patton, Jurich, & MacDermid, 1994), substance abuse (Ireland, McMahon, Marlow, & 
Kouzakanani, 1994), and recovery from child sexual abuse (Leitenberg, Greenwald, & Cado, 
1992). The research on thought suppression indicates that attempting to suppress a thought 
results in it rebounding to a greater intensity than its original state (Wenzlaff et al., 1988). 
Wegner and Zanakos (1994) found that depressive symptoms are increased in individuals 
who exhibit trait-based avoidance of emotions, particularly when this is also combined with 
thought suppression. In a review of studies looking at the relationship between 
psychopathology and experiential avoidance, Ruiz (2010) found that the weighted 
correlations between the experiential avoidance and depressive and anxiety symptoms were 
r=.55, and r=.52 respectively. Finally, Hayes et al. (1999) suggest that the incorporation of 
acceptance (the antidote of experiential avoidance) and mindfulness components into a 
number of established psychotherapies (including Dialectical Behaviour Therapy, Linehan, 
1993; behavioural marital therapy, Jacobson, 1992; Jacobson, Koerner, & Christensen, 1994; 
and emotion-focused therapy, Greenberg & Johnson, 1988) has improved treatment outcomes 
is indicative of the role of avoidance in psychological distress. Overall, this literature presents 
convincing evidence for the detrimental effects of experiential avoidance and its role in 
psychological suffering.  
Cognitive fusion is defined as “fusing with or attaching to the literal content of private 
experiences whereby we respond to a thought or feeling not just as a thought or feeling but as 
the actual event it describes” (Eifert & Forsyth, 2005, p.88). According to ACT, human 
beings’ over-reliance on verbally-derived relationships between stimuli means that they are 
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vulnerable to becoming “fused” with the content of cognitions (Hayes et al., 1999). Through 
the process of cognitive fusion, thoughts and the actual stimuli or events represented by these 
thoughts become fused together, such that the functional properties of the stimuli can be 
present in a psychological sense. Hayes and colleagues suggest that the fact that thoughts can 
produce panic symptoms is an example of cognitive fusion, because the individual is reacting 
as if the feared situation is immediately present. The ACT model emphasizes that thoughts 
themselves are not problematic – rather, it is the fusion with and subsequent avoidance of 
thoughts, feelings and situations that leads to distress (Hayes et al., 1999).  
In view of its conceptualization of psychopathology and philosophical and theoretical 
foundations, ACT does not attempt to reduce, change, suppress or avoid thoughts, feelings, 
memories, urges, and emotions. Rather, it aims to reduce the impact or influence of painful 
private events on the individual (Harris, 2006). ACT views human suffering as normal, and 
rejects the notion that happiness is dependent on the absence of negative affect (Hayes et al., 
1999). Thus, symptom reduction is not an explicit goal of ACT, rather it is seen as a natural 
consequence of acceptance, defusion from unwanted thoughts, increased engagement with 
the present experience, and increased engagement in values-consistent action.  
Core Treatment Processes 
In terms of intervention, the two major goals of ACT are to foster (a) acceptance of 
problematic, unhelpful thoughts and feelings that cannot be controlled, and (b) commitment 
and action toward living a life that is consistent with one’s values (Eifert, Forsyth, Arch, 
Espejo, Keller, & Langer, 2009). These goals are achieved through the six core treatment 
processes of ACT: acceptance, defusion, contact with the present moment (through 
mindfulness), the observing self (self-as-context), values, and committed action. In ACT, 
these treatment processes are not necessarily worked through in sequential order, rather they 
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are introduced as needed based on the client’s presentation, and are revisited and utilized in a 
dynamic way throughout the therapeutic process. An additional component of ACT called 
“creative hopelessness” is incorporated early in treatment, as a means of motivating the client 
to recognize the futility of control and avoidance behaviours.  
Given ACT’s stance that language is the cause of psychological suffering, therapeutic 
processes and techniques such as metaphors and experiential exercises are employed to 
overcome the trap of language. Hayes and colleagues (1999) maintain that changing verbal 
relations by adding new verbal relations elaborates the existing network of such relations in 
the mind rather than eliminating it, and that the most effective way of weakening verbal 
relations is to change the context supporting the verbal process, rather than by focusing on the 
verbal content. In other words, maladaptive and distressing cognitive content cannot be 
ameliorated with more cognition, and thus ACT is aimed at facilitating growth through 
engagement with the present moment, where real opportunity for change is thought to occur. 
Creative Hopelessness. 
Generally the first therapeutic component in ACT protocols, creative hopelessness 
involves helping the client to realize that past efforts to change, control and avoid difficult 
thoughts, feelings, sensations, memories and so forth have not worked, and that the struggle 
with these difficult private experiences has actually impeded the client’s ability to engage in 
valued life activities.  
Metaphors and experiential exercises are utilized to raise the client’s awareness of the 
various ways in which they have attempted to both avoid and control difficult internal 
experiences, for example, through substance use, therapy, positive thinking, numbing, and so 
forth, thereby establishing the futility (and the costs) of these efforts. The ideal outcome of 
the creative hopelessness phase of therapy is that the client is ideally able to recognize the 
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“unworkable change agenda” which has been instilled in them by broader society, that is, the 
notion that symptom control is a prerequisite for living a happy, fulfilling and successful life 
(Eifert et al., 2009). Once the individual gains insight into the fact that this agenda is not 
actually effective, the rationale for acceptance as an alternative to control and avoidance is 
established.  
Acceptance. 
Acceptance within ACT is defined as “an active taking in of an event or situation… 
[an] abandonment of dysfunctional [symptom] change agendas and an active process of 
feeling feelings as feelings, thinking thoughts as thoughts… and so on” (Hayes et al., 1999, 
p.77). Acceptance involves opening up to and making room for thoughts, feelings, sensations, 
urges, and memories, and the client is encouraged to adopt a stance of willingness in the face 
of the difficult internal experiences that human beings inevitably face. The notion of 
acceptance in ACT represents the antithesis to the idea that symptoms must be controlled or 
avoided and that difficult thoughts and feelings need to be absent in order for meaningful 
therapeutic change and psychological health to occur. Therefore, ACT offers acceptance as 
the alternative to avoidance, and it is cultivated in therapy to counter the client’s efforts to 
avoid their difficult private experiences. Importantly, however, acceptance is not framed as 
being an end in itself, but rather it is developed and used to enable values-consistent change 
to occur in the individual’s external world (Cullen, 2008). 
The ACT therapist encourages acceptance through the use of metaphors and 
mindfulness techniques. The client is encouraged to experience affect states and bodily 
sensations, such as anxiety, in the moment, as they occur, rather than trying to control the 
frequency or intensity of such feelings, as in traditional CBT (Cullen, 2008). It is introduced 
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early on in ACT sessions, and the practice of acceptance and willingness is thought to allow 
for valued and committed action to occur.  
Cognitive Defusion. 
Cognitive defusion is employed in ACT to undermine cognitive fusion with thoughts 
that perpetuate psychological distress and inhibit value-based action. It is ACT’s major tool 
for dealing with difficult and distressing thoughts, and unlike cognitive therapy, it emphasizes 
altering the context rather than the content of thought. That is, within an ACT framework, the 
specific thoughts a client has are not important; what is significant is the meaning people 
attach to their thoughts and the context in which certain thoughts occur. In light of this, the 
cognitive defusion component of ACT is aimed at weakening the literality of difficult 
thoughts (Cullen, 2008), so that the individual is able to avoid getting “caught up” in specific 
thoughts as well as in the “ruminative trap of cognition” (Arch, 2008, p. 266). 
Cognitive defusion is facilitated in therapy via experiential exercises, through which 
the client is taught to distance themselves from the literal meaning and content of language 
(by seeing thoughts as thoughts instead of facts), and to be mindful of the continuous ebb and 
flow of thoughts. For example, a particularly distressing thought, such as “I am worthless” 
will be inspected, spoken out loud, and repeated until it is seen for what it actually is – a 
group of words – rather than the actual painful event it describes (Cullen, 2008). Cullen 
highlights the parallels between cognitive defusion techniques and exposure therapy, in that 
the more an individual can stay in contact with a painful or uncomfortable thought or feeling, 
the more likely that the distress associated with that thought or feeling will diminish. 
Mindfulness. 
Mindfulness, which involves the practice of being deliberately and purposefully 
present in the current moment, is a key process practiced in ACT. Twohig (2012) defines 
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“being present” as “flexible, fluid, and voluntary attention to internal and external events as 
they are occurring, without attachment to evaluation or judgment” (p. 503). Thus, 
mindfulness is considered to help the client to live fully and purposefully in the moment, 
while accepting difficult private experiences and decreasing the negative impact of language 
and cognition (Twohig, 2012). Mindfulness is not unique to ACT, with many other 
therapeutic modalities incorporating this practice, several which were published prior to ACT 
(e.g., Kabat-Zinn, 1990; Linehan, 1993). 
In ACT, mindfulness goes hand-in-hand with the notion of self-as-context or the 
observing self. The combination of these processes is aimed at assisting the client to 
experience being in the present moment, observing the self and the surrounding environment, 
rather than living in their mind and ruminating over past events or worrying about the future 
(Arch & Craske, 2008; Cullen, 2008).  The individual is taught to recognize when they are 
not in the present, and to flexibly shift their attention (Twohig, 2012). Mindfulness is also an 
important element of ACT as it helps to counteract experiential avoidance strategies aimed at 
controlling or reducing discomfort. 
Self-as-Context (The Observing Self). 
As discussed, ACT endorses the differentiation between the content of internal 
experiences and the context in which these experiences occur (Strosahl, Hayes, Wilson, & 
Gifford, 2004). That is, distinguishing the “conceptualized self”, or the image of the self that 
is derived from one’s thoughts, feelings, memories and roles, from the “self-as-context”, or 
the self that is constant, and which acts as the neutral setting in which these events occur. 
Twohig (2012) suggests that people attempt to protect or retain the conceptualized self even 
when this is maladaptive. For example, if a person has labeled themselves as “depressed”, 
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they may continue to engage in behaviours that perpetuate that self-description, in order to 
protect the self.  
ACT interventions work to develop the individual’s sense of self-as-context in order 
to assist the client to disentangle themselves from their symptoms and to promote 
psychological flexibility. With this sense of self, the individual can experience internal and 
external events and experiences, without being defined by them.  
Values. 
The strong and explicit emphasis on values in ACT differentiates it from other 
therapeutic approaches. Arch and Craske (2008) argue that the ultimate goal of ACT therapy 
is for the client to achieve valued living (via values-driven behavior), and that this is one of 
the major ways in which ACT differs from CBT, for which symptom reduction is the primary 
therapeutic objective. Together with committed action, understanding and clarifying values 
are ACT’s “activation processes”, which assist clients to move forward in their chosen life 
directions (Cullen, 2008).  
Values can be contrasted with goals in that they are pursued in an ongoing way across 
one’s life, whereas goals are obtainable. In ACT, various exercises are used to assist the 
client to uncover and clarify their values, in order to help them to regain a sense of life 
direction that is consistent with these values (Strosahl et al., 2004). For example, the “epitaph 
exercise” aims to elicit the client’s values by asking them to imagine what they would like to 
be written about the kind of person they were on their tombstone. As foreshadowed, value-
guided exposure is also utilized in ACT, with the aim of increasing one’s ability to live in 
accordance with their values, while mindfully accepting difficult thoughts and feelings (Arch 
& Craske, 2008).  
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Committed Action. 
ACT is a behavioural therapy, and the therapeutic component of committed action is a 
key aspect of therapy. Committed action involves the client choosing to behave in ways that 
are consistent with their values, and part of the goal of this phase of treatment is to show the 
client how to gradually build patterns of sustainable, committed, value-driven behaviour 
(Strosahl et al., 2004). Thus, traditional behavior change procedures such as goal-setting are 
incorporated into therapy, and barriers (in the form of challenging thoughts, emotional 
reactions, and other difficulties) are prepared for and worked through.  Any behavioural 
intervention, including exposure exercises and skills training, can be incorporated at this 
stage as long as it is consistent with ACT processes and principles (Twohig, 2012). What 
differentiates the committed action component of ACT to behavioural aspects of other 
therapies is the motivation behind engaging in the behavior – for example, while exposure to 
feared stimuli may be incorporated into ACT, it is used to assist the client to accept 
uncomfortable feelings and thoughts so that they can live in better alignment with their 
chosen values, as opposed to being aimed solely at fear extinction. Thus, the client practices 
acceptance, defusion, and mindfulness, and self-as-context to deal with potential difficult 
private experiences that may come up for them as they engage in committed action based on 
their values. 
Committed action is generally the culmination of ACT, as the client is encouraged to 
draw upon the various other tools of ACT to assist them in defining and engaging in 
committed action that is grounded in their values and aimed at bringing them closer to where 
they want their life to be.  
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Differences between ACT and CBT 
 Given its emergence as a “third wave” behavioural therapy (Hayes et al., 1999), 
researchers have inevitably been concerned with trying to define similarities and differences 
between ACT and traditional CBT. Much of the debate in this literature has been focused on 
determining whether ACT is meaningfully different to traditional forms of CBT, such as 
cognitive therapy (e.g. Arch & Craske, 2008; Hayes, 2008; Herbert & Forman, in press; 
Hofmann & Asmundson, 2008). It is necessary to understand the hypothesized similarities 
and differences between ACT and CBT and the current state of the debate in this area in 
order to provide a contextual backdrop in regards to theory and research surrounding ACT, 
and to evaluate its therapeutic value. In order to evaluate the therapeutic value of ACT in 
relation to worry and rumination, there is an important need to understand where ACT fits in 
relation to the current dominant psychotherapeutic modality 
There is consensus regarding the notion that CBT and ACT have distinct conceptual 
and theoretical foundations, which translate to differing theories of psychopathology. CBT, 
which Hofmann and Asmundson (2008) suggest is not a single therapy but “a family of 
interventions that share a number of key treatment approaches and the same general 
structure” (p. 3), views psychological distress as arising from the presence of maladaptive 
cognitions, which stem from systematic biases in information processing (Beck, Rush, Shaw, 
& Emery, 1979). Conversely ACT, as discussed earlier in this chapter, views the root of 
psychopathology as being psychological inflexibility caused by emotional avoidance, 
problematic attempts to control internal experiences, and fusion with thoughts and emotions 
(Hayes et al., 1999). CBT is based on the premise that emotional and behavioural responses 
are moderated by cognitions, and that cognitions need to be targeted in order to promote 
psychological change. By contrast, ACT fundamentally rejects the assumptions of the 
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cognitive model and the notion that the content of cognitions have a causal influence on 
emotions and behavior. In line with the theoretical differences in their views of 
psychopathology, ACT and CBT have opposing therapeutic goals: whereas the explicit goal 
of CBT is symptom reduction, ACT prioritizes behaving consistently with one’s values, and 
sees symptom reduction as a possible but not essential consequence of this (Forman, 
Chapman, Herbert, Yuen, & Moitra, 2011).  
At the heart of the differences between ACT and CBT is the issue of whether to 
dispute and restructure maladaptive thoughts or whether to accept and embrace them (Marker 
& Abramova, 2011). Consequently, there are differing therapeutic processes associated with 
each modality: where CBT focuses on challenging irrational thoughts and substituting them 
with rational, adaptive cognitions, ACT advocates mindful acceptance of cognitions, 
emotions and symptoms, with behavior alone being targeted for change (Arch & Craske, 
2008). CBT’s main approach for dealing with thoughts is through cognitive restructuring, 
which involves challenging and reframing automatic thoughts and appraisals in order to 
modify deeper belief systems, while ACT endorses cognitive defusion as a strategy for 
dealing with difficult cognitions (Arch & Craske). Whereas CBT directly challenges the 
evidence surrounding a deeply held negative cognition, ACT focuses not on dealing with the 
content of the thought, but instead takes a contextual approach, viewing thoughts as neither 
good nor bad (Hayes et al., 1999). ACT’s stance towards how cognitions are dealt with is 
influenced by its theoretical and philosophical underpinnings – that is, to target difficult 
cognitions with more cognition is viewed as being akin to trying to fight fire with fire, and so 
defusion and acceptance strategies are employed in the aim of fostering contact with the 
present experience.  
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In their analysis of the similarities and differences between ACT and CBT, Arch and 
Craske (2008) highlight the different ways in which the two frameworks approach dealing 
with emotions and emotional symptoms. Arch and Craske suggest that whereas CBT focuses 
on the prediction and control of emotions and physiological symptoms with the aim of 
reducing their frequency and intensity (through strategies such as breathing retraining, 
relaxation and cognitive restructuring), ACT endorses acceptance of symptoms and the 
willingness to experience emotions. Arch and Craske suggest, however, that these approaches 
are not in opposition to one another, and that the lines between the two are blurred. For 
example, in ACT an individual may see acceptance of emotions as a control strategy if they 
learn that it can decrease aversive internal stimuli, and mindfulness may increase the 
predictability of emotions and symptoms. Further, an element of acceptance of difficult 
emotions and symptoms is required in CBT exposure tasks. Hofmann and Asmundson (2008) 
take a different approach to conceptualising the differences between ACT and CBT in 
relation to how emotions are dealt with, suggesting that the critical difference between ACT 
and CBT is the target of emotion regulation strategies. Based on Gross’ model of emotions 
(Gross 1998, 2002; Gross & John, 2003; Gross & Levenson, 1997), Hofmann & Asmundson 
view CBT as involving antecedent-focused emotion regulation strategies, in that therapy aims 
to change the way that internal and external emotion cues are evaluated, whereas ACT 
represents a response-focused approach to emotion regulation in that emotional responses are 
manipulated. Hofmann and Asmundson also share Arch and Craske’s view that acceptance is 
not exclusive to ACT, and that “acceptance strategies are simply another tool in the arsenal of 
a CBT therapist to combat emotional disorders” (p. 13).  
Based on a close examination of the differences between ACT and CBT, the notion 
that acceptance strategies are commonly employed in CBT is not entirely accurate. While 
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acceptance may not be unique to ACT, it is unlikely that even its strongest critics could 
dispute its position as the therapeutic modality that most explicitly emphasizes acceptance as 
a key therapeutic component and mechanism of change. CBT practitioners may draw on 
acceptance strategies, however given that acceptance is not made explicit in CBT treatment 
protocols, it is likely that it is often omitted. Furthermore, CBT’s focus on the control, 
prediction and reduction of symptoms is clearly incongruent with acceptance. While CBT 
therapists may incorporate an element of acceptance as part of exposure therapy, for example, 
ultimately this is done with the aim of eventually facilitating change. In ACT, on the other 
hand, acceptance is essentially an end in itself, cultivated so that the individual can devote 
less effort to struggling against emotional symptoms and more to living their life in a way 
that is meaningful to them.  
Research has explored the hypothesized mechanisms of change associated with both 
ACT and CBT in order to shed light on the efficacy of each therapy. In one of the few studies 
to examine mediational effects continuously across time among patients randomised to either 
ACT or cognitive therapy (CT), Forman and colleagues (2011) explored the therapeutic 
drivers of change in both conditions. In the study, 174 individuals with anxiety and/or 
depression were randomly assigned to the ACT or CT condition, and completed an 
assessment of theorized mediators and outcomes before each session. The results revealed 
that for individuals in the CT condition, therapeutic outcomes were mediated by the increased 
use of cognitive and affective change strategies (such as challenging and restructuring 
dysfunctional cognitions, and distraction from unhelpful thoughts and feelings) relative to 
utilization of psychological acceptance strategies, whereas for individuals in the ACT 
condition, the mediation effect was in the opposite direction. Furthermore, equivalent 
mediators across both conditions were decreases in self-reported dysfunctional thinking, 
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cognitive defusion, and willingness to engage in behavioural activity despite unpleasant 
thoughts or emotions. 
Also in pursuit of clarifying the mechanisms of action in ACT and CBT, Zettle, 
Rains, and Hayes (2011) reanalyzed data from Zettle and Rains’ (1989) randomized clinical 
trial of ACT versus CT, excluding a third condition involved in the original research, which 
comprised of a modified form of CT that did not include distancing. In analyzing data from 
80 females with depression on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1961)  
Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire (ATQ; Hollon & Kendall, 1980), and Dysfunctional 
Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissman & Beck, 1978). Zettle et al. found that there was no 
significant effect of treatment condition, but a significant effect for time and interaction of 
condition and time such that BDI scores improved in the ACT condition to a significantly 
greater degree across time than in the CT condition. Participants in the ACT condition 
experienced reduced occurrence of and believability in depression-related thoughts, and 
cognitive defusion effects accounted for more of the differences in follow-up outcomes 
between ACT and CT. Changes in dysfunctional attitudes did not mediate outcomes. Zettle 
and colleagues argue that the results suggest that early differences in ACT and CT processes 
of change predict ultimate outcomes, which, they argue, is evidence that ACT and CT are 
theoretically distinct models and methods. 
While there are certainly some theoretical and conceptual differences between ACT 
and CBT – pertaining primarily to their therapeutic goals, approach to cognitions, and 
emphasis on acceptance – there is ongoing debate in the literature regarding just how salient 
these differences are, and what each approach’s hypothesized theoretical differences actually 
mean for client outcomes. While Hayes and colleagues (1987; Hayes et al., 1999) argue that 
ACT and CBT are vastly different in terms of their theoretical foundations, principles, 
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assumptions, and application, other researchers have concluded that there are more 
similarities than differences between ACT and CT/CBT, but that this is not a criticism of 
ACT (Arch & Craske, 2008; Heimberg & Ritter, 2008; Herbert & Forman, 2011). Herbert 
and Forman (2011) maintain that there is significant overlap between ACT and CBT, and that 
the most critical differences between these approaches are the level of theory and philosophy. 
Researchers have also suggested that focusing too much on the differences between ACT and 
CBT only amplifies these differences and is not helpful in moving the field forward, it may 
limit exploration of the common mechanisms underlying effective therapies (Arch & Craske, 
2008; Herbert and Forman, 2011). Importantly, Herbert and Forman argue that, in order to 
maximize outcomes for clients, therapists from each model need to recognize that there are 
certain contexts in which the other therapy may be more appropriate. 
Empirical Research on ACT 
The empirical status of ACT remains an issue of contention and one that features 
heavily in the “ACT versus CBT” debate, due primarily to the fact that the body of research 
looking at the efficacy of ACT is small relative to CBT and other more established therapies. 
This is to be expected given that compared to CBT ACT is a relatively new therapy; and 
gathering clinical and empirical evidence takes time. Clinical and experimental studies have, 
however, yielded some positive findings regarding the efficacy of ACT in treating a range of 
disorders.  
In the attempt to clarify its status amongst established therapies, three separate meta-
analyses have looked at the efficacy of ACT in relation to a range of conditions (Hayes et al., 
2004; Powers, Zum Vörde Sive Vörding, & Emmelkamp, 2009; Öst, 2008). In an initial 
meta-analysis of the efficacy of ACT in 12 randomised controlled trials (RCTs), Hayes, 
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Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis (2006) found a mean controlled effect size of d=0.48 across 
ACT studies.  
Öst (2008) conducted the first independent review of ACT, in addition to other third 
wave behaviour therapies. All therapies were assessed against a sample of comparative CBT 
studies, using a psychotherapy outcome study methodology rating scale to evaluate whether 
the therapies constitute empirically-supported treatments (ESTs). A total of 13 ACT 
randomized control trials (RCTs) looking at a range of psychiatric and non-psychiatric 
disorders (for example, maths anxiety) were reviewed, with a total of 677 participants across 
all studies. The mean effect size was 0.68 (z=5.11, p>0.001), which constitutes a moderate 
effect. Two studies found significantly better treatment effects than psychological placebos, 
and four found ACT to be significantly better than treatment as usual (TAU), but were 
deemed by the author to have too many methodological issues to be considered “good” 
research. The two studies considered methodologically sound did not find ACT to be superior 
to comparison therapies. On the basis of his review, Öst concluded that none of the third 
wave therapies fulfilled criteria for ESTs, and that overall the third wave therapy RCTs used 
research methodologies that were significantly less stringent than those used in CBT studies. 
Gaudino (2009), however, cautions that these conclusions needs to be considered in light of 
the fact that a re-analysis of Öst’s data revealed that 38% of the ACT studies included could 
not be “matched” with a CBT study because the studies looked at different disorders, and that 
for the most part, the treatment populations included in the ACT studies were more complex 
and more resistant to treatment than those included in the CBT studies.  
The most recent ACT meta-analysis (Powers et al., 2009) included 18 randomized 
control trials comparing ACT to either control conditions or established treatments (CBT and 
CT). Studies without control conditions were omitted from the meta-analysis. The measure of 
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effect size used in the study was Hedges’ g, which can be interpreted equivalently to Cohen’s 
convention of small (0.2), medium (0.5), and large (0.8) effects. The overall results of the 
meta-analysis suggested that ACT performed significantly better than control conditions (g = 
0.42), with the average participant in an ACT condition improving 66% more than 
participants in control conditions. However, ACT was not significantly more effective than 
established treatments overall, and was not superior to control conditions for anxiety and 
depression (effect size = 0.03). In spite of this, Powers et al. suggest that the effects of ACT 
are promising, given that it is not uncommon to fail to find a significant difference between 
established treatments (for example,  comparing CBT with CT and exposure therapy; Powers, 
Sigmarsson, & Emmelkamp, 2008). Interestingly, Levin and Hayes (2009) re-analysed the 
data reported in Powers and colleagues’ meta-analysis, and concluded that ACT actually 
performed better than CBT and CT (g = 0.27; p = .03).  
ACT for depression and anxiety. 
Of particular significance to the present discussion is the literature on ACT for 
depression and anxiety, given that rumination and worry are central features in these 
disorders. Several studies have examined the efficacy and effectiveness of ACT in treating 
depression and anxiety disorders. Some of these have utilized experimental designs to 
compare the outcomes of ACT versus CBT; others have looked at the effectiveness of ACT 
through single or multiple case reports, by comparing pre- and post-treatment data. Given 
ACT’s theoretical view of what improvement entails (that is, reduced experiential avoidance 
and increased engagement with values), most ACT studies also include measures of ACT-
related constructs and quality of life or life functioning.  
 Interestingly, in spite of the fact that worry and rumination are increasingly 
recognized as key components in the onset and maintenance of depression and anxiety 
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disorders, the ACT treatment literature (like the CBT literature) does not reflect this. While 
ACT emphasises the importance of changing the context of maladaptive cognitions and 
thought processes, the treatment of worry and rumination has not been given theoretical nor 
empirical attention until now. While it is assumed that the treatment protocols utilized in the 
studies described below addressed client participants’ worry and rumination to a certain 
extent through the ACT processes of cognitive defusion and mindfulness, which are aimed at 
helping individuals to manage the impact of their difficult and distressing thoughts), the 
literature has not explicitly discussed the application of ACT to worry and rumination as 
transdiagnotic constructs. The next section will review the empirical literature on the 
application of ACT to samples of individuals with anxiety, depression, and transdiagnostic 
psychological problems featuring anxious and depressive symptomatology.  
ACT for anxiety.  
Studies have looked at the impact of ACT as a treatment for most of the anxiety 
disorders, including GAD, social phobia, OCD, panic disorder, PTSD and mixed anxiety 
problems. 
Two randomized clinical trials have been conducted comparing the efficacy of ACT 
and CBT for mixed anxiety disorders. In a recent study by Arch, Eifert, Davies, Plumb 
Vilardaga, Rose, & Craske (2012), 128 individuals with heterogeneous anxiety disorders 
received 12 sessions of either ACT or CBT, delivered by clinical psychology doctoral 
students. Both treatments involved behavioural exposure. Participants were assessed at pre-
treatment, post-treatment, and 6 and 12-month follow up on anxiety specific measures 
(principal disorder Clinical Severity Ratings [CSRs], Anxiety Sensitivity Index, Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire, Fear Questionnaire Avoidance) and non-specific-anxiety measures 
(Quality of Life Index [QOLI], Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-16). Findings revealed 
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that ACT and CBT showed substantial and similar improvement across all measures, 
however ACT showed steeper CSR improvements and higher psychological flexibility than 
CBT during follow-up, and lower CSTs than CBT at 12-month follow-up. However, more 
ACT than CBT patients utilized outside therapy during the initial follow-up interval. ACT 
was associated with higher scores on the AAQ-16, whereas CBT was associated with higher 
QOLI scores.  
An RCT comparing the efficacy of ACT and CBT for anxiety in a group therapy 
context is currently being undertaken at the University of New South Wales (Glaser, 
Blackledge, & Deane, 2008). This study is comparing the impact of a 6-session ACT group 
treatment program with a 6-session CBT treatment program on mild to severe mixed anxiety 
problems among students. Preliminary data suggest that the ACT and CBT produced 
equivalent results at post-treatment, however participants from the ACT group reported fewer 
anxiety symptoms than the CBT group at 12-month follow-up. This represents early support 
for the efficacy of ACT run as a group therapy. 
Two case studies have looked at the effectiveness of ACT for mixed anxiety 
disorders. Eifert and colleagues (2009) conducted a study looking at the impact of ACT for 3 
individuals with differential anxiety disorder diagnoses. Treatment involved 12 weeks of 
individual therapy sessions lasting 1 hour each, delivered by three advanced doctorate clinical 
psychology students. The treatment followed the manual developed by Eifert and Forsyth 
(2005). The results of this study showed positive pre- to post-treatment changes in ACT-
relevant process measures (experiential avoidance, acceptance and mindfulness skills), 
increases in quality of life, and significant reductions in traditional anxiety and distress 
measures.  
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Codd, Twhohig, Crosby and Enno (2011) also utilized a case series design in 
exploring the impact of ACT on three individuals with anxiety disorders (panic disorder with 
agoraphobia, comorbid social phobia and GAD, and PTSD) in a private practice setting. 
Clients received 9-13 sessions of ACT, and in-session exposure therapy was not utilized in 
order to better allow the effects of ACT to be determined. Clients completed measures of 
symptomatology and acceptance before and after treatment, in addition to a weekly measure 
of avoidance and anxiety. Following treatment, participants showed clinical reductions in 
anxiety severity, which were maintained at 8-month follow-up. Weekly data revealed marked 
reductions in avoidance throughout the course of treatment but very little change in anxiety, 
with the authors suggesting that these results indicate that an anxiety disorder can be 
effectively treated by focusing on the functional impact of anxiety on behavior, rather than 
the level of anxiety. Thus, these results are consistent with the ACT model. Furthermore, 
exposure was not necessary to produce changes in anxiety severity.  
Two studies have explored the application of ACT to GAD, a chronic condition for 
which CBT has been found to be ineffectual for a significant proportion of sufferers (Gould, 
Otto, & Pollack, 1995). In a study by Roemer and Orsillo (2007) which employed a single-
group repeated measures design, 16 participants with diagnosed GAD received 16 sessions of 
individual ACT, the structure for which was derived from a treatment manual developed 
specifically for the study. The therapists were the authors and doctoral students. Results from 
client questionnaires and clinician ratings showed significant improvements of a large 
magnitude in GAD, worry, anxiety and depressive symptoms immediately following the 
completion of therapy as well as at a 3-month follow up, and participants displayed a 
significant decrease in avoidance of internal experiences. Limitations of this study are the 
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lack of control group, and the fact that effect sizes of improvement decreased between post-
treatment and follow-up. 
Wetherall and colleagues (2011) examined the impact of ACT for GAD in older 
adults. In this pilot investigation, seven older primary care patients with GAD received 12 
individual sessions of GAD, and nine received CBT. Participants in the ACT group 
experienced significant reductions in worry and depression following the intervention, 
however reductions in anxiety were non-significant. Participants in the CBT condition 
experienced significant reductions in depression and anxiety, however reductions in worry 
were not significant. Interestingly, all ACT participants completed treatment, whereas four 
individuals in the CBT group dropped out. 
Three studies have looked at the effectiveness of ACT interventions for social phobia. 
Ossman, Wilson, Storaasli, and McNeil (2006) conducted a preliminary investigation of the 
effectiveness of a group ACT intervention for social phobia. 12 adults diagnosed with social 
phobia received 10 two hour sessions of group ACT, the protocol for which was based 
around the central therapeutic elements of ACT and incorporated exposure, however no 
symptom-specific work included. The intervention was associated with a significant decrease 
on the social phobia and experiential avoidance measures at post-treatment and follow-up, 
with effect sizes of 0.83 and 1.71 respectively. In addition, participants’ ratings of 
effectiveness in living (specifically in social relationships) significantly increased at follow-
up. This study provides support for the ACT theoretical model in that social phobia 
symptoms decreased despite the fact that they were not specifically targeted as part of the 
treatment. Ossman and colleagues suggest that this symptom reduction may have occurred as 
a consequence of participants’ increased willingness to experience difficult emotions and 
engage in social behaviours that are values-consistent, but were previously avoided.  
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Dalrymple and Herbert (2007) conducted a pilot study on the effectiveness of ACT 
for Generalised Social Anxiety Disorder with a sample of 19 individuals diagnosed with 
social anxiety. The intervention incorporated a 12-week program incorporating ACT in 
addition to exposure techniques. Analyses of the findings revealed no changes across a 4-
week baseline control period, followed by significant improvements in symptoms and quality 
of life from pre-treatment to follow-up. There were large effect size gains, which were similar 
to those obtained by previous studies that have examined CBT for SAD. Treatment also 
resulted in significant changes in quality of life and ACT-consistent process measures, and 
earlier changes in experiential avoidance independently predicted later changes in symptom 
severity. The authors suggest, therefore, that further exploration of experiential avoidance as 
a potential mechanism of change in ACT is necessary. 
 Two studies have been conducted on ACT for obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). 
In a multiple baseline design involving four participants, ACT yielded positive outcomes for 
all participants (Twohig, Hayes, & Masuda, 2006). In a randomized clinical trial comparing 
ACT with progressive relaxation training (PRT) for OCD (Twohig et al., 2010), 79 adults 
with OCD received 8 sessions of either therapy, with no in-session exposure. Analyses 
revealed that ACT resulted in greater changes in OCD severity than PRT at post-treatment 
and follow-up, and produced greater changes on depression measures amongst participants 
reporting at least mild depression before treatment. Furthermore, quality of life improved in 
both conditions, but was marginally higher in the ACT condition at post-treatment.  
Two studies have looked at the application of ACT for panic disorder with 
agoraphobia. Meuret, Twohig, Rosenfiled, Hayes and Craske (2012) conducted a pilot study 
on brief ACT for panic disorder, in which 11 patients with panic disorder with or without 
agoraphobia received four sessions of ACT followed by six sessions of exposure therapy. The 
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intervention was associated with clinically significant improvements in panic symptom 
severity, increased mindfulness, and reductions in avoidant behavior. In a case study by 
López (2000), 12 sessions of ACT (which included exposure) resulted in notable reductions 
on all anxiety measures, a moderate reduction in worry (measured by the PSWQ), and 
substantial reduction in the frequency of panic attacks and engagement in escape behaviour.   
Finally, the application of ACT to PTSD is beginning to be explored. In a case study 
by Twohig (2009), an adult woman with treatment-resistant chronic PTSD and major 
depressive disorder was treated with 21 sessions of ACT for PTSD. Assessments undertaken 
throughout the intervention revealed significant reductions in PTSD severity, depression, 
anxiety, and trauma-related thoughts and beliefs, and an increase in psychological flexibility. 
Act for depression.  
Fewer studies have explored the impact of ACT on depressive disorders. Six RCTs 
have been conducted on ACT for depression. In an early a study by Zettle and Rains (1986), 
18 females with depression were randomly assigned to “comprehensive distancing” (CD, an 
early form of ACT; Hayes, 1987) cognitive therapy, delivered in individual format. 
Outcomes revealed that participants who received CD displayed a significantly greater 
decrease in depression, relative to individuals in the cognitive therapy condition (as measured 
by the Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression; HRSD). 
Zettle and Rains (1989) randomly assigned 31 depressed females to one of three 
treatment conditions: CD, complete cognitive therapy, and partial cognitive therapy (which 
did not include distancing strategies). Following treatment, all three groups displayed 
significant symptom improvement in depression, automatic thoughts, and dysfunctional 
attitudes. While there were no significant differences in treatment condition on any outcome 
measure and all conditions reported experiencing a decrease in the frequency of negative 
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automatic thoughts (as measured by the ATQ), individuals in the ACT condition reported 
rapid decrease in the believability of thoughts from pre- to post-treatment, relative to the 
cognitive therapy groups. This finding is consistent with the ACT model in that a goal of 
therapy is to teach individuals to defuse from the content of thoughts and see them as merely 
thoughts instead of facts. However, in terms of providing support for the efficacy of group 
ACT for depression, Forman et al. (2007) note that this study should be interpreted with 
caution, CD differs in many ways from modern ACT, and neither the ACT nor the CT 
protocols used in the study were as behaviourally-oriented as current standards. Furthermore, 
like the studies discussed earlier, this study had a small sample size. 
Bohlmeijer, Fledderus, Rokx and Pieterese (2001) explored the efficacy of an early 
intervention based on ACT for adults with depressive symptomatology in an RCT. Ninety-
three adults with mild to moderate depressive symptomatology were randomly assigned to 
either the ACT intervention or to a wait list control group. Treatment was group-based, 
comprising of eight two-hour weekly sessions delivered by psychologists. Participants 
completed measures of depression, anxiety, fatigue, alcohol use and acceptance before and 
after the intervention, and at three-month follow-up. The intervention resulted in a significant 
reduction in depressive symptomatology, anxiety and fatigue, and changes in depressive 
symptomatology were maintained at the three-month follow. Importantly, the follow-up 
effects were mediated by an increase in participants’ levels of acceptance.  
Hayes, Boyd, and Sewell (2011) conducted a pilot study on ACT for the treatment of 
depression amongst adolescents clinically referred to a psychiatric outpatient setting. Thirty 
adolescents diagnosed with depression were randomly allocated to receive either ACT or 
treatment as usual (TAU), being CBT. Study outcomes revealed that ACT participants 
showed significantly greater statistical improvement on depression measures than TAU 
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participants, with. Measures of global functioning revealed significant improvements for both 
groups, however clinical change measures supported the ACT group only, with 58% of 
adolescents in this condition showing clinically reliable change. Data taken at the 3-month 
follow-up suggested that improvements observed at post-treatment increased in magnitude. 
Folke, Parling, and Melin (2012) explored the effectiveness of ACT for depression in 
individuals on long-term sick leave amongst as sample of 34 unemployed Swedish adults. 
The study compared the effectiveness of an ACT intervention to a non-standardised control 
condition. Findings revealed that participants in the ACT condition improved significantly on 
measures of depression, general health and quality of life from pretreatment to follow-up (18 
months), relative to the control condition. However, the conditions did not differ at any point 
in employment status or sick leave, with large proportions of both groups remaining on 
disability pensions.  
In a study conducted in 2007, Forman and colleagues compared ACT and cognitive 
therapy (CT) as treatments for both anxiety and depression. This study involved a 
comparatively large sample of 101 outpatients reporting moderate to severe levels of anxiety 
and/or depression.  Participants were randomly allocated to either the ACT or the CT 
condition, and minimal exclusion criteria were used in order to enhance the generalisability 
of the findings to a wider community population. The therapists were doctoral students with 
no prior experience with either model. The ACT and CT conditions yielded equivalent results 
in terms of large improvements in depression, anxiety, functioning difficulties, quality of life, 
life satisfaction, and clinician-rated functioning. However, the mechanisms of change for 
each model were different: change amongst participants in the CT condition was mediated by 
observing and describing one’s experiences, while change in the ACT condition was 
mediated by experiential avoidance, acting with awareness and acceptance. Limitations 
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associated with this study include the fact that there was no control (wait list) group, and that 
a high number of participants (42.2% of the CT group and 33.9% of the ACT group) did not 
complete treatment.  
ACT for transdiagnostic psychological problems.  
In line with the fact that ACT views the same mechanisms as underlying all 
psychopathology, several studies have explored the effectiveness of ACT as a transdiagnostic 
therapy, that is, without including any symptom-specific therapeutic components.   
A Finnish study compared individual CBT and ACT therapy administered by student 
therapists (Lappalainen et al., 2007). There were 28 participants involved in the study, most 
of whom sought treatment for depression/mood problems and interpersonal problems (there 
was no inclusion or exclusion criteria). Participants were randomly assigned to either the 
ACT or CBT conditions, and each therapist was allocated one CBT client and one ACT 
client. Treatment consisted of 10 individual sessions, and both methods of therapy were 
manualised. Client outcome data was collected 3 times – between sessions 1 and 2, after the 
last treatment session, and 6 months after treatment completion. Results indicated positive 
results for both models in terms of improvement in psychopathological symptoms, 
depression, social functioning, mood and life satisfaction, and ACT clients showed better 
symptom improvement overall (as indicated by scores on the SCL-90 GSI (Global Severity 
Index of SCL-90; Derogatis & Cleary, 1977). At post-treatment, CBT had improved clients’ 
self-confidence to a greater degree than ACT, and ACT improved acceptance to a greater 
degree than CBT. Lappalainen and colleagues suggest that the use of student therapists was a 
strength of the study in that the therapists did not have extensive previous experience with 
either ACT or CBT, which minimizes allegiance effects and makes the findings more 
generalisable. However, limitations of this study include the fact that some aspects of CBT 
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with less specific empirical support were not included (e.g. cognitive restructuring), and some 
therapy techniques such as clarification of treatment goals and homework were included in 
both therapies. In addition, the sample size was small and the study did not target a specific 
clinical disorder, however the authors argue that this enhances the generalisability of the 
findings.  
Clarke, Kingston, Wilson, Bolderston and Remington (2012) also conducted a study 
with a transdiagnostic sample, looking at the impact of ACT on treatment resistant clients. 
There were 10 participants in the study, all of whom met criteria for Axis I presentations, and 
half of whom met criteria for Axis II disorders. Treatment, which was delivered in groups 
over 16 weeks, led to significant improvements in psychological complaints, depression, 
quality of life at post-treatment, acceptance and mindfulness at 6- and 12-month follow-up. 
The most marked reductions in symptomatology occurred at 6-month follow-up.  
Markanday and colleagues (2012) looked at the application of ACT for treatment- 
resistant depression in a sample of 19 individuals with treatment-refractory mood and anxiety 
disorders. A manualised ACT intervention was delivered within a group setting, over the 
course of four weekly sessions lasting 3 hours each. The intervention resulted in significant 
improvements of participants’ scores on the AAQ-II and the Self-Compassion Scale (Neff et 
al., 2007), which incorporates measures of self-kindness and mindfulness, and has been found 
to be correlated with anxiety and depression. Interestingly, Markanday et al. did not 
incorporate traditional measures of psychological symptomatology into this study, and did 
not include a follow-up assessment phase.  
The empirical status of ACT. 
Based on the literature discussed, it is clear that research has yielded some very 
promising findings regarding the effectiveness of ACT in treating anxiety disorders and 
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depression, in addition to transdiagnostic and treatment-resistant psychological problems. To 
summarise, the results of RCTs suggest that ACT performs just as well as CBT in treating 
depression and anxiety, with some studies suggesting that ACT may result in superior and 
longer-term symptom improvement (Arch et al., 2012; Bohlmeijer et al., 2011; Glaser et al., 
2008; Forman et al., 2007; Lappalainen et al., 2007; Zettle & Rains, 1989). Case studies and 
single group effectiveness studies lend further support, suggesting that ACT is an effective 
treatment for GAD (Roemer & Orsillo, 2007; Wetherall et al., 2011), social phobia 
(Dalymple & Herbert, 2007; Ossman et al., 2006), OCD (Twohig et al., 2006; 2010), panic 
disorder with and without agoraphobia (López, 2000; Meuret et al., 2012), PTSD (Twohig, 
2009), depression (Folke et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2011). 
Importantly, the research also indicates that ACT is associated with enhanced 
acceptance (Bohmeijer et al., 2001; Forman et al., 2007), mindfulness (Meuret et al., 2012), 
and psychological flexibility (Twohig, 2009), and reduced experiential avoidance (Dalymple 
& Herbert, 2007; Ossman et al., 2006). While few, the mediation analyses that have been 
done lend some support to the mediational effect of experiential avoidance and acceptance in 
producing symptom improvement (Bohmeijer et al.; Forman et al.). ACT has also been 
associated with improvements in quality of life (Clarke et al., 2012; Dalrymple & Herbert; 
Forman et al.; Twohig et al., 2010), self-compassion (Markanday et al., 2012), and 
effectiveness in living (Ossman et al.). Interestingly, none of the studies described included a 
measure of valued living, which is surprising given that this is one of the key hypothesized 
indicators of improvement within an ACT framework.  
In spite of the results of this relatively small albeit convincing body of research, there 
remain some areas of contention and confusion in the literature in regards to the empirical 
status of ACT.  In attempting to reconcile this and reach a conclusion about the empirical 
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status of ACT based on the findings of the meta-analyses described earlier (Öst, 2008; Power 
et al., 2009), Ruiz (2010) finds that:  (1) ACT is better than control and TAU conditions 
(Hayes et al., 2006; Öst, 2008; Power et al., 2009); (2) more evidence is required to 
determine if ACT is better than established treatments (Levin & Hayes, 2009; Powers et al., 
2009); (3) the RCTs conducted in ACT literature have methodological issues that could be 
improved (Öst, 2008).  
One thing that both ACT and CBT researchers are in agreement about is that there is a 
need for more research to be undertaken to further clarify the effectiveness of ACT in relation 
to a range of psychological issues. The next chapter of this thesis will discuss the application 
of ACT to worry and rumination by outlining a theoretical rationale for this application and 
the research evidence which provides support for this.  
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Chapter 5. The Application of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy to Worry and 
Rumination 
Chapter Overview 
The preceding chapters have established the importance of treating worry and 
rumination with targeted psychological interventions, and the limitations of the current 
treatment options have been highlighted. Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) has 
been proposed as a potentially effective treatment for worry and rumination, and a detailed 
outline of ACT has been provided to support this contention. As highlighted in Chapter 4, 
studies which have examined ACT in the treatment of anxiety and depression have not 
included an explicit focus on worry and rumination, in spite of the fact that there is very 
strong theoretical rationale for applying ACT in this area. This chapter will bring together the 
previous three chapters by providing a comprehensive rationale for the application of ACT to 
worry and rumination. In the first part of the chapter, a theoretical rationale for applying ACT 
to the treatment of worry and rumination will be provided. This rationale will draw on the 
theoretical consistency between the ACT model of psychopathology and the avoidance 
theory of worry and rumination, and the congruence between the characteristics of worry and 
rumination and the ACT therapeutic processes. The second part of this chapter will review 
the existing research on ACT for worry and rumination, which consists of three studies on 
ACT for worry in the context of GAD, and one study on ACT for rumination.  
ACT for worry and rumination: theoretical rationale. 
A key reason for the logical fit between ACT and worry and rumination is that 
conceptualisations of worry and rumination as mechanisms of experiential avoidance are 
theoretically consistent with the ACT model of psychopathology. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
Borkovec’s (1994) prominent avoidance model of worry suggests that chronic worry and 
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GAD are maintained by experiential avoidance of uncomfortable psychological experience. 
Rumination has also been conceptualized as a form of experiential avoidance, and 
preliminary research has supported this perspective (Cribb et al., 2006; Giorgio et al., 2010; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Furthermore, avoidance has also been linked to both worry 
and rumination in a behavioural sense, in that people who worry and ruminate commonly 
respond to unwanted thoughts with avoidance behaviours such as thought suppression and 
distraction, which often lead to a resurgence of negative thoughts and emotionality 
(Harrington, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). In light of the conceptualization of worry 
and rumination as forms of experiential avoidance, ACT is a highly appropriate and relevant 
treatment approach, as it specifically targets experiential avoidance in reducing psychological 
distress. In ACT, acceptance – the antidote to experiential avoidance – is cultivated as an 
alternative to strategies aimed at avoiding unwanted private experiences. Thus, if the 
individual is able to adopt an accepting standpoint in relation to their difficult emotions and 
cognitions and “make space” for their occurrence, this should reduce the impetus to manage 
difficult psychological experiences by worrying and ruminating.  
Researchers have highlighted the logical application of ACT to rumination and worry 
because of its emphasis on acceptance as an alternative to avoidance of difficult thoughts and 
emotions. Arch and Craske (2008) and Twohig (2012) have noted that acceptance may be a 
much more viable approach to dealing with cognitions like worry and rumination, which (as 
previously discussed) are difficult to dispute via argumentation and logic. That is, for 
individuals who experience pathological worry and rumination, learning to accept that they 
experiencing these thought processes rather than trying to grapple with them each time they 
occur is likely to be a far more feasible and adaptive strategy. This is also likely to be a more 
sustainable way of managing worry and rumination in the long-term, which is necessary 
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given that rumination and worry have been found to be relatively stable in individuals 
(Bagby, Rector, Bacchiochi, & McBride, 2004; Just & Alloy, 1997; Kuehner & Weber, 1999; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994). Acceptance may also provide 
an alternative to thought control strategies that are targeted at suppressing worry and 
ruminative thoughts, which research has been found to be ineffective in the long-term (e.g. 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Wenzlaff et al., 1988).  
Another important theoretical reason for applying ACT to the treatment of worry and 
rumination is ACT’s approach to dealing with cognition. Given that ACT focuses on 
fostering a context of acceptance surrounding the occurrence of distressing thoughts, rather 
than encouraging the engagement with the specific content of cognitions, an ACT approach 
should allow the individual to bypass the negative effects of thoughts suppression and 
cognitive restructuring, which have been found to be particularly detrimental for those who 
worry and ruminate excessively, leading to the exacerbation of repetitive negative thoughts 
(Beevers & Meyer, 2008; Hayes et al., 1999). While CBT “keeps an individual caught up in 
the cognitive world” (Twohig, 2012, p. ), the cognitive defusion component of ACT may be a 
valuable therapeutic strategy in helping the individual to distance themselves from the 
repetitive, seemingly uncontrollable processes of worry and rumination, by helping to 
undermine the literality of the cognitive content in these chains of thought. That is, the 
individual would learn to identify when they have become “caught up” in a cycle of worry or 
rumination, and could employ cognitive defusion techniques to distance themselves from the 
literal content of their thoughts. Thus, cognitive defusion provides a framework and specific 
techniques to release the individual is released from an internal struggle aimed at trying to 
suppress or change their thoughts, and is therefore afforded more opportunity to engage in the 
external world, in which effective changes can be made. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
109 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
this approach to managing cognitions is particularly suited to worry and rumination, given the 
futility of attempting to dispute thoughts that are generally immutable to rational logic, and 
which are likely to continue to re-occur in spite of disputation attempts.  
Acceptance and cognitive defusion are facilitated by mindfulness, and the strong 
emphasis of “being present” in ACT means that it is likely to be a highly useful approach for 
targeting worry and rumination. Twohig (2012) proposes that rumination and worry can be 
seen as the antithesis to being present, given that during these chains of negative repetitive 
thought the individual is stuck in the cognitive world in their mind. When an individual is 
worrying excessively they are not engaged in their present experience, they are mentally 
“fused” with thoughts of possible future threat. When someone ruminates, they are fused with 
perceived past failures and attempts at making sense of their problems and symptoms, rather 
than attending to their external world with mindful awareness. Mindfulness skills taught in 
ACT are likely to assist the individual to notice when they mentally caught up in a chain 
worry or rumination, and to refocus their attention to the present moment.  
The empirical research on mindfulness for worry and rumination (summarized in 
Chapter 3) lends support for the ACT’s effectiveness in treating negative repetitive thought. 
Sugiura (2004) found evidence for a negative relationship between worry and mindfulness, 
suggesting that as mindfulness increases, level of worry declines. Evans and Segerstrom 
(2010) established that mindfulness was correlated with less total repetitive thought, and with 
more positively valenced repetitive thought. Research by Watkins and various colleagues has 
found that mindfulness assisted depressed ruminators to shift themselves away from their 
ruminative thoughts and towards more effective problem-solving strategies and improvement 
in the quality of their thinking (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins, 2004; Watkins & 
Teasdale, 2004). The findings of the treatment studies on mindfulness for worry and 
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rumination suggest that mindfulness is effective in reducing worry and rumination (Craigie et 
al., 2008; Evans et al., 2008; Hilt & Pollack, 2012; Teasdale et al., 2000). A number of 
researchers have also highlighted the intuitive fit and potential value associated with using 
mindfulness to manage worry and rumination (Schmaling et al., 2002; Roemer & Orsillo, 
2002; Wenzlaff & Luxton, 2003). Schmaling and colleagues note: “to the extent that 
rumination characterizes depression, an intervention that cultivates the development of an 
observant, aware, and nongrasping mind may be more useful in stopping rumination than 
teaching the episodic skill of problem solving” (p. 355). 
ACT’s incorporation of acceptance, cognitive defusion, and mindfulness make it 
highly conducive to the treatment of worry and rumination. As discussed in Chapter Three, 
elements of these therapeutic components are present in some of the more recent 
interventions for worry and rumination, which target the process-related aspects of worry and 
rumination as opposed to cognitive content. For example, worry exposure (Craske et al., 
1992) can be seen as a form of cognitive defusion in that it facilitates change in one’s 
relationship with distressing mental images, as opposed to attempting to change the thoughts 
and images themselves. RFCBT (Watkins et al., 2007) encourages individuals to be mindful 
of when they begin to engage in rumination, to accept this cognitive process rather than 
attempting to minimize or eliminate its occurrence, and to focus change efforts on behavior 
alone. There is also a growing interest in the application of mindfulness to the treatment of 
both worry and rumination. MBCT, which has been found to be effective in the treatment of 
worry and rumination, does not engage with the content or specific meaning of thoughts, and 
emphasizes the view that “thoughts are not facts” and “I am not my thoughts” (Teasdale et 
al., 2000, p. 116– statements which would commonly form part of an ACT therapy session 
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also. The fact that these treatments have been found to be effective provide support for the 
hypothesis that ACT should also be effective in treating worry and rumination.  
There are also strong reasons why the other key aspects of ACT – self-as-context, 
committed action and values – would be beneficial in the treatment of worry and rumination. 
Self-as-context interventions should promote wellbeing and psychological flexibility by 
assisting the individual to distinguish their self-image that is derived from their ruminations 
and worries from the self that is the constant and neutral setting in which these events occur. 
Given that rumination and worry interfere with instrumental behaviour (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008) the committed action and values components of ACT may assist individuals in 
defusing from repetitive, aversive thoughts and making positive changes in their lives that are 
consistent with their values. These therapeutic components are yet to be explored and 
evaluated in the treatment of worry and rumination. 
No ACT technique is designed to be delivered in isolation, and it is likely that all 
ACT therapeutic processes would complement each other in alleviating worry and rumination 
in individuals with anxiety and depression. The combination of acceptance, mindfulness and 
cognitive defusion may allow the individual to notice when they are engaging in worry or 
rumination, tune into the underlying emotion and practice willingness to experience it, defuse 
from worry or ruminative cognitions, and redirect their attention to the present where there is 
the capacity for values-guided, committed action, which is likely to alleviate depressive and 
anxious symptomatology.  For example, through ACT training, an individual would learn to 
notice and observe their thoughts without having to struggle with them; they may also learn 
to identify when they are becoming entangled in a chain of worry and ruminative thoughts, 
and would able to notice and accept this habit of their mind, without going deeper into the 
thoughts in the attempt to try to understand or dispute them. They would use mindfulness and 
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acceptance techniques to “make space” for any underlying distressing emotion which may be 
present, which the episode of worry or rumination may have been triggered in the attempt to 
avoid. With greater awareness of their mental processes and increased engagement with the 
present moment, they have the flexibility to implement meaningful, values-based action. The 
repeat occurrence of this process is likely to lead to improved outcomes for the individual, in 
both their internal and external worlds.  Thus, as highlighted by Twohig (2012), ACT may 
provide a way for sufferers of chronic rumination and worry to bypass these processes by 
being mindful of their thoughts without engaging in cognitive content, and shifting their 
attention to the present moment where adaptive, valued action can take place.  
A final and important reason for using ACT to treat rumination and worry is that 
based on its view of the origins of all psychopathology, ACT is a transdiagnostic therapy, and 
rumination and worry have been found to be transdiagnostic psychological constructs. As 
outlined in Chapter 4, ACT is a transdiagnostic therapy which views the same maladaptive 
processes – experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion – as underlying all forms of 
psychological distress.  As a consequence, ACT treatment protocols cover the same key 
therapeutic components, with minimal focus on disorder-specific symptoms. ACT has been 
found to be effective in reducing symptomatology and improving quality of life amongst 
transdiagnostic samples (Clarke et al., 2012; Lappalainen et al., 2007; Markanday et al., 
2012). As such, ACT lends itself well to treating rumination and worry, which, while most 
closely associated with depression and anxiety, are present across a range of psychological 
disorders (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). Furthermore, given that rumination and worry have 
been conceptualized as forms of experiential avoidance, it would be expected that ACT 
would be effective in reducing the occurrence of negative repetitive thought without focusing 
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specifically on these constructs in treatment, given that an ACT intervention should result in 
reduced experiential avoidance overall.  
Research on ACT and worry and rumination 
ACT and worry. 
To date, there are no studies that have specifically evaluated the effectiveness of ACT 
for pathological worry. However, the research on ACT for GAD lends positive support to the 
application of ACT to the treatment of worry, given that worry is the hallmark symptom of 
GAD, and several studies (described in the previous chapter) have found that ACT resulted in 
significant reductions in worry and anxiety severity (Codd et al., 2011; Roemer & Orsillo, 
2007; Wetherall et al., 2011). Furthermore, there is some support for superiority of ACT 
relative to CBT in treating worry, based on the findings of Wetherall and colleagues’ 
randomized control trial. Thus, there is some preliminary empirical support to suggest the 
application of ACT as an intervention for worry. Furthermore, the strong conceptual fit 
between ACT and worry has been noted previously; Borkovec (2002) states that what is 
known about ACT and mindfulness-based therapies and what is known about GAD and 
worry “overlap so considerably that the possibility of an integration of their respective 
conceptualisations and treatment techniques is compelling and nearly seamless” (p. 76).  
ACT and rumination. 
At present, only one study has looked specifically at the efficacy of ACT for 
rumination. This study by Harrington (2008) compared a brief, group-skills-learning ACT-
based intervention to thought control techniques amongst a non-clinical population of self-
reported ruminators. The participants were 10 psychology students who reported frequent, 
consistent distress from efforts to control unwanted negative thoughts. The format was a 
single-case, repeated measures, multiple baseline across participants experimental design, 
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incorporating a screening phase and an experimental phase. All participants received two 90-
minute thought control placebo (TCP) sessions (these were not actual therapy sessions) 
followed by two 90-minute ACT-based interventions delivered in a group-skills learning 
format. The ACT therapy comprised components drawn from an ACT manual and exercises 
adapted to apply to rumination. The results of the study indicated that experiential avoidance 
and believability of ruminative thoughts decreased from the TCP intervention to the ACT 
intervention. In addition, thought suppression decreased moderately from TCP to ACT for 
half of the participants.  
Overall, this study and the literature on ACT for GAD lend preliminary support for 
the usefulness of ACT as a treatment for worry and rumination. It is clear, therefore, that 
more research is needed to clarify whether the strong theoretical rationale for applying ACT 
to the treatment of negative repetitive thought translates to empirically-supported and 
clinically-relevant outcomes. 
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Chapter 6. Study One: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for worry and 
rumination: a qualitative and quantitative n=1 analysis 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter is comprised of a review of the first of two studies which were conducted 
to empirically examine the present research question. This chapter provides a detailed review 
of Study One, which is a combined quantitative and qualitative case study of the 
effectiveness of ACT for worry and rumination. This chapter will first provide a description 
of the study, including the study aims and hypotheses. Four hypotheses pertaining to the 
effectiveness of ACT for worry and rumination, psychological symptomatology, ACT-related 
variables, and functionality will be presented. A detailed outline of the study will be 
provided, including a description of the participant, measures, assessment and intervention 
procedures, and approach to data analysis. The quantitative and qualitative results will then 
be presented. In the final part of the chapter, the discussion will summarise the findings of the 
study, addressing each research hypothesis and in turn discussing the findings in relation to 
the broader theoretical and research literature. This chapter will conclude with an overall 
summary of the findings of Study One, a discussion of the study’s implications and 
limitations, and suggestions for future research.  
Study Description, Aims and Hypotheses 
As discussed in chapters 1 and 2, worry and rumination are key cognitive processes 
implicated in the onset and maintenance of a range of psychological disorders, and depression 
and anxiety in particular (Borkovec et al., 1983; Covin et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Siegle et al., 2004; Teasdale et al., 2000; Watkins, 2008; 
Watson, 2005). Worry causes significant distress and is associated with impaired processing 
of negative affect (Borkovec et al., 1983; Borkovec et al., 1998). Likewise, rumination is a 
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key feature in residual depression, and has been found to be resistant to change (Teasdale et 
al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2007). In spite of their well-recognised negative correlates, however, 
only a handful of studies have examined the effects of specifically targeting worry and 
rumination in the treatment of depression and anxiety. Furthermore, no research has 
examined the impact of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy on worry and rumination. 
There is a strong theoretical rationale for using ACT for worry and rumination. ACT 
views experiential avoidance and psychological inflexibility as underlying all 
psychopathology, and the therapeutic processes associated with ACT are targeted at reducing 
experiential avoidance and increasing acceptance (Hayes et al., 1999). Research has shown 
that ACT is effective in reducing avoidance of internal experiences (Roemer, Orsillo, & 
Salters-Pedneault, 2008; Roemer, Salters, Raffa, & Orsillo, 2005). Given that worry and 
rumination have both been conceptualized as forms of experiential avoidance (Borkovec, 
1994; Giorgio et al., 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), an ACT intervention may be able 
to create a shift in the frequency and intensity with which one engages in these processes. 
Other key therapeutic processes which are part of ACT interventions may also be effective in 
reducing worry and rumination. Cognitive defusion techniques may assist the individual in 
mentally stepping back from their worry and ruminative cognitions and disengaging from the 
cycle of repetitive thought, promoting greater psychological flexibility and the opportunity 
for more workable action to take place. Mindfulness may be effective in helping worriers and 
ruminators to cope by teaching them to engage in the present moment instead of their 
maladaptive thought processes (Schmaling et al., 2002). Finally, given that rumination and 
worry interfere with instrumental behaviour (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), the committed 
action and values components of ACT may assist individuals in defusing from repetitive, 
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aversive thoughts and making positive changes in their lives which are conducive to 
psychological health. 
Given that there has been no published research to date on ACT for rumination and 
worry, a single case design is warranted to explore the effectiveness of this approach. Kazdin 
(2010) argues that there is an important role for single-case designs in exploring new fields of 
research where interventions may not be well developed. Case study designs are commonly 
used as a first step to establishing the effectiveness of an intervention or therapeutic modality 
for a psychological disorder, before this is investigated experimentally. For example, in the 
ACT literature, case studies have recently been used to explore the impact of ACT for 
Asperger Syndrome (Cook, 2000), panic disorder with agoraphobia (Lopez, 2000), PTSD 
(Twohig, 2009),  relationship difficulties (Peterson, Eifert, Feingold, & Davidson, 2009), and 
anorexia nervosa (Berman, Boutelle, & Crow, 2009).  
The present study adopted a combined quantitative and qualitative case study 
approach. Qualitative and quantitative research methods are often combined to form a “mixed 
methods” approach, as qualitative research enhances quantitative findings by adding richness 
of insight and capturing an individual perspective (Howitt, 2010). To date, there has been no 
published research on ACT that has incorporated a qualitative component. A qualitative 
examination of ACT will offer insight into how an ACT intervention is perceived by the most 
important element of the therapeutic equation – the client. Qualitative research into an 
individual’s experience of ACT can provide an indication of the extent to which they feel 
engaged with the ACT approach and core therapeutic process, factors which are key to the 
overall impact of any psychological intervention. Qualitative analysis also affords a deep and 
specific understanding of the perceived outcomes of an ACT intervention, and the 
identification of what the individual perceives to be the most important treatment 
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components; details which are often lost in the collection and analysis of quantitative, self-
report, pre- versus post-treatment data. In the present case study, qualitative research was 
used to explore a single individual’s experience of participating in an ACT intervention, their 
attitudes towards ACT, and their perceptions of the impact of ACT on their psychological 
distress, worry and rumination.  
The primary aim of this study was to explore the impact of the ACT therapeutic 
processes (acceptance, cognitive defusion, mindfulness, self-as-context, committed action 
and values) on engagement in worry and rumination - two maladaptive cognitive processes 
which have been implicated in the development and maintenance of anxiety and depression.  
Based on a review of the literature presented in Chapters Two to Five the following 
hypotheses were formulated: 
Hypothesis 1: It was predicted that the participant would experience a substantial and 
clinically meaningful reduction in worry and rumination following the ACT intervention, 
which would be maintained at the 3-month follow-up 
Hypothesis 2: It was predicted that the participant would experience a substantial and 
clinically meaningful reduction in clinical symptomology (depression and anxiety) following 
the ACT intervention, and that this would be maintained at follow-up  
Hypothesis 3: It was predicted that the participant would experience a substantial and 
clinically meaningful reduction in experiential avoidance and an increase in mindfulness and 
valued living following the ACT intervention, and that these changes would be maintained at 
follow-up 
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Hypothesis 4: It was predicted that the participant would experience a substantial and 
clinically meaningful reduction in functional impairment following the ACT intervention, 
and that this would be maintained at follow-up. 
Method  
Participant.  
The participant was a 24-year-old female Australian student who lived with her 
boyfriend. She had experienced anxiety and depression for approximately 10 years, and had 
spent time in an inpatient psychiatric unit. Her treatment history included psychological 
therapy (including CBT in individual and group format), counselling, and pharmacotherapy. 
At the time of screening assessment the participant met DSM-IV criteria for anxiety disorder 
not otherwise specified, minor depressive disorder, and past major depressive disorder 
recurrent. The participant was not engaged in any other form of psychological therapy or 
counselling at the time of treatment, however she was not prevented from doing so as a result 
of her involvement in the study. She was taking anti-depressant medication (SSRI), and 
continued to do so for the duration of the ACT intervention.  
The participant was one of three individuals who participated in the ACT group 
treatment. She was selected to be the subject of this n=1 analysis for purely pragmatic 
reasons. She was the only participant in the group program who responded to invitations from 
the researcher (made by phone and email) to take part in the post-intervention qualitative 
interview. Potential participants for the group intervention aged between 18 and 65 years who 
were suffering from depression and/or anxiety were invited to participate through 
advertisements placed at the RMIT University Bundoora campus (including the RMIT 
psychology clinic and counselling service) and the Anxiety Disorders Association of Victoria 
support group meetings, the RMIT student web portal, a press release from the RMIT media 
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centre, and various mental health websites (including beyondblue and Anxiety Recovery 
Centre of Victoria). General practitioners in the Bundoora and surrounding area were also 
informed about the study and encouraged to refer suitable and interested patients.  
The inclusion criteria for participation in the study were a diagnosis of minor or major 
depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder or an anxiety disorder where worry and rumination are 
prominent features (i.e. generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder with or without agoraphobia, 
social phobia, and specific phobia). Individuals who met the inclusion criteria but who had co-
morbid psychosis, suicidal intent, obsessive compulsive disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder or an 
eating disorder were excluded from participating in the study. Eligibility for participation in the 
study was assessed using the  
Measures.  
Screening measures.  
Eligibility for participation in the ACT intervention was assessed using the  Modified Mini 
Screen (MMS; Alexander, Haugland, Lin, Bertollo & McCorry, 2006) and the depression and 
anxiety modules of the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Patient Edition (SCID-I/P; 
First, Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 2007). The MMS is a mental health screening tool which consists 
of 22 items covering current symptoms of major depression, dysthymia, suicidality, hypomania, 
panic, agoraphobia, social phobia, obsessive compulsive disorder, PTSD, psychosis and generalized 
anxiety. Alexander et al. note that the internal consistency of the MMS, measured by Chronbach’s 
alpha is excellent (0.92), inter-rater agreement is excellent (92%), and test–retest reliability, based on 
42 screens, is good overall (79%), with 100% agreement when administrations were performed 
within 1 week. The Negative Predictive Value of the MMS ranges from 0.75 to 0.82, meaning that 
approximately three quarters to four fifths of the time, the clinician can be sure that a person who is 
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not identified as having a mental health problem actually does not meet criteria for a current 
psychiatric diagnosis. 
The SCID-I/P is a standardised semi-structured clinical interview and commonly used to 
assess psychopathology and to screen for participant suitability for research. The participant was 
asked questions about the nature and severity of her symptoms, based on the DSM-IV-TR criteria. 
Several studies (Basco et al., 2000, Fenning et al., 1994; Fenning et al., 1996; Kranzler, et al., 1995; 
Kranzler et al., 1996) have demonstrated superior validity of the SCID-I/P over standard clinical 
interviews at intake episode. The most recent and comprehensive study of the reliability of the SCID-
I/P (for DSM-III) yielded kappa values of .80 for Major Depressive Disorder (indicating good 
agreement) and .63 for GAD (indicating fair agreement; Zanarini et al., 2000).  
Self-report measures.  
The participant completed 7 questionnaires (see Appendix A) before and after the 
intervention and at the 3-month follow-up. She also completed 3 of these measures (those measuring 
depression and anxiety symptomatology, rumination and worry) each week during the intervention, 
before each group session. The following self-report questionnaires were completed by the 
participant to measure 10 variables: mental health difficulties (depression, anxiety and stress), 
rumination, worry, experiential avoidance, dispositional mindfulness, valued living, and functional 
impairment. 
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale -21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond’s, 1995). The 
DASS-21 is a measure of symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. The 21-item scale consists of 
three 7-item self-report subscales taken from the 42-item full version of the DASS. The subscales 
measure the extent to which an individual has experienced depression, anxiety and stress over the 
past week as rated on a 4-point severity scale ranging from 0 = “Did not apply to me at all” to 3 = 
“Applied to me very much or most of the time”.  Internal consistency of the DASS-21 scale has been 
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reported to be high for the Depression scale ( = .88), Anxiety scale ( = .82), Stress scale ( = .90) 
and for the total scale ( = .93). The DASS-21 has also demonstrated good construct validity against 
independent measures of depression, anxiety and stress (Henry & Crawford, 2005). 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow‚ 1991). The RRS is a 22-
item measure which asks the individual to rate the extent to which they experience responses to 
depressed mood that are self-focused, symptom focused, and focused on the possible consequences 
and causes of the mood on a scale from 1 = “Almost never” to 4 = “Almost always”. The two 
subscales of the RRS, reflection and brooding, show good reliability, with coefficient alphas of .72 
and .77 respectively, and test re-test correlations of r=.60 and r=.62 respectively (Treynor, Gonzalez, 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). The 
PSWQ is a 16-item scale assessing general worry. Participants are asked to rate how typical items 
are of themselves, where 1 = “Not at all typical” and 5 = “Very typical”, generating a range of total 
scores from 0–80. Items include ‘‘I worry if I do not have enough time to do everything’’ or ‘‘Many 
situations make me worry.’’  Meyer et al. report that the PSWQ is a valid measure of worry, with 
high test-retest reliability (=.95) and high internal consistency (=.91).  
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011). The AAQ-II is a 7- 
item, self-report measure of experiential avoidance, or the tendency to avoid negative private events 
such as thoughts, feelings or bodily sensations. An example of a typical item is “It’s ok if I remember 
something unpleasant”. The participant was instructed to rate how true each of the 10 statements was 
for them using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = “Never true” to 7 = “Always true”. Higher 
scores indicate a greater level of experiential avoidance and psychological inflexibility. Scores from 
the AAQ-II correlate significantly with measures to which they are theoretically connected, such as 
depression, anxiety and overall psychological distress, and do not correlate significantly with a 
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measure of social desirability, thus supporting their validity. In a total sample of 2,816 participants 
across six studies, Bond et al. found the AAQ-II to have high internal consistency, with a mean alpha 
coefficient of .84, and good 3- and 12- month test-retest reliability, at .81 and .79 respectively(Bond 
et al.).  
The Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown, 2003). The MAAS is a 15-item 
questionnaire that measures dispositional mindfulness. Sample items include “I rush through 
activities without being really attentive to them” and “I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then 
wonder why I went there”. The participant was asked to report how often she believes she has 
experiences by rating each item on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 = “Almost always” to “Almost 
never”. Higher total scores reflect higher dispositional mindfulness. Cronbach’s alpha for the MAAS 
was reported to be high (α = .85; Brown, 2003). 
Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ; Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens & Roberts, 2010). The VLQ 
is a 2-part self-report questionnaire, designed to measure valued living, defined as “the extent to 
which an individual contacts his or her chosen values in everyday life” (Wilson et al., p. 254). The 
first part measures which domains of living the individual chooses to value, and consists of a 10-
point Likert scale where participants rate the importance of 10 domains of living from 1 =  “Not at 
all important” to 10 = “Extremely important”. The second part of the VLQ measures how 
consistently the respondent is living in accord with each of the 10 valued domains of living from 1 = 
“Not at all consistent” to 10 = “Extremely consistent”. A Valued Living composite score represents 
how consistent the individual has been in living in accord with their important values across all life 
domains, with higher scores indicating higher values consistency. Internal consistency of the VLQ 
Valued Living composite is reported to be good with a coefficient alpha value of .77 reported in a 
non-clinical undergraduate student sample (Wilson et al., 2010) and .75 in a moderately depressed 
undergraduate sample (Bourchier & Davis, 2008).   
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Sheehan Disability Scale (Leon, Shear, Portera, & Klerman, 1992). The Sheehan Disability 
Scale is a 3-item self-rated measure that assesses functional impairment in the areas of work, social 
and family life. The scale has been reported to be sensitive to change over time and is a valid and 
reliable measure of the functional impact of symptomatology (Leon et al.).   
Procedure. 
Assessment Procedure.  
The participant was administered the depression and anxiety modules of the SCID I/P and the 
MMS by the author, during one assessment session. The author had previously received training in 
diagnostic interviewing using both assessment tools. The participant completed a questionnaire 
package containing all outcome measures at three time points: prior to receiving the intervention, 
post-intervention, and at a 3-month follow-up. The pre-intervention questionnaire package was given 
to the participant immediately after the initial assessment interview, and she returned the completed 
package at the first group session. She completed the post-intervention questionnaire package during 
the week following the last session of the program, and returned it via post. The follow-up 
questionnaire was provided and returned via post. In addition to the three main assessment occasions, 
the participant completed the measures of psychological symptomatology, worry, and rumination on 
a weekly basis throughout the duration of the intervention, before the beginning of each group 
session. Following the completion of the treatment, the participant was interviewed about her 
experience of participating in the ACT intervention and her impressions of ACT.  
Treatment Procedure.  
The ACT intervention was delivered in group format by two therapists over 9 weeks (7 
sessions in total). The therapists were the author and another provisional psychologist who was 
undertaking her Master of Clinical Psychology degree. The protocol was designed to involve 8 
weekly sessions of two hours each in duration, however due to group members’ personal 
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commitments and timing factors, no therapy session took place in week three, and sessions seven and 
eight were combined and run in the final week. Clinical supervision was provided to the therapists by 
the project supervisor, and the group sessions were video recorded for the purposes of supervision 
and adherence to the treatment protocol. The participant completed the baseline measures (T1) prior 
to the first group session, and weekly measures were completed before the commencement of each 
group session. Post-treatment measures were completed by the participant within a week following 
the cessation of the intervention. Follow-up measures were completed 3 months after the last 
treatment session. All measures were paper-based. The baseline and post-treatment measures were 
provided to the participant following the assessment interview and final group session. The baseline 
questionnaire package was returned by the participant in person at the initial group session, and the 
post-treatment questionnaire was returned by post. The follow-up measures were provided and 
returned by post. 
The treatment was based on a manualised protocol adapted from the treatment manual 
developed by Glaser, Blackledge, Shepherd, & Deane (2009) used in their study on brief group ACT 
for anxiety. While ACT is a transdiagnostic therapy and is therefore broadly applicable, two extra 
sessions were added to the protocol to ensure that thoughts and emotions more closely related to 
depression were also covered. These additional sessions were drawn from Zettle’s (2007) “ACT for 
Depression” protocol. Table 1 outlines the core areas covered in each treatment session. 
 
Table 1.  
ACT group treatment overview 
 
Session Activities 
1. Introduction to Group Therapy and 
Creative Hopelessness 
 General Introduction & setting therapeutic frame 
 Introduction to the nature of treatment 
 Initial problem discussion 
 Creative hopelessness – discussion of patterns and costs 
of avoidance 
 Homework – Rationale for LIFE exercises and Daily 
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ACT Ratings 
 Questions and concerns 
2. Control is the Problem and 
Introduction to the Why and How of 
Willingness 
 Centering exercise 
 Homework review – LIFE exercises and Daily ACT 
Ratings 
 Control is the problem 
 Nature and function of normal fear and anxiety 
 Nature and function of normal sadness and depression 
 Willingness as an alternative to control 
 Carrying your pain exercise 
 Homework – LIFE exercises and Daily ACT Ratings 
 
3. Building Acceptance by Defusing 
Language and Negative Automatic 
Thoughts 
 Exercise – being willing to be out of breath 
 Homework Review – LIFE exercises and Daily ACT 
Ratings 
 Learning to accept thoughts and feelings through 
mindfulness 
 Undermining the power of language and introducing 
defusion 
 Defusing negative automatic thoughts 
 Exercise – being willing to be out of breath 
 Homework – reasons for depression/anxiety exercise 
and taking inventory exercise 
 
4. Mindfulness and Defusion for 
Reason-Giving 
 Homework review – reasons for depression/anxiety 
exercise and taking inventory exercise; review defusion 
practice 
 Distinguishing self-evaluations from descriptions 
 Reasons for depression and anxiety exercise 
 Defusing reason giving – why, why, why? Exercise, flat 
tire metaphor, Get off your “buts” intervention 
 Raisin exercise  
 Mindfulness of the hand 
 Homework - performing daily activities mindfully 
 
5. Self-as-context and Introduction to 
Values 
 Review homework 
 Breathing mindfully exercise 
 Thinking self vs Observing self  
 Values dignify willingness and make the hard work 
worthwhile 
 Indirect values assessment  
 Making a commitment 
 Homework – writing your life story exercise, 
mindfulness exercise 
 
6. Developing Self-as-context and 
Promoting Value-Guided Action in 
the Real World 
 Review homework 
 Breathing mindfully exercise 
 Review of life compass and commitment 
 Building awareness of self as context 
 Rationale for FEEL exercises 
 Determining appropriate interoceptive feel exercises 
 Interoceptive FEEL exercises 
 Discussion of homework 
 
7. Bringing it All Together: Building 
Acceptance and Value-guided 
 Centering exercise 
 Homework review 
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Behaviour in the Real World  Imagery FEEL exercises 
 Nature of commitment and managing barriers to goals
  
 Mindfulness and acceptance of perceived anxiety 
barriers to goal achievement 
 Discussion of homework 
 
8. Staying Committed to Value-guided 
Behaviour 
 Mindfulness exercise 
 Review of goal achievement homework 
 General discussion 
 Managing success and failure 
 Break 
 Treatment summary 
 Relapse prevention: Maintaining processes and learning 
 Post treatment evaluation – feedback/questions 
 
Qualitative Interview.  
The participant took part in a qualitative interview about her experience of participating in the 
ACT intervention and her impressions of ACT. The participant was invited to take part in this 
interview as an opportunity to provide feedback on the treatment program, and she was informed that 
she was under no obligation to participate.  
The interview occurred approximately 6 months after the final session of the ACT 
program, and was 60 minutes in duration. The interview was conducted by the author, and 
was semi-structured in that the participant was asked several questions devised by the author, 
yet she was encouraged to speak freely about her experience of ACT and the group program, 
and to discuss and elaborate on topics as they arose. The areas of coverage included in the 
interview are presented in table 2. 
Table 2.  
Qualitative Interview Areas of Coverage 
 
Topic Example questions 
Introduction  Explain the purpose of the qualitative research 
Reflecting on the group program 
 
 What was your experience of the ACT group 
program? 
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 What did you like about group therapy? 
 What did you find challenging about group therapy?  
 What would you change if you could? 
 
Positives and negatives of ACT 
 
 What did you like about ACT? 
 What didn’t you like about ACT? 
 What – if anything – did ACT bring to your life that 
was new/different? 
 In your opinion and experience, how does ACT 
compare with other psychological therapies? 
 
The Impact of the ACT group 
program: perceptions at post-
treatment  
 
 What techniques and strategies did you find 
helpful/what “worked” for you?  
 How did it work? 
 How did the ACT group program impact your 
depression and anxiety? 
 How did the ACT group program impact your 
worry and rumination? 
 Was there a specific session/exercise/moment in 
the program that you recall as having the greatest 
impact on you? How? 
 
The impact of the ACT group 
program: current perceptions 
 
 What – if anything – do you still use from the ACT 
program? (Probe for specific techniques, 
metaphors, ways of looking at things, etc.) 
 How, if at all, do you use the following  
- Willingness/acceptance 
- Cognitive defusion 
- Mindfulness 
- Self-as-context/the observer self 
- Values 
- Committed action 
 How do you use these? 
 Overall, what was the most important thing 
you got out of your involvement in the ACT 
group program? 
 
Ethical Considerations. 
This project was approved by the RMIT University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Project No. 62/10; see Appendices B and C). Prior to taking part in the 
intervention, the participant was provided with a plain language statement outlining the 
purpose of the research, the relevant questions being addressed, requirements associated with 
participation, potential risks and disadvantages of involvement, information regarding data 
management, the individual’s rights as a participant, the voluntary nature of participation and 
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the contact details of the principal investigator and project supervisors (see Appendix D). 
Following the ACT intervention, the participant was invited to participate in the qualitative 
interview, and was informed that she was under no obligation to do so (as previously stated, 
the other two participants who took part in the ACT intervention did not respond to the 
invitation to participate in the interview). The participant was informed of the purpose of the 
interview and was encouraged to be honest in her feedback. Both the interview and the 
treatment sessions were video recorded, and the recording of the interview was then 
transcribed by the author. A number of measures were taken to protect the participant’s 
privacy. All digital data was stored on a secure server, password protected and de-identified. 
A document containing the participant’s contact details was kept separate from other research 
data. Access to both digital and hard-copy data was restricted to the researcher and the 
supervisors. All completed measures and assessments generated in the course of the project 
were stored in a locked filing cabinet located within the Discipline of Psychology and 
electronic data were stored on a secure RMIT server with access granted only to the 
researcher and the supervisors. Video footage was stored in a locked filing cabinet in the 
clinic that was accessible only to the researcher.  All video footage and participant 
information will be kept for 5 years after the completion of the project and subsequently 
destroyed. Electronic data will be disposed of through an approved method of electronic 
deletion, and paper materials will be shredded.  
Data Analysis.  
Quantitative analysis.  
The effectiveness of the intervention was explored by examining the degree of change in 
outcome measures that occurred across the three assessment points and by determining whether this 
change was reliable and clinically meaningful.  
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Inference by eye.  
Consistent with single-subject research, visual inspection of the participant’s scores on all 
outcome measures was used to determine the effect of the intervention using a technique called 
inference by eye (Cumming & Finch, 2005). A set of graphs were created and the participant’s 
scores at pre-intervention, post-intervention, and 3-month follow-up were plotted for visual 
inspection. Standard error of measurement (SEm) bars were included in these graphs so that change 
could be assessed using inference by eye. Two independent raters who were not involved in the 
study rated each graph according to criteria specified by Wade (2007). The raters were a registered 
psychologist experienced in visual inspection, and a provisional psychologist. The two independent 
raters evaluated each graph according to the following criteria: 
1. Substantial change – data demonstrated that the intervention resulted in a significant increase 
or decrease in the variable (i.e., an increase towards the maximum possible score; decrease 
towards the minimum possible score). That is, a gap between the Standard Error of 
Measurement bars was clear and evident. 
2. Moderate change – data demonstrated that the intervention resulted in a clear increase to 
decrease in the variable; but the change was not sufficient to be considered substantial. That a 
minimal overlap between the Standard Error of Measurement bars was evident. 
3. No change – data demonstrated that the intervention resulted in no change in the variable 
across time. Significant overlap between the Standard Error of Measurement bars was 
evident. 
A graphical representation of these criteria is presented in Figure 1. 
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             Substantial change            Moderate change              No change 
 
Figure 1. Inference by eye change criteria 
 
The raters were given these criteria, along with a set of instructions (see Appendix F) 
detailing how to complete the visual inspection task. Each graph summarises the participant’s pre-
intervention, post-intervention, and follow-up data for a particular variable. Each graph was 
presented to the raters on an A4 sheet of paper, and the variable name that the graph represented was 
not shown on the graph, so as not to influence raters’ opinions. Percentage of agreement was then 
calculated between the independent raters. If the raters disagreed on the rating for any of the graphs, 
then they conferred until an agreement could be reached, resulting in a 100% agreement rate.  
Reliable and clinical change.  
To supplement the findings from visual inspection, the participant’s data over the three points 
of measurement were analysed to determine whether reliable and clinically meaningful change had 
occurred. The Clinical Change Generator component of ClinTools version 4 (Devilly, 2005) was 
used to assess reliable and clinical change. This program relies on Jacobson and Truax’s (1991) 
approach to calculating reliable change, and therefore takes into account the Standard Error of the 
Difference (SEd) between two administrations of the test. Thus, when there is change that occurs 
over and above the SEd, it is likely that this is due to a genuine difference rather than the 
psychometric properties of the measure, and it can therefore be considered reliable change. The 
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program provides three confidence intervals for assessing reliable change. In interpreting the present 
data, all changes in the participant’s outcome measures that occurred with 95% confidence (1.96 SD) 
or above were considered reliable change. 
Once a change in scores has been found to be reliable it is possible to determine whether this 
change is clinically meaningful. According to Jacobson and Truax (1991), the assumption can be 
made that individuals enter therapy with certain problems, and that the expectation is that therapy 
will reduce or eliminate these problems. As such, those entering therapy are considered to be part of 
a dysfunctional or clinical population. Those who successfully complete therapy should no longer 
fall into this population, and ideally should return to the levels of the normal population. Thus, 
Jacobson and Truax suggest three criteria for assessing whether clinically meaningful change has 
occurred: the individual’s post-treatment level of functioning is outside of the range of the 
dysfunctional population, where range is defined as extending to two standard deviations beyond the 
mean for that population, in the direction of functionality (Criterion A); the individual’s post-
treatment level of functioning falls within the range of the normal population (Criterion B); and the 
individual’s post-treatment level of functioning is closer to the mean of the functional population 
than to the mean of the clinical population (Criterion C). Either criterion A, B or C can be used to 
determine whether clinical change has occurred, and the criterion that is selected is often dependent 
on the availability of data for normative and clinical samples (Devilly, 2005). For the present study, 
Criterion C was used to assess clinical change on all outcome measures except the SDS, as 
normative and clinical data was available for these measures. Criterion A was used to measure 
clinical change on the SDS, as data for a clinical population only was available for this measure.   
Qualitative analysis.  
The interview with the participant was transcribed and analysed using the thematic analysis 
approach outlined by Braun and Clarke (2006). This approach has been validated in numerous 
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studies, including Bell and Treleaven (2011) and Hellsten and Prytula (2011). This approach 
includes six phases: familiarization with the data, generation of initial codes, search for themes, 
review of themes, definition and naming of themes, and selection of extracts. The first phase, 
familiarization with the data, involved immersion in the data through the transcription and repeated 
reading of the interview. The second phase, generation of initial codes, involved the line-by-line 
coding of the data, designed to capture the key themes in each segment of the text. The coding was 
data-led rather than theoretically-led, in that the coding was determined by what was in the text 
rather than guided by a theoretical framework of some sort. The third phase involved searching for 
themes, that is, exploring commonalities and contradictions between codes. Six key themes were 
identified, and the relevant extracts of text were organized under these themes. These themes were 
refined further in the fourth phase, review of themes. This phase involved reviewing the relevance 
of the themes and checking them against the original data to ensure that they were accurate and 
representative. Themes were clarified to ensure that they were internally coherent, consistent, and 
distinctive (Braun & Clarke, 2006), and some data was recoded at this point. In the fifth phase, 
definition and naming of themes, each theme was labeled and defined based on its unique story and 
its contribution to the story of the data as a whole (Braun & Clarke). The sixth and final phase of 
the thematic analysis involved the selection of extracts to illustrate the themes. 
Results 
Quantitative results.  
The participant’s scores at pre-intervention (T1), post-intervention (T9), and follow-
up (T10), are displayed in the figures below. The results of the reliable and clinical change 
analyses are represented in table 3. To be considered meaningful, change needed to occur in 
both inference by eye and reliable and clinically significant change analyses. Based on these 
criteria, meaningful change was observed in the participant’s scores on measures of 
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rumination, anxiety, stress, mindfulness, and disability following the intervention, and 
reductions in rumination, anxiety and stress were maintained at 3-month follow-up. A 
moderate reduction was observed in the participant’s experiential avoidance at post-
treatment. 
The participant’s scores on the PSWQ and RRS over the nine assessment points are 
displayed in figure 2.  There was some moderate change in the participant’s worry scores 
during the intervention (beginning at T3), however worry increased again towards the end of 
the intervention, and there was no overall change in worry scores from pre- to post-
treatment..  Inference by eye analysis indicated a substantial reduction in rumination at post-
treatment (which also began at T3), which was maintained at 3-month follow-up.  Reliable 
and clinical change analysis indicated that the reduction in rumination was reliable and 
clinically meaningful (see table 3).   
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Figure 2. Weekly worry scores as measured by the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
and weekly rumination scores as measured by the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) for 
participant one from  baseline (T1), to post-treatment (T9) and follow-up (T10). 
 
Figure 3 represents the participant’s scores on the DASS across the nine assessment 
points. There was no change across the treatment in depression scores, however the 
participant’s depression score was in the normal range at baseline. A substantial reduction in 
anxiety scores was detected at post-treatment, and was maintained at follow-up. This change 
was found to be reliable and clinically meaningful (see table 3).  Stress scores decreased 
substantially from baseline to follow-up, and represented reliable and clinically significant 
change.  The substantial reduction in stress was also maintained at follow-up. 
 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10
D
ep
re
ss
io
n
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 T7 T8 T9 T10
A
n
x
ie
ty
136 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.Weekly depression, anxiety and stress scores on the Depression Anxiety and Stress 
scale (DASS-21) for the participant from baseline (T1), post-treatment (T9) and follow-up (T10). 
The participant’s scores on the ACT process measures are depicted in figure 4.  A moderate 
change was detected in experiential avoidance scores from baseline to follow-up, however 
this was not reliable or clinically meaningful. No change was detected in valued living scores. 
There was substantial change in mindfulness scores from baseline to post-treatment, which 
was reliable and clinically significant. The increase in mindfulness from baseline to follow-
up was moderate.  
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Figure 4. ACT process 
measures, experiential avoidance as measured by the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II 
(AAQ-II), valued living measured by the valued living questionnaire (VLQ), and mindfulness 
measured by the mindful attention and awareness scale (MAAS). 
The participant’s disability scores are depicted in figure 5 below.  A substantial 
reduction in disability was detected from baseline to post-treatment and this was found to be 
reliable and clinically meaningful.  This change, however, was not maintained at follow-up 
and scores returned to baseline levels.   
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Figure 5. Disability scores on the Sheehan Disability Scale (SDS) at baseline (T1), post-
treatment (T2) and follow-up (T3) for participant one 
 
The results of the reliable and clinical change analyses are summarized and combined 
with the results of the inference by eye analyses in table 3. As depicted, the change that 
occurred in the participant’s scores on outcome measures was examined across three time 
points (baseline to post-treatment, post-treatment to follow-up, and baseline to follow-up) to 
determine whether it could be considered reliable and clinically significant. As stated 
previously, to be considered meaningful, change needed to occur in both inference by eye and 
reliable and clinically significant change analyses.  
Table 3. 
Inference by eye and reliable and clinical change on outcome measures 
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  Baseline to Post-treatment  Post-treatment to Follow-up  Baseline  to Follow-up 
 
 Change Reliable Clinical  Change Reliable Clinical  Change Reliable Clinical 
Depression 
 
none    None    None   
Anxiety 
 
moderate    None    moderate   
Stress  
 
significant    moderate    moderate   
Worry 
 
none    None    None   
Rumination 
 
significant    significant    significant   
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Qualitative results.  
Six main themes emerged from the interview with the participant about her 
experience of the ACT intervention: (i) use of mindfulness, (ii) experiential avoidance and 
difficulty with acceptance, (iii) strong control agenda and focus on symptom reduction, (iv) 
perceived impact of values and committed action, (v) lack of connection with defusion and 
self-as-context, and (vi) perceived impact of ACT on worry and rumination.  
 Mindfulness.  
The participant maintained that the mindfulness component of the ACT intervention 
was the most helpful part of the therapy, and was one aspect of ACT that she was still using 
at the time of the interview. She talked spontaneously about mindfulness more than any other 
aspect of ACT. 
It was clear, however, that the participant used mindfulness within a CBT rather than 
ACT framework: for her, the goal of mindfulness was distraction and/or relaxation as 
opposed to connecting with her present experience and allowing her thoughts and feelings to 
be as they are. Thus, she liked mindfulness because it effectively provided her with some 
respite from her thoughts; however it was used very much as a reactive strategy aimed at 
symptom reduction. In the following excerpts the participant describes how she incorporated 
mindfulness into her life: 
Avoidance 
 
none    moderate    None   
Valued 
Living 
 
none    None    None   
Mindfulness 
 
significant    None    moderate   
Disability 
 
significant    significant    none   
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“Mindfulness is the main thing I use. It’s a distraction. When I went for a walk last 
week I was at the train station and I was looking at the train, and listening to the 
different sounds. And I do the same thing at night-time. It takes me out of my head and 
relaxes me.” 
“Last week when I was feeling anxious I went for a walk and I was just concentrating 
on my surroundings…just taking in different things and I guess at night-time counting 
to 20 or just listening to sounds I can hear.” 
“I think I’ll have to work harder at it now that I’m off medication and in my last 
semester. I’ll use mindfulness meditation for stress relief. Also do it before bed 
sometimes. But it’s more if I notice that I have anxiety.”  
The control agenda and symptom reduction.  
It was evident that the participant found it hard to relinquish a control agenda and 
identified this to be a potential problem. When asked about which aspects of ACT resonated 
with her the most, the participant said "the whole thing about control. I recognised that in 
myself.” In spite of the fact that she became more aware of her control agenda during the 
intervention, it appeared this this was very difficult for her to shift: from her point of view, a 
therapeutic technique or strategy only worked if it resulted in a fairly immediate and 
noticeable reduction in emotional distress or psychological symptoms. This view is in direct 
opposition to an ACT approach, which suggests that difficult private experiences cannot be 
controlled, and that control and the absence of psychological symptomatology are not 
prerequisites for a rich and meaningful life.  
The participant’s view of feelings as controllable through the examination and 
modification of cognitive content is more consistent with CBT, and her strong control agenda 
may be a product of her extensive experience with this therapeutic modality. The participant 
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was aware of her allegiance to CBT and acknowledged that this may have impacted on her 
experience of participating in the ACT intervention. She had experienced prior success (in the 
form of symptom reduction) with challenging her thoughts, and as a consequence her belief 
in the effectiveness of CBT was strong. The participant said: 
“I still feel like I connect more with CBT, and I don’t know if that’s because I’ve done 
a lot of CBT courses. That probably has a lot to do with it. I was saying to the 
counsellor I saw that I do still use little bits from ACT. See it as more of a way I can 
distract myself from thoughts, whereas with CBT it’s about looking at them and 
thinking about how I can change them.” 
“[CBT involves] more practical strategies, and writing it down is therapeutic. It’s 
like getting it out. It makes me look at my thoughts more, and once I look at them it 
makes me think ‘that’s a bit irrational.’ It’s harder to do that in my head.” 
These excerpts indicate that from the participant’s perspective, CBT provided her with a way 
of effectively taking her distressing thoughts out of her head, examining them, and changing 
them. A point of interest is the fact that one of the only aspects of the ACT intervention the 
participant said she did not like was the “pink elephant” exercise, which is part of the creative 
hopelessness phase of the intervention, designed to demonstrate the futility of thought 
suppression efforts. It may be that the participant found this exercise aversive as it 
represented a direct challenge to her belief that it is possible for her to exercise control over 
her thoughts. 
The participant’s focus on control was evident in her approach to the different 
components of the ACT intervention. She tended to view the various ACT strategies and 
techniques through a CBT lense, seeing the goal of the different therapeutic components as 
being symptom reduction. If the exercises didn’t achieve this goal almost immediately and in 
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a lasting way, they were deemed ineffective. Furthermore, she talked about only using the 
ACT strategies reactively, once she has begun to feel anxious or depressed, in the attempt to 
eliminate the difficult thoughts, feelings and sensations. The following excerpts illustrate this 
point: 
“Mindfulness of the hand and the raisin exercise didn’t work that much for me. It 
might help for a minute but then the anxiety comes back.” 
“I wasn’t really a fan of the long mindfulness/imagery stuff. It didn’t work for me as 
much. Sometimes when I’m anxious and I listen to a CD it helps, maybe this time it 
didn’t help because I wasn’t feeling that anxious.” 
“I’ll use mindfulness meditation for stress relief. I also do it before bed sometimes. 
But it’s more if I notice that I have anxiety.” 
The participant acknowledged her strong control agenda. Interestingly, however, 
while she briefly mentioned the creative hopelessness component of the intervention and said 
that the notion of the control agenda resonated with her, she did not elaborate on this further. 
Therefore, it appears that while the intervention made her aware of her control agenda, it did 
not have the effect of shifting this in a meaningful way.  
Acceptance and experiential avoidance.  
It was evident that the participant found it very difficult to accept her depression and 
anxiety, and her psychological difficulties were a source of distress and even shame for her. 
Her avoidance of emotional and physiological experiences was evident in the effort she has 
put into trying to eliminate her symptoms of depression and anxiety over the years. In this 
way, being in a group therapy environment was helpful to her as it normalised her own 
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difficulties in her mind, and was conducive to self-acceptance. The following excerpts 
illustrate this point: 
 “Being in a group helps you not to feel so alone.” 
“I think it was good for me to go, even just having people around and talking about 
things. It was good… I feel like I don’t get as stressed. Maybe what I say to myself has 
changed. I still get stressed and anxious, but it’s not as bad as it used to be.” 
Not only did the participant find it hard to accept her own anxiety and depression, she 
also found it difficult to tolerate these emotions in others, as it cued her to think about her 
own mental health issues. At the time of the group she perceived herself as being in a period 
of remission from episodes of anxiety and depression, and it was painful for her to be 
reminded of what it is like to feel severely depressed and anxious. Thus, the participant was 
somewhat ambivalent about taking part in group therapy. This sense of ambivalence is 
highlighted in the following comment: 
“I like small groups. People describe their anxiety and you think ‘I feel that too’ and 
you don’t feel as much like there’s a problem with you. But sometimes – because I 
was feeling well I would think “I don’t need this” It was a bit of a drag, because I live 
far away, and it was a reminder of anxiety. But I’m still glad I did it.”  
As the participant felt conflicted by the idea of accepting her difficult thoughts and 
feelings, willingness to experience her depression and anxiety required a huge shift in her 
mindset regarding her internal experience.  As a consequence the concept of acceptance was 
also met with some resistance. This is reflected in the lack of substantial change observed in 
her scores on the AAQ-II. In the following excerpts, she describes her struggle with 
acceptance: 
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“I didn’t find the concept of willingness that helpful. It’s hard, because anxiety and 
depression are horrible. I accept it more, but to say I’m willing to have it is still a bit 
hard.” 
“I’m not completely there. I have times when I’m like ‘this sucks I hate it.’ But it’s 
better.” 
 “I don’t really use willingness and acceptance in situations. If I’m feeling really 
anxious I get anxious about being anxious, so I’m more focused on relaxing myself. 
Last week I was saying ‘It’s ok’ and just do the things I know break the cycle. Try and 
reassure myself.” 
Cognitive defusion and self-as-context.  
The participant did not spontaneously mention the concept of defusion or any of the 
defusion techniques presented in the intervention. Even when prompted, she was not able to 
recall any of the defusion exercises, and she concluded that defusion was not of use to her. 
While the participant saw CBT as a way for her to control her difficult emotions 
through the modification of her irrational thoughts, she saw ACT and specifically the notion 
of cognitive defusion as merely being a way for her to temporarily distract herself from her 
thoughts. As a result, defusion was seen as inferior to cognitive restructuring, and ACT was 
seen as inferior to CBT overall. The participant’s view of cognitive defusion as merely a 
distraction technique is evident in the following two excerpts: 
 “[I see ACT] as more of a way I can distract myself from thoughts, whereas with 
CBT it’s about looking at them and thinking about how I can change them.” 
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 “When I say ‘it’s ok’ I find that helps for about half an hour, but when I actually go 
into the thought and examine it it helps. When I get anxious it’s hard for me to think 
rationally.” 
Interestingly, however, a counsellor whom the participant had started seeing at the 
time of the interview taught her to say “and it’s ok” after her anxious thoughts – which is 
essentially a defusion/acceptance technique – and the participant said that she was finding 
this helpful. This suggests that she was not opposed to defusion, but for some reason the 
defusion component of the ACT intervention did not resonate with her at the time. 
The participant had also little recollection of the self-as-context component of the 
intervention. 
Values and Committed Action.  
The participant connected with the values component of ACT, and saw this as one of 
the main benefits of participating in the intervention. It was an important realisation for her to 
recognise that she was behaving in ways that were inconsistent with some of her key values, 
and she felt that this realisation had had a lasting impact on her. In talking about the impact 
the values component of the intervention had on her, the participant made the following 
comments: 
“I really liked the values – family, friends, social life. That was good. And that was a 
bit of a different way of looking at things, it made me make a couple of changes. That 
was good at the time.” 
“In my mind I knew it was a bit of an issue but I didn’t do enough about it, so it kind 
of prompted me to take action. Instead of saying ‘I should do this’ I thought ‘I’m just 
going to do this’ and set myself a goal, like ‘this week I’m not going to procrastinate.’ 
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It was more looking at the values and rating them: how important things are and how 
much you’re engaged in them. It was a bit of a wake-up call.” 
Worry and Rumination.  
The participant’s thoughts about her depression and anxiety were a strong contributor 
to her distress. She discussed the fact that once she noticed that she was feeling depressed or 
anxious she started to worry or ruminate about her symptoms, which then exacerbated her 
initial distress. The following comment illustrates this: 
“When I get really anxious and think about the anxiety it snowballs… I just felt awful 
last week, it was really bad. Really bad anxiety over nothing. And it made me worry 
about things that I don’t usually worry about.” 
The quantitative findings indicate that there was a significant change in the participant’s 
scores on the RSS from baseline to post-treatment. Interestingly, however, she did not 
highlight the change in her rumination as one of the main outcomes of the intervention, and 
did not talk about rumination spontaneously. 
“[ACT is effective for my rumination] in a minor way, for a short time when I would 
try it. I don’t think I would use it unless I was feeling anxious.” 
To summarise the findings of the interview, from the participant’s perspective, the 
mindfulness, values and committed action components of the intervention were the most 
engaging aspects of ACT, and the aspects which she feels have had the most meaningful and 
lasting impact on her. She was somewhat ambivalent in regards to participating in a group 
therapy program, and in regards to ACT in general. The participant felt that she connected 
better with CBT (which is unsurprising based on her extensive experience with this 
therapeutic modality), and she struggled with the acceptance/willingness and cognitive 
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defusion components of the intervention, which are cornerstones of ACT, in particular. It is 
likely that the overall impact of the ACT intervention for this participant was influenced by 
the difficulty she experienced in relinquishing her control agenda. 
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Discussion 
Study One examined the effectiveness of a group-based ACT intervention in treating 
rumination and worry in an individual with anxiety and depressive symptoms. Variables of 
interest were rumination and worry, psychological symptomatology (depression, anxiety and 
stress), ACT-related measures (experiential avoidance, valued living and mindfulness), and 
functional impairment (disability). The current section will address each research hypothesis 
and in turn discuss both the quantitative and qualitative findings in relation to the broader 
theoretical and research literature. 
Worry and rumination.  
It was hypothesized that the participant would experience a significant reduction in 
rumination and worry following the ACT intervention, and that these changes would be 
maintained at the 3-month follow-up. This hypothesis was partially supported in that a 
significant reduction in rumination was observed immediately after the intervention and at 
follow-up. However, there was no change in the participant’s worry scores following 
treatment.   
The fact that a significant change was observed in rumination but not worry was 
unexpected, and this finding is inconsistent with the literature which suggests that worry and 
rumination are essentially the same type of cognitive process: they are both perseverative, 
repetitive, self-focused forms of thought. It is necessary to consider the way these constructs 
were measured in interpreting the discrepancy in the pattern of change observed for each 
construct. One possibility is that this can be accounted for by the differences in the RRS 
(Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and PSWQ (Meyer et al., 1990) in terms of the wording 
and rating of items. Stöber and Bittencourt (1998) suggest that the PSWQ was constructed as 
a measure of trait-like worry, as evidenced by the fact that respondents are asked to rate how 
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typical worry symptoms are of them. Stöber and Bittencourt argue that typicality implies 
stability, such that the rater may still consider pathological worry to be typical of them, even 
if they have experienced some recent changes in levels of worry. The items on the RRS, 
however, are focused on present feelings and recent events, which are likely to prompt the 
rater to reflect on recent mood-states and experiences in making their ratings, thus leading to 
more of a state-based measure of rumination. This explanation is consistent with the fact that 
the participant considered herself to be “a worrier”, and it may be that even if she 
experienced some change in worry, this was not captured by the trait-based questions of the 
PSWQ, as this self-perception was too ingrained. However, given that the PSWQ has been 
shown to be an appropriate measure for assessing weekly fluctuations in worry symptoms 
that is sensitive to change in both 6- and 12-week therapeutic interventions (Borkovec & 
Costello, 1993; Gervais & Dugas), it is necessary to look for additional explanations for the 
present findings. 
While there are significant commonalities in the nature of worry and rumination, and 
they may both belong to an overarching category of repetitive negative thought (as suggested 
by Ehring & Watkins, 2008), a possible interpretation of the finding that change was 
observed in rumination but not worry is that that these constructs also differ in important 
ways, and may therefore not always co-vary in the same way. That is, change in one may not 
always be associated with change in the other, and the impact of treatment on rumination and 
worry may depend on which construct is more salient for a particular individual. For this 
participant, worry may have been a more deeply-entrenched and distressing problem than 
rumination, and therefore have been less amenable to change. This explanation is consistent 
with the fact that while the participant experienced both depression and anxiety throughout 
her life, at the time of the intervention her anxiety was a more severe and distressing problem 
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for her, as evidenced by the outcome of the screening assessment and her comments in the 
qualitative interview.  
In spite of the substantial changes observed in rumination over the course of 
treatment, in the qualitative interview the participant was not able to speak in detail about 
how the intervention had impacted on her worry and rumination, other than to say that the use 
of ACT strategies provided short-term relief when she began to ruminate over her anxiety 
symptoms. However, in examining the comments she made about mindfulness, it was evident 
that she used mindfulness to distract herself from her distressing thoughts, which was often 
about her psychological symptoms. Thus, it is possible that without necessarily being 
explicitly aware of it, she used mindfulness to manage her rumination. This explanation is 
consistent with the fact that the participant experienced an increase in mindfulness and a 
reduction in rumination.  
Psychological symptomatology.  
It was predicted that the participant would experience a substantial and clinically 
meaningful reduction in depression, anxiety and stress following the ACT intervention, and 
that these changes would be maintained at 3-month follow-up. The findings support this 
hypothesis, as the participant experienced significant reductions in anxiety and stress 
following treatment, which were maintained at follow-up. There was no change in the 
participant’s depression scores, however this is not surprising given that this score was in the 
normal range at baseline.  
The substantial reduction in the participant’s anxiety following the ACT intervention 
is consistent with the existing research on the effectiveness of ACT for anxiety, and lends 
further support for the use of this modality in treating anxiety disorders. Furthermore, the fact 
that this reduction was maintained at the 3-month follow-up is a promising finding, and 
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suggests that ACT can have a lasting, long-term impact on anxiety. The present findings also 
indicate that ACT may be an appropriate intervention for targeting stress, with the participant 
experiencing a significant reduction in stress which remained present at follow-up. While 
these findings are promising, there is also a need to interpret their support for ACT in the 
treatment of anxiety and stress with some caution, given that the participant’s anxiety and 
stress scores remained high throughout the duration of the ACT program, only dropping once 
the program finished. This pattern of change was unexpected and is inconsistent with the 
profile of change in symptomatology that is typically associated with psychological therapies, 
and it is therefore necessary to consider possible explanations for this finding. One possible 
interpretation is that the weekly measurements were completed under different circumstances 
than the main pre- and post-treatment follow-up assessments: while the participant completed 
the main assessments outside of the therapy setting, on her own, and in an environment and at 
a time of her own choosing, the weekly assessments were completed in the therapy setting 
before the beginning of each group session, and the other group participants completed their 
questionnaire packages at the same time. It is possible that the participant’s scores on the 
weekly measures may have been confounded by some state anxiety that she was experiencing 
based on the upcoming therapy session, which was reflected in the qualitative interview when 
she spoke about her apprehension at participating in the group program: for her, the group 
therapy environment cued her to think about the full extent of her own struggles with anxiety 
and depression, and she worried that participating in the program and being exposed to other 
people’s distress might actually make her symptoms worse, at a time that she perceived 
herself to be relatively well. This it may be that she was in a state of heightened anxiety when 
completing the weekly measures relative to the pre- and post-treatment and follow-up 
measures, which are less likely to have been completed in an anxiety-evoking context. If this 
is the case, it would follow that comparing the change in the participant’s scores from 
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baseline to post-treatment follow-up paints a more accurate picture of the impact on the ACT 
intervention on her stress and anxiety levels than examining the weekly data. However, 
because the overall pattern of change was unexpected, it is important that the results 
regarding the effectiveness of ACT for anxiety and stress are interpreted in light of this 
finding.  
The fact that the participant experienced reductions in rumination and anxiety but not 
worry and depression is interesting, given that in the literature, rumination has been more 
closely aligned with depression, and worry has been traditionally linked with anxiety. Based 
on the research, it would have been expected that a change in anxiety would have coincided 
with a change in worry, and that a change in rumination would have coincided with a change 
in depression. While it cannot be inferred based on the current findings, and indeed the wider 
body of research on the topic remains mixed, it is interesting to consider the direction of the 
relationships between worry, rumination, depression and anxiety. Based on the current 
results, it would appear that a change in worry is not necessary for a change in anxiety to 
occur, and a change in rumination is not necessarily associated with a change in depression 
(however, it is important to remember that the participant’s symptoms of the depression were 
not of clinical severity to begin with). A possible explanation for this is that, as reflected in 
the qualitative data, the participant’s rumination was more closely associated with her 
psychological distress (anxiety and stress) than her worry was. While rumination is generally 
linked with depression in the literature, it has also been found to be related to anxiety, and 
research suggests that it has a unique relationship with mixed anxiety and depression 
presentations (Hughes et al., 2008; Nolen-Hoesksema, 2000). This relationship may be due to 
the fact that rumination (as measured by the RRS) is more closely linked with both 
depressive and anxious symptomatology than worry is, and is therefore more likely to reduce 
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in frequency and intensity when there is a reduction in emotional distress. In the present case, 
it may be that the participant’s rumination occurred primarily in the context of her anxiety, 
stress, and depressive symptoms, and thus when her symptoms improved, so too did her 
rumination. The strong link between the participant’s rumination and psychological 
symptomatology is reflected in the fact that, as she highlighted in the interview, ruminating 
about her depression and anxiety led to an exacerbation in her symptoms and overall distress.  
In contrast to her rumination, it may be that the focus of the participant’s worry was 
more generalised, such that it went beyond the context of her symptoms and represented a 
global, ingrained cognitive style. If this is the case, it would be unlikely that her level of 
worry would reduce simply as a byproduct of the reduction in her emotional distress, which is 
consistent with the current results. While she experienced a significant improvement in 
anxiety and stress symptoms following the intervention, the results indicate that the cognitive 
component of anxiety – worry – was the most difficult to shift. This is consistent with the fact 
that GAD (the hallmark symptom of which is worry) is associated with less treatment success 
than the other anxiety disorders (Ballenger et al., 2001; Colvin et al., 2008). Thus, a possible 
explanation for the fact that the participant experienced change in anxiety and rumination but 
not worry is that these cognitive processes may not change at the same rate as each other, 
based on their differing relationships to psychological distress. It would be interesting to 
determine whether the participant’s level of worry would decrease if her anxiety remained at 
sub-clinical levels for an extended period of time, or whether the intervention needed to more 
specifically target worry in order to promote change in this area.  
  An alternative explanation for the present findings is – as discussed earlier – that the 
participant was able to use ACT strategies to manage her rumination more effectively than 
she was able to apply them to her worry. The qualitative data point to the fact that as a 
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consequence of the ACT intervention, the participant began to use mindfulness as a strategy 
to manage her rumination (albeit via a more CBT-based approach of distraction) and that she 
found this to be effective, whereas as she did not talk about using mindfulness in relation to 
worry. It is also possible that both of these explanations of the findings are valid, that is, that 
there were two influences which contributed to the change in her rumination: the reduction in 
her psychological distress, and her use of mindfulness, which allowed her to refrain from 
becoming “caught up” in chains of ruminative thought. If this is the case, it would suggest 
that it may be possible to ameliorate rumination via a combined approach of improving 
emotional wellbeing, in addition to managing the rumination directly through mindfulness.  
ACT outcome measures.  
It was hypothesized that the participant would experience a substantial and clinically 
meaningful reduction in experiential avoidance and an increase in mindfulness and valued 
living following the ACT intervention, and that this would be maintained at the 3-month 
follow-up. This hypothesis was partially supported, as mindfulness increased significantly 
following the intervention, however, experiential avoidance and valued living did not change 
in a meaningful way. The change in mindfulness was not maintained at the 3-month follow-
up. These findings, combined with the observed change in the participant’s anxiety and 
rumination, are inconsistent with the ACT model, which proposes that symptom reduction 
should co-occur with a reduction in experiential avoidance (and cognitive fusion), and an 
increase in mindfulness and valued living. Thus, it is necessary to consider possible 
explanations for the fact that anxiety and rumination decreased, despite the lack of change in 
avoidance and values.   
One possible explanation for the fact that the participant’s anxiety decreased in spite 
of the lack of change in experiential avoidance and valued living is that her anxiety improved 
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simply as a result of participating in the group intervention. In the qualitative interview she 
spoke about how she benefited from the group environment, in that being around other 
people who shared similar difficulties helped to normalize her own struggles in her mind. 
However, it is unlikely that the normalizing effect alone would have produced the changes 
observed in the participant’s psychological symptomatology, particularly as she had been 
exposed to others struggling with depression and anxiety in the past through her participation 
in CBT therapy groups. Furthermore, the reduction in the participant’s anxiety was 
maintained 3-months after the intervention, which would not be expected if the change was 
due solely to the normalizing effect of the group. Also, the participant’s experience of group 
therapy was not purely positive, as the other participants’ experiences reminded her about her 
own anxiety, which was somewhat distressing for her. The participant’s ambivalence about 
the group environment makes it unlikely that the improvement in her anxiety can be 
attributed to the normalizing effect of the group alone. 
As stated previously, however, the reduction in the participant’s anxiety was also not 
associated with meaningful change in ACT construct measures. It is necessary to look at 
possible explanations for this unexpected result, in addition to the finding that change was 
observed on one ACT construct, mindfulness, but not the others. In considering possible 
methodological explanations for this discrepancy, it is possible that differences in the 
wording of the measures of mindfulness, experiential avoidance and values may account for 
the observed findings. That is, The MAAS (Brown, 2003) differs from the AAQ-II and the 
VLQ in that its items ask the individual about their everyday experience, which makes it 
likely that their ratings of the items would be influenced by their present state or very recent 
history. Conversely, the AAQ-II and VLQ are more global and general in focus, requiring the 
individual to rate items by referring to their life as a whole. Therefore, one possibility is that 
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change was observed in the participant’s levels of mindfulness but not experiential avoidance 
or valued living simply because the measure of mindfulness was able to detect more recent 
and subtle changes in her day-to-day experience and outlook, as opposed to the more 
measures broad constructs of experiential avoidance and engagement with values.   
It is very surprising that significant change did not occur in the domain of experiential 
avoidance. The participant experienced some moderate change in this area; however it was 
not substantial or clinically meaningful, which is unexpected given that experiential 
avoidance is a key target for intervention in ACT. One possibility is that the participant did 
experience some reduction in experiential avoidance, but that these changes were not 
detected by the AAQ-II (Bond et al., 2011). The AAQ-II has strong internal consistency and 
test-retest reliability, however, and been shown to be sensitive to change across numerous 
outcome studies (e.g., Arch et al., 2012; Bohlmeijer et al., 2001; Clarke et al., 2012; Codd et 
al., 2011; Eifert et al., 2009; Markanday et al., 2012), which suggests the need to look beyond 
methodological factors to explain the present findings. Furthermore, the lack of observed 
change in experiential avoidance observed on the AAQ-II is corroborated by the qualitative 
data, which indicates that the participant herself did not feel that her levels of avoidance 
changed substantially over the course of the intervention. The participant talked about the fact 
that she struggled with the concept of willingness, and acknowledged that she had a strong 
control agenda. Increasing in levels of willingness and acceptance would, for this participant, 
mean letting go of her way of managing her anxiety and depression through CBT, which had 
been reinforced over a period of time. If she was to believe that difficult thoughts and 
feelings cannot be changed, this would mean she would have to accept herself the way she is, 
which was painful for her. As a consequence, she remained invested in the view that it is 
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possible to change, as opposed to the view that it is ok to accept private experiences as they 
are.  
It may be that the intervention was not effective in inducing creative hopelessness – 
that is, the realization that past efforts to change, control and avoid difficult experiences had 
not worked – and therefore she remained invested in her control agenda and was reluctant to 
adopt a position of acceptance. The ACT model proposes that a reduction in experiential 
avoidance is associated with an increase in acceptance, and theoretically, complete 
acceptance can only occur if the individual gives up the view that they can change their 
psychological experiences. This raises some important questions: is the complete 
abandonment of the control agenda essential in promoting acceptance? Can an ACT 
intervention still be effective if the individual retains the belief that some difficult thoughts 
and feelings can be changed, while accepting that others cannot? Is it realistic to think that an 
individual can ever be fully accepting of their experience, and give up all belief that they can 
change their psychological state? Ultimately, this leads to a broader question: can ACT and 
CBT sit side by side, or are they fundamentally in opposition to one another? 
The lack of meaningful change in the participant’s valued living scores was also 
unexpected, and is inconsistent with the fact that in the qualitative interview she talked about 
the values component of the intervention as having had a strong impact on her, prompting her 
to re-evaluate her life and make some changes. This said, she did not speak in detail about the 
specific changes she made to her life during and following the group program, and it may be 
that while the values part of the intervention caused her to think about how there were areas 
of her life in which she was not living consistently with her values, perhaps this did not 
translate to actual, sustained, values-consistent behaviour.  
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An alternative explanation to the lack of change observed in the area of values is that 
the instrument used to measure this construct, the VLQ (Wilson et al., 2010), was not 
sensitive to the changes experienced by the participant. The calculation of a composite score 
allows for the quantification of the extent to which an individual is living consistently with 
their values, however the instrument was originally designed for clinical use and was 
intended to be interpreted qualitatively (Wilson et al.). Thus, it may be that the VLQ did not 
pick up on the range or nature of change in valued living experienced by the participant, 
which qualitatively she discussed as being significant. Kirk Strosahl (2012), co-developer of 
ACT, maintains that the VLQ lacks sensitivity in measuring valued living, and that the 
Bull’s-eye Values Survey (Lundgren, Luoma, Dahl, Strosahl, & Melin, 2012) represents a 
more sensitive and accurate measure of values. Lundgren et al. report that the Bull’s-eye has 
been shown to be sensitive to treatment effects. Therefore, a suggestion for future research is 
to utilize the Bull’s-eye measure instead of the VLQ.  
The observed increase in mindfulness is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings 
of ACT and with outcomes of previous research. It is also consistent with the fact that the 
participant emphasized mindfulness as being the aspects of the intervention that she found 
most helpful. However, it is clear that the participant’s view of mindfulness as a distraction 
mechanism is more consistent with a CBT perspective rather an ACT approach, which views 
the purpose of mindfulness as being present and paying attention to thoughts, feelings and 
sensations, as opposed to distracting oneself from them. The fact that the participant viewed 
mindfulness through a CBT lens is likely to be due to her extensive experience with CBT, 
and it seems that the current intervention was not successful in shifting her mindset to be 
more consistent with an ACT perspective on psychological symptoms and distress. Like the 
aforementioned conflict between acceptance and control/change, this is further suggestive of 
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the potential challenges associated with using ACT with an individual who has had 
significant prior experience with CBT. 
Disability measure.  
It was hypothesized that the participant would experience a substantial and clinically 
meaningful reduction in disability scores following the intervention, and that this would be 
maintained at follow-up. The results provided partial support for this hypothesis, in that there 
was a meaningful reduction in disability following the group program, however this was not 
maintained at follow-up. While the participant’s functioning improved substantially during 
the course of the treatment, it was not sustained. It would be expected that an increase in 
disability would be associated with an increase in psychological symptoms, however the 
reduction in the participant’s anxiety following treatment was maintained at follow-up. As 
mentioned, however, the participant’s stress scores had also increased at follow-up, and while 
they did not reach baseline levels, it may be that her symptoms of stress were associated with 
significant functional impairment in the various domains of her life.  
Overall summary.  
The aim of Study One was to provide a preliminary investigation into the 
effectiveness of group ACT for rumination and worry, utilizing a single case design with a 
mixed qualitative and quantitative research approach. Given that this study did not employ an 
experimental design and included only one assessment of baseline functioning, no causal 
conclusions can be drawn. However, a number of notable findings emerged from an 
examination of the study outcomes. Firstly, the study provides rudimentary support for the 
effectiveness of ACT in reducing rumination and anxiety, in a sustainable way. Second, it 
suggests that ACT may lead to significant improvement to the functionality of an individual 
suffering from anxiety and depressive symptoms, and rumination and worry. Given the 
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change observed in rumination but not worry, this case study raises questions about the 
relationship between these two cognitive processes. In light of the fact that symptom 
reduction did not occur alongside meaningful change in experiential avoidance and valued 
living, the present study also calls for further clarification of the role of these ACT constructs 
in relation to the amelioration of psychological distress.  
This single case design also raises questions about the impact of delivering an ACT 
intervention to an individual who has had extensive experience with CBT, and the potential 
difficulties and barriers associated with this. More broadly, the findings echo the questions 
asked by theorists and researchers since the development of ACT: what is the relationship 
between ACT and CBT? Can they be used alongside one another, or are they too different in 
fundamental ways, such that the adoption of an ACT perspective requires a complete 
paradigm shift away from CBT? And if the latter is true, how do ACT practitioners manage 
this, given the ubiquity of CBT in clinical settings?  
Limitations and directions for future research. 
The present findings need to be considered in the context of the study’s limitations. 
The first is that the study was not experimental in design, and the baseline data was derived 
from only one assessment occasion, meaning that it is more difficult to determine whether the 
changes observed are due to the intervention or due to other influences in the participant’s 
life (Kazdin, 2010). The qualitative component of this study suggests that ACT was not 
necessarily responsible for changes but rather changes are likely to have resulted from an 
application of strategies learnt from a CBT perspective.  A second limitation is that the 
intervention was not delivered within the planned timeframe. While the treatment protocol 
was designed to involve 8 weekly therapy sessions of two hours each in duration, group 
participants’ personal commitments and timing factors meant that no therapy session took 
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place in week three, and sessions seven and eight were combined and run in the final week. 
The two-week gap early on in the program may have affected the participant’s engagement 
with ACT during this time. Also, the combining of the final two sessions may have meant 
that the concepts discussed in these sessions were not consolidated sufficiently, and that there 
was not adequate time to discuss relapse-prevention strategies, which may have impacted 
potential gains from post-treatment to follow-up. This may account for the lack of maintained 
change in the areas of mindfulness and disability. Third, the key ACT construct of cognitive 
fusion was not measured due to the lack of a psychometric measure of this variable. Future 
research should incorporate a measure of cognitive fusion if this becomes available. Fourth, 
the participant did not complete weekly outcome measures in the same context as the main 
pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up measures, and the weekly measures may have 
been confounded by the presence of state anxiety. Finally, the qualitative interview took 
place 6 months after the end of the ACT program. This is a considerable time lapse, and the 
consequence of this was that the participant had difficulty remembering specific details of the 
program and elaborating on her responses.  Regardless, the participant was able to reflect on 
the intervention as a whole, and a useful byproduct of the delay between the conclusion of the 
intervention and the interview was that it also revealed which aspects of ACT had had a 
lasting impact on her.  
Future research should build on the present findings by exploring the research 
questions amongst a larger sample of participants taking part in a group ACT intervention. 
By utilizing a larger sample and exploring group findings statistically, it will be possible to 
draw more definitive conclusions about the effectiveness of group ACT for rumination and 
worry. In addition, given the minimal change observed in experiential and values in the 
current study, it is important to explore the impact of a group ACT intervention on ACT 
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constructs amongst a larger sample of participants. This would provide further clarity in 
regards to the relationship between symptom improvement and change in the ACT constructs 
theoretically presumed to be central to psychological health. 
Despite its limitations, the study provides initial data on the impact of ACT on worry 
and rumination. By incorporating a quantitative analysis of the outcomes of a group ACT 
intervention with a qualitative exploration of an individual’s experience of participating in the 
program, this study furthers our understanding of not only the effectiveness of ACT for worry 
and rumination, but of ACT itself. As the only qualitative exploration of ACT, this study 
provides some insight into the important question: what is ACT like for the client? Given the 
difficulty in recruiting participants with clinically-diagnosed psychological disorders to 
randomized clinical trials and the dearth of experimental literature in the area, the present 
research represents a first step in extending the literature on group ACT for rumination and 
worry.  
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Chapter 7. Study Two: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for rumination and 
worry in an Australian private hospital setting 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter focuses on the Study Two, which examined effectiveness of a group-
based ACT intervention for the treatment of worry and rumination in individuals with 
transdiagnostic psychological problems attending the outpatient service at a private 
psychiatric hospital. The first part of the chapter provides a description of the study, in 
addition to the study aims and hypotheses. Eight hypotheses pertaining to the effectiveness of 
the ACT intervention for worry and rumination, psychological symptomatology, ACT-related 
variables and quality of life from baseline to post-treatment and post-treatment to follow-up 
are provided. A description of the study method will be provided, including a description of 
the participants, measures, assessment and treatment procedure. The results of the study will 
then be presented, comprising of preliminary analyses, descriptive statistics, and inferential 
analyses. The final part of the chapter focuses on a discussion of the findings of the study, 
reviewing each hypothesis and the implications of the results in the context of the wider 
literature. An overall summary will be provided, incorporating a summary of the Study Two 
results, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research. 
Study Description, Aims and Hypotheses 
The findings of Study One provide preliminary support for the effectiveness of a 
group ACT intervention in treating rumination, with the participant experiencing a substantial 
and lasting reduction in rumination. However, the impact of ACT for worry remains unclear, 
as the intervention was not associated with a reduction in the participant’s worry.  This 
finding was unexpected based on the apparent theoretical compatibility between ACT and 
worry (which has been noted previously, e.g., Borkovec, 2002; Roemer & Orsillo, 2002), and 
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is inconsistent with the literature which suggests that rumination and worry are very similar 
cognitive processes, which may even represent a common construct of negative repetitive 
thought (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). The fact that these findings are based on just one 
individual, however, means that it is necessary to explore the effectiveness of ACT for worry 
and rumination in a larger sample.  
Based on the findings of Study One, it is also necessary to further explore the 
relationships between rumination and worry, psychopathology, and ACT therapeutic 
processes. The fact that reductions in rumination and anxiety and improvement in 
functionality were not associated with meaningful change in the ACT constructs was 
surprising in light of the ACT literature, which views psychological flexibility, acceptance 
and valued living as fundamental to emotional wellbeing (Hayes et al., 2011). As such, 
research with a larger sample is required in order to determine whether worry and rumination 
are associated with ACT therapeutic components, and with experiential avoidance in 
particular. This will provide insight into the theory on avoidance models of worry and 
rumination, in addition to the relevance of ACT to these cognitive processes.  
The aim of Study Two was to evaluate the effectiveness of a group ACT program for 
rumination and worry amongst individuals attending the outpatient service of a private 
psychiatric hospital, The Melbourne Clinic. Following the case study described in Study One, 
the aim of the present study was to determine whether ACT is a viable option for the 
treatment of rumination and worry amongst individuals with a range of transdiagnostic 
psychological problems. As foreshadowed, an additional aim of Study Two was to explore 
the association between rumination and worry and ACT therapeutic elements, in addition to 
the way these cognitive processes relate to anxiety, depression, and emotional wellbeing. The 
availability of a measure of cognitive fusion (Cognitive fusion Questionnaire; Gilanders et 
165 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
al., 2010) means that this central component of ACT could also be examined in this study, 
which will provide a more comprehensive understanding of the effects of the ACT 
intervention.  
Based on the literature review and theoretical rationale presented in chapters two, 
three, four and five, and the outcomes of Study One, the following hypotheses were made: 
Hypothesis 1: It was predicted that there would be significant reductions in ACT 
group participants’ worry and rumination from baseline to post-treatment.  
Hypothesis 2: It was predicted that changes in worry and rumination will be 
maintained at 1-month follow-up. 
Hypothesis 3: It was predicted that there would be significant reductions in 
participants’ clinical symptomology (depression, anxiety and stress) following the ACT 
intervention. 
Hypothesis 4: It was predicted that changes in depression, anxiety and stress would be 
maintained at 1-month follow-up. 
Hypothesis 5: It was predicted that relative to pre-treatment, ACT group participants 
would have significantly lower levels of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion, and 
significantly higher levels of valued living and dispositional mindfulness. As a secondary 
hypothesis linked to Hypothesis 5, it was predicted that the relationship between worry and 
rumination and ACT-related variables would be stronger than the relationship between worry 
and rumination and depression, anxiety and stress. 
Hypothesis 6: It was predicted that changes in ACT variables would be maintained at 
1-month follow-up. 
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Hypothesis 7: It was predicted that following the ACT intervention, participants 
would have significantly higher levels of personal wellbeing and satisfaction with life, and 
significantly lower levels of functional impairment.  
Hypothesis 8: It was predicted that changes in satisfaction with life, personal 
wellbeing and functional impairment would be maintained at 1-month follow-up.  
Method 
Participants. 
All Individuals who are registered for The Melbourne Clinic ACT group program 
were invited to participate in this study. Individuals were notified about the study and advised 
of the opportunity to participate by the author or the ACT group facilitators at the program 
orientation session held at The Melbourne Clinic. Permission from potential participants’ 
treating psychiatrists was obtained prior to inviting them to participate in the research 
programme. There were no exclusion criteria for this study. As ACT is a transdiagnostic 
approach, no diagnoses were ruled out.  
 40 individuals (11 male, 29 female) consented to participating in the study and 
completed pre-intervention questionnaires. The age range of participants was 21 to 67 years 
(M = 42.58, SD = 11.45). Of this, 18 participants (6 male, 12 female) completed post-
intervention measures, and only four of this 18 (1 male, 3 female) completed follow-up 
measures. Of the 40 participants who completed pre-intervention measures, 47.5% had one 
psychiatric diagnosis, 35% had two diagnoses, and 12.5% had three. Participants had 
diagnoses of unipolar depressive disorders (65%), anxiety disorders (35%), bipolar disorder 
(I or II; 20%), borderline personality traits (12.5%), substance use disorder (7.5%), chronic 
pain (2.5%), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (10%) and ADD/ADHD (5%). Ninety per cent 
of the sample was currently taking anti-depressant medication. Other classes of medication 
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taken by participants included anti-psychotics (35%), anti-convulsants (27.5%), anxiolytics 
(22.5%), mood stabilisers (12.5%), GABA (5%), psychostimuluants (2.5%), opiod receptor 
antagonists (2.5%), anti-chlorigenic medication (2.5%). The treatment history of participants 
included psychological therapy (32.5%), hospitalisation in an inpatient psychiatric unit 
(25%), psychiatry (22.5%), counselling (12.5%), psychotherapy (15%), other group therapy 
program at The Melbourne Clinic (12.5%), CBT (10%), electroconvulsive therapy (ECT; 
7.5%), detox/rehabilitation (5%).  
Measures. 
Participants were asked to complete 9 questionnaires (see Appendix A) before commencing 
the group program, immediately after the completion of the program, and one month following the 
completion of the program (follow-up assessment). The questionnaire package took participants 
approximately 20 minutes to complete. The following self-report questionnaires were completed by 
participants to measure psychological symptomatology, rumination, worry, experiential avoidance, 
cognitive fusion, dispositional mindfulness, valued living, functional impairment, satisfaction with 
life, and personal wellbeing.  
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale -21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond’s, 1995). The 
DASS-21 is a measure of symptoms of depression, anxiety and stress. The 21-item scale consists of 
three 7-item self-report subscales taken from the 42-item full version of the DASS. The subscales 
measure the extent to which an individual has experienced depression, anxiety and stress over the 
past week as rated on a 4-point severity scale ranging from 0 = “Did not apply to me at all” to 3 = 
“Applied to me very much or most of the time”.  Internal consistency of the DASS-21 scale has been 
reported to be high for the Depression scale ( = .88), Anxiety scale ( = .82), Stress scale ( = .90) 
and for the total scale ( = .93). The DASS-21 has also demonstrated good construct validity against 
independent measures of depression, anxiety and stress (Henry & Crawford, 2005). Psychometrics 
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from the current study (based on Time 1 data) are: Depression (α = .92), Anxiety (α = .81), and 
Stress α = .87). 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990). The 
PSWQ is a 16-item scale assessing general worry. Participants are asked to rate how typical items 
are of themselves, where 1 = “Not at all typical” and 5 = “Very typical”, generating a range of total 
scores from 0–80. Items include ‘‘I worry if I do not have enough time to do everything’’ or ‘‘Many 
situations make me worry.’’  Meyer et al. report that the PSWQ is a valid measure of worry, with 
high test-retest reliability (=.95) and high internal consistency (=.91). Internal consistency for the 
current study (based on Time 1 data) was α = .76. 
Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow‚ 1991). The RRS is a 22-
item measure which asks the individual to rate the extent to which they experience responses to 
depressed mood that are self-focused, symptom focused, and focused on the possible consequences 
and causes of the mood on a scale from 1 = “Almost never” to 4 = “Almost always”. The two 
subscales of the RRS, reflection and brooding, show good reliability, with coefficient alphas of .72 
and .77 respectively, and test re-test correlations of r=.60 and r=.62 respectively (Treynor, Gonzalez, 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2003). Based on Time 1 data for the current study, Cronbach’s alpha was.89.  
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire-II (AAQ-II; Bond et al., 2011). The AAQ-II is a 7- 
item, self-report measure of experiential avoidance, or the tendency to avoid negative private events 
such as thoughts, feelings or bodily sensations. An example of a typical item is “It’s ok if I remember 
something unpleasant”. The participant was instructed to rate how true each of the 10 statements was 
for them using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = “Never true” to 7 = “Always true”. Scores 
from the AAQ-II correlate significantly with measures to which they are theoretically connected, 
such as depression, anxiety and overall psychological distress, and do not correlate significantly with 
a measure of social desirability, thus supporting their validity. The AAQ-II also has high internal 
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consistency (Bond et al.). Higher scores indicate a greater level of experiential avoidance and 
psychological inflexibility. The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for the current study (Time 1 data) was 
.90. 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; Gilanders et al., 2010). The CFQ is a 13-item self-
report questionnaire designed to measure cognitive fusion and defusion as a general process. Sample 
items include “I get so caught up in my thoughts that I am unable to do the things that I most want to 
do” and “Even when I am having upsetting thoughts, I can see that those thoughts may not be 
literally true”. Participants rate how true each statement is for them on a 7-point Likert scale from 1 
= “Never true” to 7 = “Always true”. Higher scores reflect higher levels of cognitive fusion. The 
CFQ has shown very good reliability across four separate community samples (α = .86), and good 
reliability with a clinical sample (α = .86; Gilanders et al.). It has also been shown to correlate in 
theoretically predicted directions with measures of related constructs such as experiential avoidance, 
mindfulness, distress, rumination, thought control strategies, life satisfaction, quality of life, and 
values. Internal consistency for the current study (Time 1 data) was α = .70. 
The Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown, 2003). The MAAS is a 15-item 
questionnaire that measures dispositional mindfulness. Sample items include “I rush through 
activities without being really attentive to them” and “I drive places on ‘automatic pilot’ and then 
wonder why I went there”. The participant was asked to report how often she believes she has 
experiences by rating each item on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 = “Almost always” to “Almost 
never”. Higher total scores reflect higher dispositional mindfulness. Cronbach’s alpha for the MAAS 
was reported to be high (α = .85; Brown, 2003). Internal consistency for the current study (Time 1 
data) was α = .87).  
Valued Living Questionnaire (VLQ; Wilson, Sandoz, Kitchens & Roberts, 2010). The VLQ 
is a 2-part self-report questionnaire, designed to measure valued living, defined as “the extent to 
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which an individual contacts his or her chosen values in everyday life” (Wilson et al., p. 254). The 
first part measures which domains of living the individual chooses to value, and consists of a 10-
point Likert scale where participants rate the importance of 10 domains of living from 1 =  “Not at 
all important” to 10 = “Extremely important”. The second part of the VLQ measures how 
consistently the respondent is living in accord with each of the 10 valued domains of living from 1 = 
“Not at all consistent” to 10 = “Extremely consistent”. A Valued Living composite score represents 
how consistent the individual has been in living in accord with their important values across all life 
domains, with higher scores indicating higher values consistency. Internal consistency of the VLQ 
Valued Living composite is reported to be good with a coefficient alpha value of .77 reported in a 
non-clinical undergraduate student sample (Wilson et al., 2010) and .75 in a moderately depressed 
undergraduate sample (Bourchier & Davis, 2008). Psychometrics from the current study (based on 
Time 1 data) are: Values Importance (α = .80), Values Consistency (α = .85). 
Sheehan Disability Scale (Leon, Shear, Portera, & Klerman, 1992). The Sheehan Disability 
Scale is a 3-item self-rated measure that assesses functional impairment in the areas of work, social 
and family life. The scale has been reported to be sensitive to change over time and is a valid and 
reliable measure of the functional impact of symptomatology (Leon et al.). The internal consistency 
for the current study (Time 1 data) is α = .80.    
Satisfaction with Life as a Whole and Personal Wellbeing Index Scale (PWI; International 
Wellbeing Group, 2006). The Satisfaction with Life as a Whole and PWI Scale is a two-part measure 
of quality of life. The first part is comprised of a single-item measure of overall life satisfaction 
which asks the individual to rate the extent to which they are satisfied with their life as a whole, 
based on their life and personal circumstances. The second part of the measure is the PWI contains 8 
items of satisfaction, each one corresponding to a quality of life domains including standard of 
living, health, achieving in life, relationships, safety, community-connectedness, future security, and 
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spirituality/religion. For both the Satisfaction with Life as a Whole item and each domain of the 
PWI, individuals the extent to which they are satisfied on an Cronbach’s alpha for the scale ranges 
between .70 and .85. The 8 domains of the PWI scale constitute the minimum set of domains that 
represent the first level deconstruction of ‘Life as a Whole’ (International Wellbeing Group). The 
PWI has also shown good test-retest reliability across 1-2 week interval with an intra-class 
correlation coefficient of 0.84 (Lau and Cummins, 2005). For the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficient was .79. 
Procedure. 
Assessment Procedure. 
All individuals who were registered to participate in the ACT group program were mailed a 
project information statement, consent form, and the questionnaire package prior to the first group 
session. Participants were asked to complete the consent form and questionnaire package and bring it 
with them to the first group session, should they wish to be involved in the research. Participants 
were asked to complete the post-treatment questionnaire package at the end of the final group 
session. Follow-up measures were mailed to participants one month after the final ACT session, and 
participants were provided with a reply-paid envelope to return their completed assessments to the 
researchers.  
Treatment Procedure. 
The ACT group intervention was delivered by clinicians at The Melbourne Clinic private 
psychiatric hospital. The clinicians were psychologists and psychiatric nurses trained in ACT. The 
program was developed by The Melbourne Clinic clinicians, and consisted of 10 weekly sessions, 
each of which was two hours in duration. Consistent with the ACT transdiagnostic theoretical model, 
the treatment program was not designed to target a specific psychological disorder or disorders, 
rather it was designed for adults with a range of mental health problems. The focus of the 
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intervention was on assisting participants in practicing acceptance of unhelpful experiences, 
thoughts, and urges and promoting engagement in meaningful actions toward their valued life 
directions. Table 4 outlines the core areas covered in each treatment session. The author did not 
modify The Melbourne Clinic’s ACT treatment manual in any way.  
Data was collected from participants across nine groups, which ran from October 2012 until 
June 2013. The nine groups were divided into three rounds of three groups, which ran concurrently 
by different clinicians. Each group was run by one clinician, and total of five clinicians were 
involved in facilitating the nine groups (two clinicians ran three groups each in separate rounds, and 
three clinicians ran a group each).  
Table 4.  
The Melbourne Clinic ACT group treatment overview 
 
Session Activities 
1. Introduction to ACT, Group 
Therapy and Creative 
Hopelessness 
 General Introduction and introduction to ACT 
 Establishment of group guidelines 
 Creative hopelessness – discussion of strategies 
used in the aim of control and avoidance, and the 
costs of these 
 Discussion of secondary suffering and values 
 Brief mindfulness exercise 
 
2. ACT Foundations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. 3.  Introduction to Acceptance  
 Introductions 
 Review of week – discussion of participants’ 
engagement in avoidance and values during the 
week 
 Introduction to mindfulness practice  
 Mindful chocolate eating 
 Brief informal and formal mindfulness discussion 
and practice 
 Homework: mindfulness practice and noticing 
what your thoughts tell you 
 
 Review of mindfulness during the week (focus on 
mindfulness of pleasurable moments) 
 Vicious cycles of avoidance 
 Acceptance as the alternative to avoidance – 
discussion of acceptance and willingness for 
things that cannot be changed (thoughts, emotions, 
other people, the world, versus behavior and 
attention) 
 Expansion exercise 
 ‘ACT in a Nutshell’ mindfulness exercise 
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4. 4. Introduction to Values 
 
 Review of mindfulness practice and acceptance of 
emotions during the week. Discussion of what got 
in the way 
 Introduction to the concept of values 
 Values clarification exercise – incorporating art 
and written reflection 
 Debrief/sharing with the group 
 Homework: reflecting on values, mindfulness 
practice, paying attention to thoughts 
 
5. 5. Introduction to Cognitive Fusion 
and Defusion 
 Review of mindfulness of pleasurable moments 
during the week 
 Mindfulness of the breath and labelling thinking 
 Recap of the previous weeks – mapped on ACT 
hexiflex 
 Recap of values 
 Cognitive fusion experiential exercises and 
rationale for defusion 
 Discussion of defusion exercises (e.g. “I’m having 
the thought that…”, sing uncomfortable thoughts) 
 
6. 6. Values and Committed Action  Review of mindfulness of pleasurable moments 
during the week 
 Review of ACT principles (including control, 
primary and secondary suffering, struggle) and 
discussion of how group members are 
incorporating principles into their lives 
 ‘Demons on the boat’ exercise 
 Committed action and values – setting of a values-
based goal for the week, using the ‘Willingness 
and Action Plan’ 
 Homework: attempt committed action goal 
 
7. 7. Acceptance and Values Re-
visited and Introduction to the 
Observing Self 
 Review of mindfulness of pleasurable moments 
and general mindfulness practice during the week 
 Discussion of how group members have been 
incorporating ACT principles into their lives 
 Review of Acceptance versus control and 
avoidance. Review of common control and 
avoidance strategies 
 Expansion exercise and debrief 
 Review of committed action homework and 
discussion of barriers and challenges 
 Setting of a values-based goal for the week, using 
the ‘Willingness and Action Plan’ 
 
8. 8. Choice Points and Values in the 
Real World 
 Review of mindfulness of pleasurable moments 
during the week and committed action 
 Review of how group members have been 
incorporating ACT principles into their lives 
 ‘Choice points’ description and mindfulness 
exercise (a behavior which takes you closer or 
further away from your values) 
 Values rating form 
 Committed Action map exercise 
 ‘Passengers on the Bus’ role play 
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9. 9. The Observing Self and 
Maintaining Committed Action  
 Review of mindfulness of pleasurable moments 
during the week  
 Review of how group members have been 
incorporating ACT principles into their lives 
 Observing self exercise and debrief 
 Discussion of willingness 
 Defusion brainstorm – thoughts and feelings that 
get in the way of willingness; cultivating 
willingness 
 Expansion exercise 
 Setting of a values-based goal for the week, using 
the ‘Willingness and Action Plan’ 
 
10. Revision and Consolidation of 
ACT Principles 
 Discussion of thoughts and feelings about group 
end 
 ACT quiz 
 Mindfulness exercise 
 Group discussion to reflect on the last 10 weeks 
 Graduation 
 Post-treatment evaluation 
 
 
Ethical Considerations. 
This project was approved by The Melbourne Clinic Research Ethics Committee (Project No. 
211) on 13 June 2012. The project was approved by the RMIT University Human Research Ethics 
Committee (Project No. ASEHAPP 31/12) on 13 September 2012 (see Appendices G and H). Prior 
to taking part in the research by completing the questionnaire packages, participants were provided 
with a plain language statement outlining the purpose of the research, the relevant questions being 
addressed, requirements associated with participation, potential risks and disadvantages of 
involvement, information regarding data management, the individual’s rights as a participant, the 
voluntary nature of participation and the contact details of the principal investigator and project 
supervisor (see Appendix I).  
A number of measures were taken to protect the privacy of participants. At no point during 
the course of the research did researchers have access to participants’ files at The Melbourne Clinic. 
In order to link questionnaire responses across the different time points, participants generated their 
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own personal code (Grube, Morgan and Kearney, 1989) by answering the following questions: 
Month of birth, Number of older brothers, Number of older sisters, First initial of mother’s first 
name, first initial of father’s first name. No identifying information was recorded on the hard copies 
of self-report forms.   
Completed forms were kept at the School of Health Sciences at RMIT University, within a 
locked filing cabinet. Access to both digital and hard-copy data was restricted to the investigators 
and the supervisor. Digital data did not contain any identifying information, and was entered into 
statistical packages was password encrypted and stored in a secured hard drive. 
Finally, information will be retained only for the required period (5 years) and will then be 
securely destroyed. Electronic data will be disposed of through an approved method of electronic 
deletion. Paper materials will be shredded.  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses. 
All data analysis in Study Two was conducted using SPSS for Windows version 21. The 
outcome variables were inspected for missing data at pre-treatment, post-treatment, and follow-up. 
The rate of missing data was highest for the pre-treatment measures, however the amount of missing 
data at this point was not substantial, at less than 5% for the majority of measures. Missing data at 
post-treatment and follow-up was 0% for the majority of variables. In instances where participants 
missed a complete questionnaire at any assessment, these were excluded from the overall analyses. 
No missing data estimation technique was to impute responses for whole measures. There were very 
few missing responses to individual items on questionnaires. In the few cases where this did occur, 
the mean substitution method of missing data estimation was used, and missing values were replaced 
with estimated values.  
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Attrition analysis.  
The rates of attrition in this study were quite high, with 18 of the initial 40 participants 
completing the post-treatment measures, and only 4 of these participants responding to the 1-month 
follow-up questionnaire package. In light of the high rate of attrition noted, an attrition analysis was 
conducted. A series of independent samples t-tests were conducted to examine differences between 
those participants who completed the post-treatment measures and those who did not, on age, sex, 
number of diagnoses, and baseline levels of depression, anxiety, stress, worry, rumination, 
experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, mindfulness, valued living, disability, satisfaction with life, 
and personal wellbeing. Analysis revealed no significant difference between the groups on any 
variable, except for personal wellbeing, with completers exhibiting higher levels of personal 
wellbeing at baseline (M = 43.78) than non-completers (M = 33.00), t(36) = 2.702, p<.01. 
Due to these high rates of attrition, a linear mixed-effects model analysis was used to 
determine the effect of the intervention from pre- to post-treatment. A linear mixed-effects models 
analysis is appropriate in instances when repeated measures analyses are required, yet there is 
significant attrition at different points of measurement. This approach includes all observations at 
each time point, such that a participant’s data is not excluded if they have not completed the 
questionnaire package at each assessment phase.  Therefore, this technique reduces the bias which 
may be created from excluding respondents based on incomplete data (Cnaan, Laird, & Slassor, 
1998). Furthermore, a linear mixed-effects models analysis is a preferable way of managing data 
missing from different time points than data imputation, as it makes fewer assumptions about the 
nature of the missing data and consequently produces less biased estimates (Kalton & Kasprzyk, 
1982). The linear mixed-effects models analysis was used to analyse the impact of the ACT 
intervention from pre- to post-treatment only. In light of the very low response rate to the follow-up 
measures, a trend analysis was used to explore the changes in outcome variables at follow-up.  
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Descriptive Statistics. 
Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables at each of the three assessment points are 
presented in table 5.  
Table 5.  
Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Variables at Pre-Treatment, Post-Treatment and Follow-
up 
 Means and Standard Deviations 
  
Baseline 
  
Post-Treatment 
  
Follow-up 
 N M (SD)   N M (SD)  N M (SD) 
PSWQ 38 60.87  (12.87)  18 52.22  11.54)  4 47.5 (13.17) 
RRS 38 57.37  (12.26)  18 47.61  10.80)  4 49.00 (5.77) 
Brooding 40 13.8  (3.54)  18 11.72  (3.43)  4 11.25 (1.71) 
Reflection 38 11.32  (3.07)  18 9.61  (2.61)  4 10.25 (4.57) 
Depression-related Rumination 40 32.35  (7.61)  18 26.28  (6.47)  4 27.50 (2.65) 
DASS-21            
Depression 39 18.92  (12.26)  18 9.44  (8.31)   4 13.50 (8.23) 
Anxiety 39 13.08  (9.85)  18 6.33  (5.54)  4 10 (4.32) 
Stress 39 21.44  (10.26)  18 15.22  (8.57)  4 15.5 (5.74) 
MAAS 39 3.29  (.79)  18 3.83  (.74)  4 3.88 (.36) 
VLQ 40 40.47  (15.74)  18 58.99  15.89)  4 66.03 (13.36) 
CFQ 37 62.70  (11.94)  18 47.33  12.58)  4 44.50  (9.85) 
AAQ-II 37 35.54  (9.16)  18 26.33  (8.58)  4 28.00  (6.38) 
SDS 36 18.25  (7.93)  18 12.33  (8.13)  4 11.67  (7.09) 
Satisfaction with Life as a Whole 38 4.13  (2.43)  17 6.76  (1.60)  4 6.75  (1.50) 
PWI 38 38.10  (13.28)  18 54.22  (9.49)  4 52.50  (11.09) 
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Inferential Analyses. 
Relationships between variables. 
 The relationships between worry (as measured by the PSWQ), rumination (as measured by 
the RRS), ACT constructs (AAQ-II, CFQ, MAAS, VLQ) and psychological symptomatology 
(DASS) were investigated using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. Preliminary 
analyses were performed to ensure no violations of the assumptions of normality, linearity and 
homoscedacity. The correlations between variables of interest are presented in table 7.   
 As expected, there was a large positive correlation between the PSWQ and the RRS. The 
PSWQ and the RRS were each strongly and positively correlated with the DASS stress scale, the 
AAQ, and the CFQ. There were also strong negative correlations between the PSWQ and the MAAS, 
and the RRS and the MAAS.  There were moderate, positive correlations between the PSWQ and the 
depression and anxiety scales of the DASS, and the depression and anxiety scales were also 
moderately and positively correlated with the RRS.   
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Table 6.  
Pearson Product-moment Correlations between Measures of Worry, Rumination, ACT-
Related Constructs and Psychological Symptomatology 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. PSWQ - .667** .395* .475* .589** .698** .723** -.643** -.096 
2. RRS  - - .481** .467** .522** .742** .690** -.680** -.254 
3. Depression  - - - .582** .366* .606** .583** -.399* -.578** 
4. Anxiety  - - - - .494** .682** .587** -.182 -.338* 
5. Stress  - - - - - .600** .562** -.491** -.199 
6. AAQ-II - - - - - - .862** -.579** -.291 
7. CFQ - - - - - - - -.533** -.279 
8. MAAS - - - - - - - -   .257 
9. VLQ - - - - - - - - - 
 < .05, **p < .01 (2-tailed). 
Intervention effects. 
Baseline to Post-Treatment.  
Using linear mixed-effects models, a standard single-factor within-subjects ANOVA was 
conducted to examine the impact of the ACT intervention from pre-treatment to post-treatment. The 
models included phase as a categorical repeated measures factor, and participants’ total scores on the 
outcome measures as the dependent variables. As is recommended, a variety of covariance structures, 
including first-order autoregressive, compound symmetry and scaled identity, and model selection 
was based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The compound symmetry model yielded the 
lower AIC.  
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The results of the linear mixed-effects model analysis of the changes in participants’ scores on 
worry, rumination and other outcome variables following the ACT intervention are summarized in 
table 7.  
Table 7.  
Change in Outcome Measures from Pre-Treatment to Post-Treatment based on Linear Mixed-
Effects Models Analysis 
 
  *p < .05, **p < .01. 
 df F p ηp2 CI ηp2 
     Lower Upper 
PSWQ 1, 21.02 5.559 .027* .21 <.01 .46 
RRS total 1, 24.26 9.422 .005** .28 .03 .51 
Brooding 1, 23.30 4.257 .050* .15 <.01 .40 
Reflection 1, 31.78 4.424 .043* .12 <.01 .33 
Depression Related Rumination 1, 23.64 9.488 .005** .29 .03 .51 
DASS-21       
Depression 1, 18.50 8.729 .008** .32 .03 .56 
Anxiety 1, 11.97 6.830 .023* .36 <.01 .62 
Stress 1, 21.94 6.282 .020* .22 <.01 .47 
AAQ-II 1, 21.31 5.190 .000* .20 <.01 .45 
CFQ 1, 22.85 29.448 .000** .56 .25 .72 
MAAS 1, 22.10 6.729 .017* .23 .01 .48 
VLQ 1, 26.89 18.267 .000** .40 .12 .59 
SDS 1, 21.31 5.190 .033* .20 <.01 .45 
Satisfaction with Life as a Whole 1, 17.08 5.937 .026* .26 <.01 .52 
PWI 1, 22.62 29.675 .000** .57 .25 .72 
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Data indicated that there were significant reductions on the PSWQ and RRS following the 
intervention. Participants’ scores on all of the subscales of the RSS (brooding, reflection, and 
depression-related rumination) were significantly lower at post-treatment. The change in scores RRS 
was associated with a larger effect size compared to the change in scores the PSWQ. Of the RRS 
subscales, the largest effect was observed for depression-related rumination.  
There was a significant reduction in scores on the depression, anxiety and stress scales of the 
DASS-21 following the ACT intervention, with the most substantial reduction occurring in 
depression scores. The greatest effect was observed for anxiety.  
There were significant changes in all ACT constructs from pre- to post-treatment. Significant 
reductions were observed on the AAQ-II and CFQ, while the MAAS and VLQ increased 
significantly following the intervention. The largest effects were observed for the CFQ and the VLQ. 
Finally, an analysis of change in participants’ scores on the SDS revealed a significant 
reduction from pre- to post-treatment. Furthermore, scores on the Satisfaction with Life as a Whole 
item and the PWI increased significantly following the ACT intervention.  
Post-Treatment to Follow-Up. 
A trend analysis was used to test for the presence of a trend in the data over the three points of 
measurement (pre-treatment, post-treatment and follow-up). The results of the trend analysis are 
presented in table 8. The trends in the data were also inspected at a descriptive level using plots of 
the mean scores at each phase. These plots are displayed in figures 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 below.   
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Table 8.  
Trend Analysis Results for Outcome Variables 
 
 Linear trends   Quadratic trends  
 
 
 
 
 
df 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
p 
 
 
 
 
 
ηp2 
 
 
 
 
 
95% CI for ηp2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
df 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F 
 
 
 
 
 
p 
 
 
 
 
 
ηp2 
 
 
 
 
 
95% CI for ηp2 
     
 
 
 
Lower  
 
 
 
Upper      
 
 
 
 
Lower  
 
 
 
 
Upper 
PSWQ 1, 60 4.207 .05 .07 <.01 .21  1, 60 .115 .738 .00 <.01 .21 
RRS total 1, 60 1.036 .38 .02 <.01 .13  1, 60 3.154 .09 .05 <.01 .19 
Brooding 1, 62 1.530 .23 .02 <.01 .14  1, 62 .533 .47 .01 <.01 .10 
Reflection 1, 60 .189 .67 .00 <.01 .08  1, 60 1.882 .18 .03 <.01 .15 
Depression-    
related rum. 
1, 62 .933 .34 .01 <.01 .12  1, 62 3.334 .08 .05 <.01 .18 
DASS-21              
Depression 1, 61 .015 .91 .00 <.01 .01  1, 61 5.669 .03 .09 <.01 .23 
Anxiety 1, 61 .303 .11 .000 <.01 .09  1, 61 2.812 .11 .04 <.01 .17 
Stress 1, 61 2.085 .16 .03 <.01 .16  1, 61 1.049 .32 .02 <.01 .12 
AAQ-II 1, 59 5.818 .02 .06 <.01 .24  1, 59 3.928 .06 .06 <.01 .20 
CFQ 1, 59 12.041 .00 .17 .03 .33  1, 59 3.262 .08 .05 <.01 .19 
MAAS 1, 61 .697 .41 .01 <.01 .11  1, 61 2.341 .14 .04 <.01 .16 
VLQ 1, 62 10.452 .00 .14 .02 .30  1, 62 .955 .34 .02 <.01 .12 
SDS 1, 58 4.145 .053 .07 <.01 .21  1, 58 .212 .96 .00 <.01 .09 
Satisfaction 
Whole 
1, 60 2.531 .121 .04 <.01 .17  1, 60 1.350 .255 .02 <.01 .14 
PWI 1, 60 11.944 .00 .17 .03 .33  1, 60 3.663 .07 .06 <.01 .20 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Figure 6. Participants’ mean worry scores (measured by the PSWQ) and mean rumination 
scores (measured by the RRS) at baseline, post-treatment and follow-up 
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Figure 7. Participants’ mean scores on the brooding, reflection and depression-related 
rumination subscales of the RRS at baseline, post-treatment and follow-up. 
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Figure 8. Participants’ mean depression, anxiety and stress scores (measured by the DASS-
21) at baseline, post-treatment and follow-up. 
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Figure 9. Participants’ mean experiential avoidance (AAQ-II), cognitive fusion (CFQ), 
mindfulness (MAAS) and valued living (VLQ) scores at baseline, post-treatment and follow-
up. 
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Figure 10. Participants’ mean disability (SDS), Satisfaction with Whole of Life, and personal 
wellbeing (PWI) scores at baseline, post-treatment and follow-up. 
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As can be seen in table 8, the only variable for which there was a significant quadratic trend 
was depression. In examining the plot of mean depression scores, it appears that this trend has 
resulted from a bounce-back in participants’ depression scores from post-treatment to follow-up. 
There were significant linear trends for the PSWQ, AAQ-II, CFQ, VLQ, and PWI, indicating that 
scores on these measures continued to change from post-treatment to follow-up. An inspection of the 
plots of these variables indicates that scores on the PSWQ continued to decrease at approximately 
the same rate from post-treatment to follow-up as pre- to post-treatment. There was a steep change in 
scores on the AAQ-II from baseline to post-treatment, and this change was maintained from post-
treatment to follow-up, in spite of a slight increase in scores. There was also a steep decline in scores 
on the CFQ from pre- to post-treatment, which levelled out slightly from post-treatment to follow-up. 
Scores on the VLQ continued to increase from post-treatment to follow-up, however the rate of 
change levelled out somewhat. Scores on the PWI decrease slightly from post-treatment to follow-
up, however there remained a notable improvement in scores on this measure from baseline to 
follow-up.  
There was no significant trend for rumination. An examination of the plot of total RRS scores 
suggests that was a minimal increase in scores from post-treatment to follow-up, but that follow-up 
scores were notably reduced compared to baseline scores. An inspection of the plots of the subscales 
of the RRS indicates that brooding scores levelled out from post-treatment to follow-up, indicating 
maintenance of change. There was little change in reflection across the three time points. There was 
a slight increase in scores on the depression-related rumination subscale from post-treatment to 
follow-up. 
There were no significant trends for anxiety and stress. An examination of the plots of these 
variables suggest there was a similar bounce-back in anxiety scores from post-treatment to follow-up 
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as there was in depression scores, however a significant trend was not observed. Stress scores 
returned to baseline levels. 
An examination of the plot of MAAS scores revealed that mindfulness increased substantially 
from pre- to post-treatment, then levelled out from post-treatment to follow-up. A descriptive 
analysis of the plot of MAAS scores suggests that change was maintained from post-treatment to 
follow-up, however this was not supported statistically in the trend analysis.  
There was no significant trend for SDS scores, however an examination of the plot of scores on 
this measure indicates suggests that change was maintained, as there appears to be minimal change in 
scores from post-treatment to follow-up. This pattern was also observed for Satisfaction with Life as 
a Whole scores, however there was also no significant trend for this measure.  
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Discussion 
 Study Two examined the effectiveness of a group-based ACT intervention for the treatment 
of worry and rumination in individuals with transdiagnostic psychological problems attending the 
outpatient service at a private psychiatric hospital. The objective of this study was to expand upon 
the findings of Study One by examining the impact of ACT on worry and rumination in a larger 
sample, in addition to exploring the effects of the treatment on participants’ depression, anxiety and 
stress, and ACT-related variables (experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, mindfulness, and valued 
living). The impact of the intervention on functional impairment and quality of life (life satisfaction 
and personal wellbeing) were also of interest, as were the relationships between worry and 
rumination, measures of psychological symptomatology, and ACT constructs.  The specific 
hypotheses and findings associated with each variables of interest will be discussed individually in 
the following section.  
Worry and rumination. 
It was hypothesised that there would be significant reductions in ACT group 
participants’ worry and rumination from pre-treatment to post-treatment. This hypothesis was 
supported by the results, as worry and rumination both decreased significantly from pre- to 
post-treatment. The reductions in the brooding, reflection, and depression-related rumination 
were all significant, with the most change occurring in depression-related rumination. These 
findings suggests that the ACT intervention was most effective for the type of rumination that 
is correlated with depressive symptoms, for example, thinking about how passive and 
unmotivated you feel (Treynor et al., 2003).  A possible explanation for this finding is that 
the rumination which occurs in relation to one’s psychological symptoms may be the most 
amenable to change, perhaps because it reduces concurrently as depression and anxiety 
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decrease. Importantly, however, the results also suggest that ACT is effective for rumination 
that is independent of psychological symptomatology.  
It was also hypothesised that changes in worry and rumination would be maintained 
at 1-month follow-up. The observed reduction in worry was not only maintained from post-
treatment to follow-up, but levels of worry actually continued to reduce during this period. 
While the follow-up results must be interpreted with caution based on the fact that only four 
participants completed measures at this point, the pattern of change observed for worry from 
post-treatment to follow-up suggests that participants generalized what they learnt in the 
intervention into to their day-to-day lives, adopting an ACT approach to the management of 
their worry. This represents the ideal outcome of any psychological intervention, and this 
finding therefore provides strong support for the effectiveness of ACT for the treatment of 
pathological worry. There was no significant trend associated with participants’ rumination 
scores at follow-up, however a descriptive analysis indicates that the results indicated that 
reductions in rumination were largely maintained. Interestingly, while not indicative of a 
significant trend, it appears that brooding was the only rumination-related construct which 
continued to decrease from post-treatment to follow-up. This is promising, as research has 
shown that brooding is associated with more depression concurrently and longitudinally, 
relative to reflection (Treynor et al., 2003). Thus, there is some indication that ACT is 
effective in producing sustainable improvements in rumination.  
Interestingly, while worry continued to decrease following the intervention and 
rumination did not, the magnitude of change from baseline to post-treatment was greater for 
rumination compared to worry. This suggests that ACT was more effective for rumination 
across the course of the intervention (while still being effective for worry), but was more 
effective for worry from post-treatment to follow-up. It is possible, therefore, that ACT 
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impacts worry and rumination in different ways, perhaps based on the inherent differences 
between these constructs. One key difference is that rumination (and particularly depression-
related rumination) is more associated with psychological symptoms than worry, such that 
its onset may be triggered by the experience of a depression or anxiety-related symptom, 
emotion, or bodily sensation, which cues the individual to perseverate over their symptoms 
and psychological problems. If this is the case, rumination is likely to be particularly 
affected by change in symptomatology, such that if depression and anxiety increase 
somewhat following an intervention (as they did in the present study), rumination is also 
likely to experience a bounce-back effect. Conversely, it may be that worry is less sensitive 
to change in depression and anxiety, which is consistent with the present finding in that 
worry continued to decline following the conclusion of the intervention, in spite of increases 
in depression and anxiety.  
Another potential difference between worry and rumination which may explain the 
differences in these variables observed at post-treatment (in terms of magnitude of change) 
and follow-up (in terms of continuation of change) is that individuals are better able to 
identify when they are worrying compared to when they ruminating. There are several 
reasons for why this may be the case. In the theoretical and empirical literature, worry is 
clearly a better understood concept than rumination, which remains ambiguous and is not 
associated with a single, accepted definition (Siegle, 2008). It is possible that this lack of 
clarity has meant that in spite of the prevalence of the experience of rumination, rumination 
as a term and a concept has not yet gained mainstream awareness. In addition, it may be that 
worry is more easily identifiable for individuals because it is frequently associated with 
physical symptoms of anxiety (feelings of tension, panic, heart palpitations, and so forth), 
whereas rumination is not necessarily associated with an obvious physiological response, 
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and may be difficult to differentiate from simply being in a “bad mood”. Finally, it is 
possible that individuals are more aware of their worry than their rumination, as it is likely 
that they would have discussed it with their treating team as part of the symptom profile of 
anxiety and/or GAD, whereas in spite of rumination’s intrinsic role in depression, it is not 
part of the diagnostic criteria for depressive disorders, and is therefore less likely to be 
discussed in conversations with doctors and psychiatrists.  
The possible difference in people’s understanding and awareness of worry compared 
to rumination may have had implications following the conclusion of a psychological 
intervention. While it must be remembered that the follow-up sample in the present study is 
very small, it was this period where prominent differences between worry and rumination 
were observed. The superior improvement in worry relative to rumination may be because 
individuals are better able to identify when they are worried, and therefore have the 
opportunity to implement the ACT techniques they learnt in the intervention to manage their 
worry. Rumination, on the other hand, may not be as easily identifiable, and if the individual 
is not able to notice that they are ruminating, then they are less able to implement strategies 
that may shift their focus and lead to improvement. Furthermore, it may be that the greater 
reduction in rumination relative to worry observed from baseline to post-treatment was 
because of the intervention’s strong emphasis on shifting attention and mindfulness of 
positive and pleasurable experiences, which would have cued participants’ attention away 
from their depression and anxiety (which were also improving concurrently). Thus, while 
the ACT intervention was highly effective in reducing rumination and worry over the course 
of treatment, it may be important to better define rumination and assist individuals to see 
how it operates in their lives, in order to consolidate the intervention techniques aimed at 
ameliorating this process over time.  
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Overall, the present findings support the application of ACT to worry and 
rumination, suggesting that it leads to significant change in these processes, which are 
maintained following the conclusion of treatment. The findings are consistent with the 
literature which indicates that there are important differences as well as similarities between 
worry and rumination, and it is possible that these differences may mediate the long-term 
impact of ACT. 
Psychological symptomatology. It was hypothesised that there would be significant 
reductions in participants’ clinical symptomology (depression, anxiety and stress) following 
the ACT intervention. This hypothesis was supported by the results, as depression, anxiety 
and stress all decreased significantly from baseline to post-treatment. This finding is 
consistent with the ACT empirical literature outlined in Chapter Four which indicates that 
ACT is an effective treatment for anxiety and depression.  
It was also hypothesised that changes in depression, anxiety and stress would be 
maintained at 1-month follow-up. This hypothesis was partially supported by the current 
findings. The data revealed that participants’ depression and anxiety increased somewhat 
from post-treatment to follow-up, and a significant quadratic trend was observed for 
depression, indicating a bounce-back effect. However, an inspection of the plotted scores 
suggests that depression and anxiety scores remained reduced from baseline, indicating that 
some change had been maintained. Interestingly, while no significant trend was observed, 
stress appeared to return to baseline levels at follow-up, indicating that the reduction in 
stress observed at post-treatment was not maintained.  
The fact that depression, anxiety and stress increased from post-treatment to follow-
up is surprising and inconsistent with previous research which has found that treatment 
effects associated with ACT interventions were maintained (and even increase) at follow-up 
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(e.g. Arch et al., 2012; Bohlmeiker et al., 2001; Clarke et al., 2012; Hayes et al., 2011; 
Forman et al., 2007; Roemer & Orsillo, 2007). Therefore, it may be that the present findings 
regarding the effectiveness of ACT beyond the conclusion of an ACT intervention may be 
due to the small sample of follow-up respondents. However, it is also important to note that 
the increase in depression, anxiety and stress observed at follow-up occurred in the context 
of improved personal wellbeing and life satisfaction. An alternative explanation for the 
bounce-back of psychological symptomatology is therefore offered below.   
ACT process measures.  
It was hypothesised that relative to pre-treatment, ACT group participants would have 
significantly lower levels of experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion, and significantly 
higher levels of valued living and dispositional mindfulness. The present findings supported 
this hypothesis, as experiential avoidance and cognitive defusion decreased significantly from 
pre-treatment to post-treatment, and mindfulness and valued living increased significantly. It 
was also hypothesised that changes in ACT variables would be maintained at 1-month 
follow-up. This hypothesis was supported, with experiential avoidance and cognitive 
defusion continuing to decrease at post-treatment in a linear direction, and values continuing 
to increase. Changes in mindfulness was maintained at follow-up.  
The present results suggest that an ACT intervention is effective in promoting 
sustainable change in the mechanisms it sees as being key to psychological flexibility and 
overall wellbeing and vitality. The findings are consistent with the ACT literature which has 
shown that ACT leads to increased acceptance (Bohmeijer et al., 2001; Forman et al., 2007), 
mindfulness (Meuret et al., 2012), and psychological flexibility (Twohig, 2009), and reduced 
experiential avoidance (Dalrymple & Herbert, 2007; Ossman et al., 2006). Importantly, the 
current research also build on previous ACT research, as to date no study of ACT and 
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depression and anxiety has included a measure of cognitive fusion and valued living. Thus, 
the present results provide support for the effectiveness of ACT in significantly reducing 
cognitive fusion and increasing engagement with values.   
A secondary hypothesis related to the predicted change in ACT-related variables was 
that the relationship between worry and rumination would and ACT-related variables would 
be stronger than the relationship between worry and rumination and depression, anxiety and 
stress. This hypothesis was supported, as the correlational analysis indicated that a stronger 
relationship existed between both worry and rumination and ACT constructs compared to the 
relationship between worry and rumination and psychological distress. While conclusions 
cannot be drawn based on the current data, the fact that worry and rumination were so closely 
related to experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion in particular makes it quite possible 
that the observed changes in worry and rumination were directly associated with changes in 
these ACT-related variables. Further support for the role of experiential avoidance and 
cognitive fusion in the reductions in worry and rumination lies in the fact that changes in 
worry, rumination, experiential avoidance and cognitive fusion were all either maintained or 
continued to improve from post-treatment to follow-up, whereas depression, anxiety and 
stress all increased somewhat. Thus, the current findings provide evidence for the strong 
relationship between worry and rumination and experiential avoidance, cognitive fusion, and 
mindfulness, and to a lesser extent, valued living. These results are consistent with the 
literature which defines the function of worry and rumination as experiential avoidance (e.g. 
Borkovec, 1994; Crib et al., 2006; Giorgio et al., 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), 
suggesting that a reduction in experiential avoidance (in addition to changes in cognitive 
fusion, mindfulness and valued living) coincides with a reduction in worry and rumination.   
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Quality of life. 
It was hypothesised that following the ACT intervention, participants would have 
significantly higher levels of personal wellbeing and satisfaction with life, and significantly 
lower levels of functional impairment. This hypothesis was supported, as satisfaction with 
life and personal wellbeing increased and functional impairment reduced significantly 
following the intervention. It was also hypothesised that changes in satisfaction with life, 
personal wellbeing and functional impairment would be maintained at 1-month follow-up. 
This hypothesis was supported, with personal wellbeing continuing to increase in a linear 
fashion at follow-up, and satisfaction and functional impairment levels being maintained. 
However, it is again important to note the sample of individuals who completed the follow-up 
measures was very small.  
These results are consistent with the literature which indicates that ACT is effective in 
improving quality of life and life satisfaction (e.g. Clarke et al., 2012; Dalrymple & Herbert; 
Forman et al.; Twohig et al., 2010). They are very significant findings as they indicate that 
essentially, the intervention made participants feel better about their lives and themselves, 
and reduced their level of impairment in engaging with the different facets of their world. 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that while depression, anxiety and stress increased 
somewhat from post-intervention to follow-up, improvements in functionality and life 
satisfaction were maintained, and personal wellbeing continued to improve. This indicates 
that in spite of the rebound that occurred in participants’ psychological symptoms, their 
overall quality of life remained stable, and even improved in some aspects. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that the functional context around the participants’ 
psychological symptoms changed. For example, in light of the fact that following the 
intervention the participants were experiencing reduced experiential avoidance and were 
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engaging in avoidance strategies such as worry and rumination to a lesser degree (as 
indicated by the results), while simultaneously engaging in increased levels of values-
consistent behavior, it is not surprising that individuals experienced a resurgence of anxiety, 
stress and depressed mood as they grappled with making changes in their lives without the 
weekly support of the ACT group. If this explanation is accurate, the context of this distress 
is not one of avoidance but of living a meaningful life in the service of one’s values, which is 
consistent with the finding that life satisfaction, functionality and personal wellbeing were 
maintained in spite of changes in depression, anxiety and stress. Thus, this finding is highly 
consistent with the assumptions of the ACT model, which proposes that the presence of 
difficult private events does not have to equate to the absence of vitality, wellbeing, and even 
happiness. 
Overall summary. 
The aim of Study Two was to explore the effectiveness of ACT for rumination and 
worry in a transdiagnostic sample. The findings of this study lend support for the use of ACT 
in the treatment of pathological worry and rumination in individuals with a range of 
psychological problems. The group ACT intervention was associated with significant 
reductions in participants’ worry, rumination, depression, anxiety and stress, and 
improvements in participants’ life satisfaction, personal wellbeing, and functionality. The 
intervention was also associated with large and sustained changes in experiential avoidance, 
cognitive fusion, mindfulness, and valued living.  
Limitations and future directions. 
The findings of this study must, however, be interpreted in the context of its 
limitations, the most important one being the absence of a control condition. The fact that 
there was no control condition to compare the treatment effects against means that it is not 
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possible to infer any casual conclusions in relation to the findings. Another important 
limitation is the relatively small sample size. The attrition in this study was significant, with 
quite large reductions in responses occurring at both post-treatment follow-up. The fact that a 
substantial proportion of ACT program participants did not complete the post-treatment and 
follow-up measures may have influenced the representativeness of the results in important 
ways. For example, while the sample of individuals who completed the post-treatment 
measures did not differ significantly from the non-completers at baseline, it may be that the 
non-completers were less satisfied with the intervention program and/or ACT in general than 
the completers, and were therefore less inclined to complete the post-treatment measures. In 
addition, it is possible that individuals who experienced symptom improvement over the 
course of the intervention were more motivated to complete the follow-up measures. If this 
was the case, it would mean that the post-therapy findings regarding the impact of ACT may 
be biased by the fact that they are based only on a sample of individuals who had a positive 
experience of the intervention, and this must be kept in mind when considering the 
generalizability of the present findings. The findings pertaining to the follow-up assessment 
in particular should be viewed in light of the fact that a very small proportion of the sample 
completed the measures at this point, and should therefore be considered preliminary findings 
only, rather than a generalizable indication of the long-term impact of ACT for worry and 
rumination.  
Future research on group ACT for worry and rumination should explore ways of 
minimizing participant attrition. While the follow-up period was set at one month post-
intervention based on the view that participants would be more likely to respond sooner after 
the intervention rather than later, this may have contributed to the low response rate. While 
the assessments were not lengthy, it is possible that the follow-up assessment point was too 
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soon after the intervention, and participants were reluctant to complete it having completed 
the questionnaire package only one month prior. It is impossible to determine whether there 
would have been a better response had follow-up occurred at 3 months post intervention, for 
example, however this may be an area for future exploration.  
These limitations aside, as the first multiple-participant study on ACT for worry and 
rumination, this study represents an initial step to understanding the effectiveness of ACT in 
relation to these cognitive processes. Future research should continue to build on the present 
findings to explore the mechanisms of action responsible for the impact of ACT on worry and 
rumination; specifically, which treatment components are most integral to change in worry 
and rumination, and whether ACT processes have a direct effect on worry and rumination 
even when change in depression and anxiety is controlled for.  
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Chapter 8. Summary and Conclusions 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter focuses on summarizing the research findings of studies one and two, 
and integrating the results in the context of the proposed theoretical rationale for the 
application of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) to worry and rumination. The 
chapter will begin with a review the aims and design of studies one and two, and will go on to 
summarise the findings or both research programmes. The second part of the chapter will 
discuss the clinical implications of the current research studies with reference to the key 
research concern – the effectiveness of ACT for worry and rumination – in addition to 
another significant implication which emerged from the research, which was the differences 
between worry and rumination. In reviewing the effectiveness of ACT for worry and 
rumination based on the current research, the support for an experiential avoidance model of 
worry and rumination, support for a focus on process rather than content in the treatment of 
worry and rumination, and support for the relevance of the ACT model in the treatment of 
worry and rumination will also be discussed. Finally, future directions for research will 
discussed, and a treatment framework for ACT for worry and rumination will be provided.  
Aims and Design 
The aim of the current research studies was to explore the effectiveness of group 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for the treatment of worry and rumination as 
transdiagnostic cognitive processes. This was examined through exploring the impact of an 
ACT group program delivered in a community setting, in addition to the outcomes of a group 
ACT intervention delivered through the outpatient service of a private psychiatric hospital. 
Study One utilised a case study design and incorporated both quantitative and qualitative 
measures. It represented a preliminary exploration of the effectiveness of ACT for worry and 
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rumination, as there has been no published research to date on the application of ACT to 
rumination and worry. The use of a mixed methods approach afforded a deep and detailed 
exploration of whether ACT was effective in reducing worry and rumination, and how the 
participant engaged with an ACT approach. Study Two utilised a within-subjects repeated 
measures design to assess the whether ACT is a viable option for the treatment of worry and 
rumination amongst individuals with a range of transdiagnostic psychological problems. The 
objective of Study Two was to illuminate and expand on the findings of Study One using a 
larger sample, in particular, by exploring the relationships between worry and rumination, 
ACT therapeutic processes and anxiety and depression.    
Summary of Findings 
Data from Study One demonstrated that ACT was effective in reducing the 
participant’s rumination but not her worry, and the change in rumination was maintained at 
follow-up. The intervention also led to a reduction in the participant’s anxiety but not her 
depressive symptoms, however her depression score was not at clinical levels at pre-
treatment. The participant also experienced an increase in functioning following the 
intervention. Interestingly, the participant experienced no significant change in ACT-related 
variables other than mindfulness, which increased following the intervention and was 
maintained at follow-up. The qualitative data indicated that it was also mindfulness which the 
participant felt was the therapeutic component which had the greatest and most lasting impact 
on her, while she talked about struggling with acceptance as her degree of experiential 
avoidance and investment in the control agenda were entrenched and difficult to shift. Study 
One yielded some interesting findings which required further exploration in Study Two: 
firstly, the fact that there was no change in most ACT constructs (experiential avoidance, 
cognitive fusion, and valued living) was very surprising, and warranted further exploration 
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with a larger sample. Second, the participant only experienced change in rumination, not 
worry, and anxiety but not depression, which was unexpected in light of the literature which 
assumes strong relationships between these variables. Third, Study One raised an additional, 
important question, which could not be addressed by Study Two, but which should be 
explored in future research: is the impact of ACT moderated by prior experience with CBT? 
The results of Study Two provide support for the effectiveness of ACT in treating 
worry and rumination, in addition to depression and anxiety, the primary psychological 
disorders with which worry and rumination are associated. Data also indicated that a group 
ACT intervention was associated with significant change in ACT-related constructs, and that 
ACT was linked to increased life satisfaction, functionality, and personal wellbeing. Follow-
up data indicated that changes in worry, ACT constructs, and personal wellbeing were 
maintained, however depression, anxiety and stress increased at 1-month follow-up (although 
scores remained reduced from baseline levels). However, follow-up trends must be 
interpreted in light of the fact that data is based on only four participants.  
Clinical Implications of Findings  
The effectiveness of ACT for worry and rumination. 
The findings from studies one and two support the application of ACT to worry and 
rumination. Prior to the current research, empirical ACT had only looked at the effectiveness 
of ACT for depression and anxiety, without focusing specifically on worry and rumination as 
key processes in the onset and maintenance of these disorders. Thus, the present findings 
provide empirical support for the strong theoretical rationale for applying ACT to the 
treatment of worry and rumination outlined in Chapter Five. Because of the small sample size 
and absence of a control condition, it is impossible to determine from the current study 
whether the reductions in psychopathology observed in the two studies were mediated by the 
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reductions in worry and rumination, however the findings do suggest that ACT is associated 
with reductions in rumination and worry, which occurred alongside reductions in 
psychological distress and improvements in quality of life and wellbeing.  
Support for an experiential avoidance model of worry and rumination. 
The current findings were consistent with the theory and research which proposes that 
worry and rumination have avoidant functions (e.g. Borkovec, 1994, 1998; Cribb et al., 2006; 
Giorgio et al., 2010; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; Sibrava and Borkovec, 2006). The current 
study also builds on existing research by providing support for an experiential avoidance 
model of rumination, as while it is widely accepted that worry serves an avoidance function, 
only a few studies have looked at rumination as a form of avoidance. In Study One, the 
participant was highly avoidant and experienced great difficulty with the concept of 
acceptance, and the fact that neither her levels of worry nor her levels of experiential 
avoidance changed may suggest a relationship a relationship between the two variables. In 
Study Two, the data revealed strong relationships between worry, rumination, and 
experiential avoidance, and the fact that the ACT intervention was successful in reducing 
participants’ worry and rumination further indicates that the concept of experiential 
avoidance is important in understanding and treating worry and rumination. Thus, the 
findings suggest that worry and rumination are mechanisms of experiential avoidance, that is, 
that the function of these processes is to allow the individual to avoid painful and distressing 
emotions and other private events. In light of this, interventions focusing on worry and 
rumination should incorporate an analysis of how the client’s worry and rumination function 
to maintain their experiential avoidance, in the context of broader psychological difficulties.  
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Support for a focus on process rather than content in the treatment of worry and 
rumination.  
The present findings are also consistent with the trends observed in more recent 
interventions for worry and rumination which focus on the process aspects of worry and 
rumination as opposed to targeting the content of worry and rumination. Consistent with an 
ACT approach, at no point in either of the present interventions was there any discussion of 
the content of worry and ruminative thought, however, rumination reduced substantially in 
Study One, and both rumination and worry decreased significantly in Study Two. The fact 
that ACT was effective in significantly reducing rumination in both studies and worry in one 
suggest that it is not necessary to engage with the content of these constructs at all in 
reducing the frequency and intensity of their occurrence. This finding has broader clinical 
implications for the ACT versus CBT debate, as central to this dichotomy is the question of 
whether maladaptive thoughts should be disputed or accepted (Marker & Abramova, 2011). 
Consistent with the trends in the rumination and worry intervention literature, the present 
findings provide support for the latter approach to dealing with thoughts, at least in the 
context of worry and rumination. The current research also builds on the existing research on 
process-focused interventions for worry and rumination as it is the first research to examine 
the effectiveness of a process-based intervention which targets both worry and rumination as 
co-occurring, transdiagnostic processes, whereas other interventions which incorporate 
similar principles (e.g. RFCBT, metacognitive therapy, MBCT) have only focused on worry 
or rumination in isolation. Furthermore, ACT incorporates additional therapeutic components 
which are aimed at improving the individual’s overall functioning and quality of life (such as 
mindfulness, values and committed action), as opposed to merely focusing on reducing the 
occurrence of worry and rumination.  
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Support for the relevance of the ACT model in the treatment of worry and 
rumination. 
More broadly, the present findings also provide support for the ACT model in 
general, in that worry and rumination (in addition to depression and anxiety) reduced 
substantially following the ACT interventions, despite the fact that, consistent with the ACT 
model of psychopathology, neither intervention targeted them specifically, nor were they 
emphasised as an explicit aim of therapy. This finding is consistent with other research (e.g. 
Ossman et al. 2006) which has found that ACT leads to the amelioration of problematic 
symptoms without them being an explicit focus of therapeutic efforts (as would be the case in 
CBT).  
Given that the current findings suggest that it is not necessary to focus on specific 
symptoms in order to achieve widespread improvement, the findings also provide support for 
ACT as a transdiagnostic therapy, and suggest that it is effective in improving levels of worry 
and rumination, in addition to depression, anxiety and stress in a transdiagnostic sample. This 
is consistent with newer approaches to working with psychological distress, which focus on 
the overlap between mood and anxiety disorder diagnostic categories and emphasise the 
continuous rather than discrete nature of emotional problems (Barlow, Allen, & Choate, 
2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). For example, Barlow et al. propose a unified 
treatment for emotional disorders based on their argument that the similarities in etiology and 
latent structure between disorders outweigh the differences. Their proposed approach, which 
has not yet been evaluated empirically, involves three fundamental therapeutic components, 
which are: 1) altering antecedent cognitive reappraisals; 2) preventing emotional avoidance; 
and 3) facilitating action tendencies not associated with the emotion that is dysregulated. This 
framework has clear similarities to ACT in its emphasis on avoidance and intervention at the 
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behavioural level, and when considered in conjunction with the more recent intervention 
literature for worry and rumination, points to the fact that in the treatment of emotional 
disorders and the cognitive processes they are associated with, the clinical psychological 
literature is moving away from an emphasis on targeting cognitive content for change, and 
towards a focus on targeting avoidance, shifting attention, and expanding the repertoire of 
behaviours that are enacted in response to emotional distress. Thus, the present research 
supports the use of a transdiagnostic therapeutic approach to treating worry and rumination as 
well as emotional disorders, and builds on the existing literature which indicates that ACT is 
a highly effective, empirically supported transdiagnostic therapy.  
Differences between worry and rumination. 
A final implication of the present findings is associated with conceptualisations of 
worry and rumination, and our understanding of the commonalities and differences between 
these cognitive processes. It has been suggested that worry and rumination are so similar that 
they there may be a single construct representing negative thought (Ehring & Watkins, 
2008). While the present results certainly confirmed their common features, particularly in 
light of the strong correlation observed between measures of each construct, the data also 
suggested that there may be important differences between worry and rumination, which 
may have clinical ramifications. Differences observed in the patterns of change in worry and 
rumination across the two studies are interesting outcomes of this research. In Study One, 
there was no change in the participant’s worry at post-treatment, yet her rumination 
decreased substantially and was maintained at follow-up. In Study Two, there were 
significant reductions in participants’ worry and rumination, but the follow-up trend 
indicated a greater reduction in worry from post-treatment to follow-up. While the follow-up 
findings must be interpreted with caution based the size of the sample who completed 
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follow-up measures, a possible explanation for these differences in the changes in worry and 
rumination may be that there are inherent differences in these constructs which mediate the 
impact of an ACT intervention. For example, as suggested in Study Two, it is possible that 
rumination (and particularly depression-related rumination) is more closely associated with 
psychological symptoms than worry, such that change in this construct is likely to be 
particularly affected by change in symptomatology, whereas worry may be less sensitive to 
changes in depression and anxiety. The present results are consistent with this explanation, 
as the participant in Study One’s rumination reduced with her anxiety, and the reduction in 
both variables were maintained, while in Study Two, there was a rebound in participants’ 
rumination, depression and anxiety following the intervention, yet worry continued to 
decline following the conclusion of the intervention. These findings suggest that worry is 
more independent of psychological symptomatology than rumination, which may represent 
important differences between the two constructs requiring further clarification.  
Alternatively, the differences in the changes in worry and rumination observed across 
the two studies may be a result of the different ACT interventions undertaken. The 
intervention in Study One consisted of six two-hour sessions and one four-hour session (a 
combination of the final two sessions), whereas the Study Two intervention comprised 10 
sessions which were 4.5 hours each. This extended length of the second intervention may 
have provided more opportunity for the consolidation of ACT concepts, which may be 
especially necessary for worry. This intervention was highly effective in targeting worry. 
Worry continued to decrease substantially following the conclusion of the treatment 
programme, indicating that the participants had generalized the ACT strategies in relation to 
their worry management beyond the intervention itself. The participant in Study One may 
have benefited from a longer and more comprehensive intervention, particularly as her worry 
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was highly entrenched and long-standing. Therefore, the present results may suggest that a 
10-week ACT incorporating sessions of 4.5 hours each in duration is more effective than an 
8-week intervention incorporating sessions of 2 hours each in duration in creating a shift in 
worry, and future research should explore the duration of an ACT intervention required to 
reduce worry and rumination in sustainable way.  
Future directions  
The present findings provide support for the effectiveness of ACT in the treatment of 
worry and rumination, and indicate that it is not necessary to explicitly target these cognitive 
processes in order to reduce the frequency and intensity with which they occur, and the 
distress they are associated with. These findings are important as the studies described were 
the first to examine the treatment of both worry and rumination as co-occurring, 
transdiagnostic processes. While the research yielded promising results, the findings should 
only be considered as preliminary, and there is certainly room for improvement in the 
effectiveness of ACT for worry and rumination if it is to be considered an evidence-based 
treatment in this area. For example, Study One data indicated that the intervention did not 
reduce the participant’s worry, which was a long-standing problem for her and a significant 
source of distress. The participant in Study One also did not adopt an ACT approach to her 
worry and rumination and made few explicit references to worry and rumination in the 
qualitative interview, suggesting that while the intervention assisted her in managing her 
psychological distress, it was not specific enough in targeting worry and rumination. 
Furthermore, in Study Two, while the intervention was effective in reducing worry and 
rumination, rumination was associated with greater change than worry, and only changes in 
worry were maintained at follow-up. Also, the capacity to draw firmer conclusions regarding 
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the effectiveness of ACT for worry and rumination is limited by the high rate of attrition and 
the fact that the follow-up findings are based on such a small sample of participants.  
To ensure that an ACT intervention targets worry and rumination in a specific, unified 
and consistent way, it may be important to tailor the intervention to more explicitly focus on 
these cognitive processes. While ACT is a transdiagnostic approach that theoretically can be 
applied to all psychological problems, individuals have adapted the standard ACT treatment 
framework to specifically target different psychological problems in order to enhance the 
effectiveness and efficiency of therapy and improve outcomes for the client (e.g. Act for 
Anxiety, Eifert & Forsyth, 2005; ACT for Depression, Zettle, 2007). While ACT is a flexible 
therapy which does not involve prescriptive interventions and adherence to a sequential 
structure, ACT treatment protocols frame the particular psychological problem within ACT 
parameters and provide a “road map” for clinicians to guide them in the process of therapy. 
ACT for worry a rumination: towards an improved understanding and a 
treatment protocol. 
Based on the literature on worry and rumination reviewed in earlier chapters and 
drawing on the findings of studies one and two, there are some clear ways in which an ACT 
treatment protocol could be tailored to more specifically target worry and rumination. 
Chapter Five outlined a theoretical rationale for the application of ACT to worry and 
rumination, based on ACT’s focus on reducing experiential avoidance, and the hypothesised 
relevance of ACT therapeutic components in ameliorating the negative effects of these 
cognitive processes. In revisiting this rationale in the context of the present research findings, 
further steps can be taken towards proposing an ACT model of worry and rumination and 
putting forward a targeted treatment protocol.  
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An ACT model of worry and rumination. 
Based on its theoretical foundations, an ACT model of worry and rumination would 
emphasise that these processes are not bad or aversive in themselves; rather, that it is in the 
context in which they occur and how the individual responds to them that determine whether 
they are problematic or not. This view of worry and rumination is consistent with the 
literature which highlights that worry and rumination are normal processes experienced by 
clinical and non-clinical populations, and should only be considered pathological when they 
cause the individual significant distress or impairment to functioning (Martin & Tesser, 1996; 
Ruscio et al., 2001; Szabó and Lovibond, 2002; Tallis et al., 1994; Treynor et al., 2003). 
Within an ACT framework, a problematic context in which worry and rumination may occur 
is one of experiential avoidance and psychological inflexibility. As highlighted throughout 
this research, worry and rumination can operate as mechanisms of experiential avoidance 
whereby instead of experiencing and accepting a difficult internal event – whether it fear, 
sadness, uncertainty, confusion, vulnerability, guilt – an individual responds by diverting 
their focus to the cognitive level and engaging in worry and/or rumination, as opposed to 
processing their distress emotionally. In light of the repetitive and cyclical nature of these 
cognitive processes, the individual is likely to then become “fused” with their worry and 
rumination, which exacerbates their sense of threat or hopelessness and makes it difficult for 
them to shift their attention. It is likely that psychological inflexibility develops as worry and 
rumination become part of the individual’s increasingly narrow repertoire of responses to 
distressing stimuli, leaving minimal opportunity for engagement in adaptive action which 
would promote positive change in the individual’s world. This is consistent with the literature 
which highlights that worry and rumination interfere with instrumental behavior (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). It is likely that an individual’s engagement in worry and rumination 
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as a response to experiential avoidance would represent a long-standing pattern that is 
automatic and occurs outside of their conscious awareness, and therefore it is important for 
therapy to bring awareness to the role worry and rumination in relation to the urge to control 
and avoid difficult psychological experiences.  
In considering the impact of the engagement in worry and rumination as avoidance 
strategies over time, it is easy to see how worry and rumination can lead to the development 
of anxiety, depression, and other psychological problems. Furthermore, once psychological 
symptoms have developed, it is likely that they provide more content for the individual to 
incorporate into the focus of their worry and rumination, leading to a likely exacerbation. 
Furthermore, once an emotional disorder develops, it is likely that depressed or anxious mood 
act as a cue for worry and rumination, and worry and/or rumination act as a cue for depressed 
or anxious mood. Thus, in linking this ACT model of worry and rumination back to the 
broader literature on worry and rumination in particular, it is proposed that a) depressive 
rumination (and anxious rumination) develops from a more a more global form of rumination 
when it occurs in the context of long-standing experiential avoidance and psychological 
inflexibility; and b) that once clinical levels of emotional distress develops, it is likely that 
worry/rumination and anxiety/depression maintain the occurrence of each other, which 
increasingly exacerbates the individual’s distress and functional impairment.  
ACT for worry and rumination: treatment framework 
In light of this account of ACT for worry and rumination, an ACT approach should 
focus not on reducing worry and rumination, but on assisting the individual to change the 
context in which they occur. This would involve assisting the individual to recognise the role 
worry and rumination play in relation to experiential avoidance, gain insight into the 
detrimental consequences of worry and rumination in the context of psychological 
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inflexibility, and to gradually expand their repertoire of values-based behavioural responses 
to emotional distress. As an initial step in the development of a treatment protocol for ACT 
for worry and rumination, table 9 outlines each of the core ACT therapeutic processes and 
how they can be tailored to more specifically target rumination and worry. 
Table 9.  
ACT for Worry and Rumination Proposed Therapeutic Components 
ACT Treatment Process Applied to Worry and Rumination 
Creative Hopelessness 
 Discuss the control agenda and experiential 
avoidance  
 Define worry and rumination and how they operate in 
the individual’s life  
 Discuss the function of worry and rumination, 
highlighting their avoidant functions  
 Develop a formulation of how worry and rumination 
operate for the individual as mechanisms of 
experiential avoidance 
 Discuss patterns and costs of engaging in worry and 
rumination in the service of avoidance 
 Establish that control and avoidance are the problem 
– not worry and rumination 
 
Acceptance 
 Acceptance and willingness as the alternative to 
avoidance 
 Cultivate practice of willingness instead of worry and 
rumination in response to distress  
 Acceptance of the mind’s tendency to engage in 
worry and rumination – efforts should not be directed 
at stopping this, but on more workable action 
 
Cognitive Defusion 
 Focus is on worry and rumination as processes rather 
than individual thoughts. For example, instead of 
“I’m noticing that I am having the thought that X”, 
one might say “I’m noticing that my mind is starting 
to ruminate” or “I’m feeling the urge to start 
worrying” 
 Defusion efforts are focused on identifying when 
thoughts as occurring as part of an episode of worry 
or rumination, and defusing from the process 
 
Mindfulness  
 Mindfulness practice aimed at increasing awareness 
of thoughts and feelings 
 Increase mindfulness of ‘choice points’ – notice 
when episodes of worry and rumination begin and 
shift attention away from thoughts and onto 
acceptance of emotions or adaptive action 
 
Self-as-Context  
 Enhance awareness of the ‘observing self’ and 
distinguish between the part of the self that worries 
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and ruminates and the part of the self that can observe 
this occurring 
 Defusion from the conceptualised self that is 
associated with worry and rumination – e.g. “I’ve 
always been a worrier” “I overthink everything”  
 In conjunction with other ACT processes, aimed at 
promoting psychological flexibility and creating 
space for behavioural change  
 
Values 
 Values identification  
 
Committed Action 
 Identification of desired behaviours/actions that are 
values-consistent  
 Setting goals around these behaviours with the aim of 
bringing one closer to living in accordance with one’s 
values 
 Emphasis is on increasing action rather than 
decreasing worry and rumination 
 Discussion of potential barriers to action – such as 
painful feelings, worry and rumination – and 
problem-solving/discussion of solutions 
 
 
The proposed treatment framework represents only a first step to better target ACT 
therapeutic processes in the treatment of worry and rumination. This framework requires 
empirical validation in order to gauge its value in the treatment of worry and rumination. 
Similarly, as the first empirical exploration of ACT for worry and rumination, the present 
findings represent only preliminary evidence, and further research is recommended in this 
area. Randomised clinical trials are advocated to explore the efficacy of ACT in relation to 
other treatments for worry and rumination, such as CBT and metacognitive therapy, in order 
to gain a better understanding of the impact of ACT.  
A further area for exploration is whether the impact of ACT on worry and rumination 
is mediated by a client’s prior experience with CBT. Study One suggested that the 
participant’s experience of ACT may have been affected by her extensive prior experience 
with CBT, however a deeper exploration of this issue was beyond the scope of Study Two. 
The research raised some interesting questions regarding the relationship between ACT and 
CBT, and this warrants further investigation as it is likely to have practical implications. As 
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ACT gains increasing support, it is necessary to understand and address the potential 
challenges clinicians may face in working with clients who are familiar with a therapeutic 
approach that differs in crucial (and potentially opposing) ways to ACT. It is necessary for 
the ACT versus CBT debate to go beyond the theoretical world and to deal with the reality 
that these two therapies are often used by the same clinicians, with the same clients. This can 
only lead to improved outcomes for clients.  
In sum, as preliminary findings, the present results provide early encouraging support 
for the application of ACT to the treatment of worry and rumination, which are important 
transdiagnostic processes that should arguably be considered by all therapists working with 
clients with emotional disorders, given their high prevalence and detrimental correlates. 
While there were several limitations associated with both studies, the fact that the research 
yielded theoretically consistent outcomes is promising. Taken together, the results of this 
research programme add to the separate bodies of literature on worry and rumination and 
ACT, as well as beginning a discussion on the application of ACT to worry and rumination.  
 
 
  
216 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
References 
Abela, J. R., Brozina, K., & Haigh, E. P. (2002). An examination of the response styles 
theory of depression in third-and seventh-grade children: A short-term longitudinal study. 
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 30(5), 515-527. 
Alexander, M. J., G. Haugland, S. P. Lin, D. N. Bertollo, and F. A. McCorry. 2008. 
Mental Health Screening in Addiction, Corrections and Social Service Settings: Validating 
the MMS. International Journal on the Addictions 6 (1), 105–19. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7916(88)90006-7 
Alford, B. A., & Beck, A. T. (1994). Cognitive therapy of delusional beliefs. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 32(3), 369-380. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-
7967(94)90134-1 
Andreescu, C., Lenze, E. J., Mulsant, B. H., Wetherel, J. L., Begley, A. E., Mazumdar, S., & 
Reynolds, C. F. (2009). High worry severity is associated with poorer acute and 
maintenance efficacy of antidepressants in late-life depression. Depression and 
Anxiety, 26(3), 266-272. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/da.20544 
Andrews, V. H., & Borkovec, T. D. (1988). The differential effects of inductions of worry, 
somatic anxiety, and depression on emotional experience. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 19(1), 21-26. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7916(88)90006-7 
Antony, M. M., Bieling, P. J., Cox, B. J., Enns, M. W., & Swinson, R. P. (1998). 
Psychometric properties of the 42-item and 21-item versions of the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales in clinical groups and a community sample. Psychological 
Assessment, 10(2), 176-181. doi: 10.1016/0272-7358(88)90050-5 
217 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Arch, J. J., & Craske, M. G. (2008). Acceptance and commitment therapy and cognitive 
behavioral therapy for anxiety disorders: Different treatments, similar mechanisms? 
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 15(4), 263-279. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2850.2008.00137.x 
Arch, J. J., Eifert, G. H., Davies, C., Vilardaga, J. C. P., Rose, R. D., & Craske, M. G. (2012). 
Randomized clinical trial of cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) versus acceptance 
and commitment therapy (ACT) for mixed anxiety disorders. Journal of Consulting 
and Clinical Psychology, 80(5), 750-765. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0028310 
Arch, J. J., Wolitzky-Taylor, K. B., Eifert, G. H., & Craske, M. G. (2012). Longitudinal 
treatment mediation of traditional cognitive behavioral therapy and acceptance and 
commitment therapy for anxiety disorders. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 50(7-8), 
469-478. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2012.04.007 
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental 
disorders (4th ed., text rev.). Washington, DC: Author. 
Bagby, R. M., Rector, N. A., Bacchiochi, J. R., & McBride, C. (2004). The Stability of the 
Response Styles Questionnaire Rumination Scale in a Sample of Patients With Major 
Depression. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28(4), 527-538. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:COTR.0000045562.17228.29 
Ballenger, J. C., Davidson, J. R. T., Lecrubier, Y., Nutt, D. J., Borkovec, T. D., Rickels, K., . 
. . Wittchen, H. (2001). Consensus statement on generalized anxiety disorder from the 
international consensus group on depression and anxiety. Journal of Clinical 
Psychiatry, 62, 53-58. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/619661077?accountid=13552 
Barlow, D. H. (2002). Anxiety and its disorders: The nature and treatment of anxiety and 
panic (2nd ed.): Guilford Press, New York, NY. 
218 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Beck, R., & Perkins, T. S. (2001). Cognitive content-specificity for anxiety and depression: A 
meta-analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 25(6), 651-663. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1012911104891 
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G.  (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression: 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Beck, A.T., Ward, C. H., Mendelson, M., Mock, J., & Erbaugh, J. (1961) An inventory for 
measuring depression. Archives of General Psychiatry, 4, 561-571. Retrieved from 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/13688369 
Beck, A. T., Steer, R. A., & Brown, G. K. (1996). BDI–II, Beck Depression 
Inventory: Manual (2nd ed.). Boston: Harcourt Brace. 
Beevers, C. G., & Meyer, B. (2008). I feel fine but the glass is still half empty: Thought 
suppression biases information processing despite recovery from a dysphoric mood 
state. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32(3), 323-332. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10608-006-9108-8 
Berman, M. I., Boutelle, K. N., & Crow, S. J. (2009). A case series investigating acceptance 
and commitment therapy as a treatment for previously treated, unremitted patients 
with anorexia nervosa. European Eating Disorders Review, 17(6), 426-434. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/erv.962 
Bentall, R. P., Haddock, G., & Slade, P. D. (1994). Cognitive behavior therapy for persistent 
auditory hallucinations: From theory to therapy. Behavior Therapy, 25(1), 51-66. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7894(05)80145-5 
Biglan, A., & Hayes, S. (1996). Should the behavioural sciences become more pragmatic? 
The case for functional contextualism in research on human behavior. Applied and 
Preventative Psychology: Current Scientific Perspectives, 5, 47-57. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0962-1849(96)80026-6 
219 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Blackledge, J. T. (2007). Disrupting verbal processes: Cognitive defusion in acceptance and 
commitment therapy and other mindfulness-based psychotherapies. The 
Psychological Record, 57(4), 555-576. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/212694460?accountid=13552 
Blagden, J. C., & Craske, M. G. (1996). Effects of active and passive rumination and 
distraction: A pilot replication with anxious mood. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 
10(4), 243-252. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0887-6185(96)00009-6 
Block-Lerner, J., Wulfert, E., & Moses, E. (2009). ACT in context: An exploration of 
experiential acceptance. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 16(4), 443-456. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cbpra.2009.04.005 
Bohlmeijer, E. T., Fledderus, M., Rokx, T. A. J. J., & Pieterse, M. E. (2011). Efficacy of an 
early intervention based on acceptance and commitment therapy for adults with 
depressive symptomatology: Evaluation in a randomized controlled trial. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 49(1), 62-67. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2010.10.003 
Bond, F. W., Hayes, S. C., Baer, R. A., Carpenter, K. M., Guenole, N., Orcutt, H. K., . . . 
Zettle, R. D. (2011). Preliminary psychometric properties of the acceptance and action 
Questionnaire–II: A revised measure of psychological inflexibility and experiential 
avoidance. Behavior Therapy, 42(4), 676-688. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2011.03.007 
Borkovec, T. D. (1985). Worry: A potentially valuable concept. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 23(4), 481-482. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(85)90178-0 
Borkovec, T. D. (1994). The nature, functions, and origins of worry Worrying: Perspectives 
on theory, assessment and treatment. (pp. 5-33): John Wiley & Sons, Oxford. 
Borkovec, T. D. (2002). Life in the future versus life in the present. Clinical Psychology: 
Science and Practice, 9(1), 76-80. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/clipsy/9.1.76 
220 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Borkovec, T. D., & Hu, S. (1990). The effect of worry on cardiovascular response to phobic 
imagery. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28(1), 69-73. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(90)90056-O 
Borkovec, T. D., & Inz, J. (1990). The nature of worry in generalized anxiety disorder: A 
predominance of thought activity. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 28(2), 153-158. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(90)90027-G 
Borkovec, T. D., Lyonfields, J. D., Wiser, S. L., & Deihl, L. (1993). The role of worrisome 
thinking in the suppression of cardiovascular response to phobic imagery. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 31(3), 321-324. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-
7967(93)90031-O 
Borkovec, T. D., Ray, W. J., & Stöber, J. (1998). Worry: A cognitive phenomenon intimately 
linked to affective, physiological, and interpersonal behavioral processes. Cognitive 
Therapy and Research, 22(6), 561-576. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1018790003416 
Borkovec, T. D., Robinson, E., Pruzinsky, T., & DePree, J. A. (1983). Preliminary 
exploration of worry: Some characteristics and processes. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 21(1), 9-16. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(83)90121-3 
Borkovec, T. D., & Roemer, L. (1995). Perceived functions of worry among generalized 
anxiety disorder subjects: Distraction from more emotionally distressing topics? 
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 26(1), 25-30. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7916(94)00064-S 
Brown, T. A., Campbell, L. A., Lehman, C. L., Grisham, J. R., & Mancill, R. B. (2001). 
Current and lifetime comorbidity of the DSM-IV anxiety and mood disorders in a 
large clinical sample. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110(4), 585-599. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.110.4.585 
221 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Brown, K. W., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role 
in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84(4), 
822-848. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.822 
Burwell, R. A., & Shirk, S. R. (2007). Subtypes of rumination in adolescence: Associations 
between brooding, reflection, depressive symptoms, and coping. Journal of Clinical 
Child and Adolescent Psychology, 36(1), 56-65. 
Butler, L. D., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1994). Gender differences in responses to depressed 
mood in a college sample. Sex Roles, 30(5-6), 331-346. 
Calmes, C. A., & Roberts, J. E. (2008). Rumination in interpersonal relationships: Does co-
rumination explain gender differences in emotional distress and relationship 
satisfaction among college students?. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32(4), 577-
590. 
Carver, C.S. & Scheier, M.F. (1982). Control theory: A useful conceptual framework for 
Personality, social, clinical, and health psychology. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 111-
135. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/619470240?accountid=13552 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1990). Origins and functions of positive and negative affect: 
A control-process view. Psychological Review, 97(1), 19-35. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.97.1.19 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1998). On the self-regulation of behavior: Cambridge 
University Press, New York, NY. 
Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1999). Control theory: A useful conceptual framework for 
personality-social, clinical, and health psychology: Psychology Press, New York, 
NY. 
222 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Chadwick, P. D., & Lowe, C. F. (1990). Measurement and modification of delusional beliefs. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 58(2), 225-232. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.58.2.225 
Chadwick, P. D. J., & Lowe, C. F. (1994). A cognitive approach to measuring and modifying 
delusions. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(3), 355-367. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)90133-3 
Ciesla, J. A., & Roberts, J. E. (2007). Rumination, negative cognition, and their interactive 
effects on depressed mood. Emotion, 7(3), 555. 
Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia Social 
phobia:Diagnosis, assessment, and treatment. (pp. 69-93): Guilford Press, New York, 
NY. 
Clark, L. A. (1989). The anxiety and depressive disorders: Descriptive psychopathology and 
differential diagnosis Anxiety and depression: Distinctive and overlapping features. 
(pp. 83-129): Academic Press, San Diego, CA. 
Clark, L. A., & Watson, D. (1991). Tripartite model of anxiety and depression: Psychometric 
evidence and taxonomic implications. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100(3), 316-
336. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.100.3.316 
Clarke, S., Kingston, J., Wilson, K. G., Bolderston, H., & Remington, B. (2012). Acceptance 
and commitment therapy for a heterogeneous group of treatment-resistant clients: A 
treatment development study. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 19(4), 560-572. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cbpra.2012.03.001 
Cnaan, A., Laird, N.M., & Slasor, P. (1998). Using the general linear mixed model to analyse 
unbalanced repeated measures and longitudinal data. Statistics in Medicine, 16 (20), 
2349 – 2380. doi: 10.1002/(SICI)1097-0258(19971030)16:20,2349:AID-SIM667. 
3.0.CO 
223 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Codd, R. T., Twohig, M. P., Crosby, J. M., & Enno, A. (2011). Treatment of three anxiety 
disorder cases with acceptance and commitment therapy in a private practice. Journal 
of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 25(3), 203-217. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0889-
8391.25.3.203 
Collins, K., & Bell, R. (1997). Personality and aggression: The Dissipation–Rumination 
Scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 22(5), 751-755. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(96)00248-6 
Cook, S. (2009). Can You Act with Aspergers? A Pilot Study of the Efficacy of Acceptance 
and Commitment Therapy (ACT) for Adolescents with Asperger Syndrome And/or Nonverbal 
Learning Disability. The Wright Institute 
Conway, M., Csank, P. A.., Holm, S. L., & Blake, C. K. (2000). On individual differences in 
rumination on sadness. Journal of Personality Assessment, 75(3), 404-425. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/S15327752JPA7503_04 
Covin, R., Ouimet, A. J., Seeds, P. M., & Dozois, D. J. A. (2008). A meta-analysis of CBT 
for pathological worry among clients with GAD. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 22(1), 
108-116. doi: 10.1037/0022-006x.61.4.611. 
Craigie, M. A., Rees, C. S., Marsh, A., & Nathan, P. (2008). Mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy for generalized anxiety disorder: A preliminary evaluation. Behavioural and 
Cognitive Psychotherapy, 36(5), 553-568. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S135246580800458X 
Craske, M. G., Barlow, D. H., & O’Leary, T. A. (1992). Mastery of your anxiety and worry. 
San Antonio, TX: The Psychological Corporation. 
Cribb, G., Moulds, M. L., & Carter, S. (2006). Rumination and Experiential Avoidance in 
Depression. Behaviour Change, 23(3), 165-176. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1375/bech.23.3.165 
224 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Cullen, C. (2008). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT): A Third Wave Behaviour 
Therapy. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 36(6), 667-673. doi: 
10.1017/s1352465808004797 
Dalrymple, K. L., & Herbert, J. D. (2007). Acceptance and commitment therapy for 
generalized social anxiety disorder: A pilot study. Behavior Modification, 31(5), 543-
568. doi: 10.1016/s0005-7894(89)80060-7. 
Davey, G. C. L. (1994). Worrying, social problem-solving abilities, and social problem-
solving confidence. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(3), 327-330. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)90130-9 
de Bruin, G. O., Rassin, E., & Muris, P. (2007). The prediction of worry in non-clinical 
individuals: The role of intolerance of uncertainty, meta-worry, and neuroticism. 
Journal of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 29(2), 93-100. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10862-006-9029-6 
DeGenova, M. K., Patton, D. M., Jurich, J. A., & MacDermid, S. M. (1994). Ways of coping 
among HIV-infected individuals: Are they related to depression and physical illness? 
Journal of Social Psychology, 3, 23-28. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00224545.1994.9922996 
Delgado M R, Nearing KI, LeDoux JE, & EA, P. (2008). Neural circuitry underlying the 
regulation of conditioned fear and its relation to extinction. Neuron, 59 (5). 829-883. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2008.06.029 
Derogatis, L. R., & Cleary, P. A. (1977). Confirmation of the dimensional structure of the 
SCL-90: A study in construct validation. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 33(4), 981-
989. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1097-4679(197710)33:4<981::AID-
JCLP2270330412>3.0.CO;2-0 
225 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Devilly, G.J. (2005). ClinTools Software for Windows: Version 4 (computer programme). 
www.clintools.com, Psytek Ltd. 
Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., & Ladouceur, R. (1997). Intolerance of uncertainty and 
problem orientation in worry. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 21(6), 593-606. 
Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/619181555?accountid=13552 
Dugas, M. J., Gagnon, F., Ladouceur, R., & Freeston, M. H. (1998). Generalized anxiety 
disorder: A preliminary test of a conceptual model. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
36(2), 215-226. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/619334471?accountid=13552 
Dugas, M. J., & Ladouceur, R. (2000). Treatment of GAD: Targeting Intolerance of 
Uncertainty in Two Types of Worry. Behavior Modification, 24(5), 635-657. doi: 
10.1016/0005-7967(90)90027-g 
Ehlers, A., Mayou, R. A., & Bryant, B. (1998). Psychological predictors of chronic 
posttraumatic stress disorder after motor vehicle accidents. Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology, 107(3), 508-519. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.107.3.508 
Ehlers, A., & Steil, R. (1995). Maintenance of intrusive memories in posttraumatic stress 
disorder: A cognitive approach. Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy, 23(3), 
217-249. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S135246580001585X 
Ehring, T., & Watkins, E. R. (2008). Repetitive negative thinking as a transdiagnostic 
process. International Journal of Cognitive Therapy, 1(3), 192-205. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1680/ijct.2008.1.3.192 
Eifert, G. H., & Forsyth, J. P. (2005). Acceptance and commitment therapy for anxiety 
disorders: A practitioner's treatment guide to using mindfulness, acceptance, and 
values-based behavior change strategies. Oakland, CA, US: New Harbinger 
Publications, Oakland, CA. 
226 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Eifert, G. H., Forsyth, J. P., Arch, J. A., Espejo, E., Keller, M., & Langer, D. (2009). 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for Anxiety Disorders: Three Case Studies 
Exemplifying a Unified Treatment Protocol. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 16, 
368-385. Retrieved 
fromhttp://search.proquest.com/docview/754055374?accountid=13552 
Endler, N. S., & Macrodimitris, S. D. (2003). Anxiety and depression: Congruent, separate, 
or both? Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research, 8(1), 42-42-60. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9861.2003.tb00084.x 
Evans, D., & Segerstrom, S. (2009). Mindfulness, repetitive thought, and self-regulation. 
Manuscript under review. 
Evans, S., Ferrando, S., Findler, M., Stowell, C., Smart, C., & Haglin, D. (2008). 
Mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of 
Anxiety Disorders, 22(4), 716-721. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.janxdis.2007.07.005 
Feldman, G., & Hayes, A. (2005). Preparing for problems: A measure of mental anticipatory 
processes. Journal of Research in Personality, 39(5), 487-516. 
First, Michael B., Spitzer, Robert L, Gibbon Miriam, and Williams, Janet B.W.: Structured 
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV-TR Axis I Disorders, Research Version, Patient 
Edition. (SCID-I/P) New York: Biometrics Research, New York State Psychiatric 
Institute 
Fisher, P. L. (2006). The efficacy of psychological treatments for generalised anxiety 
disorder? (pp. 359-377) Wiley Publishing, Hoboken, NJ. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9780470713143.ch20 
Folke, F., Parling, T., & Melin, L. (2012). Acceptance and commitment therapy for 
depression: A preliminary randomized clinical trial for unemployed on long-term sick 
227 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
leave. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 19(4), 583-594. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cbpra.2012.01.002 
Forman, E. M., Herbert, J. D., Moitra, E., Yeomans, P. D., & Geller, P. A. (2007). A 
randomized controlled effectiveness trial of acceptance and commitment therapy and 
cognitive therapy for anxiety and depression. Behavior Modification, 31(6), 772-799. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0145445507302202 
Forman, E. M., Shaw, J. A., Goetter, E. M., Herbert, J. D., Park, J. A., & Yuen, E. K. (2012). 
Long-term follow-up of a randomized controlled trial comparing acceptance and 
commitment therapy and standard cognitive behavior therapy for anxiety and 
depression. Behavior Therapy, 43(4), 801-811. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2012.04.004 
Fox, E. J. (2006). Constructing a pragmatic science of learning and instruction with 
functional contextualism. Educational Technology Research & Development, 54(1), 
5-36. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/218037689?accountid=13552 
Francis, K., & Dugas, M. J. (2004). Assessing positive beliefs about worry: Validation of a 
structured interview. Personality and Individual Differences, 37(2), 405-415. doi: 
10.1016/0272-7358(88)90050-5 
Freeston, M. H., Ladouceur, R., Rhéaume, J., Letarte, H., Gagnon, F., & Thibodeau, N. 
(1994). Self-report of obsessions and worry. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(1), 
29-36. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)90081-7 
Fresco, D. M., Frankel, A. N., Mennin, D. S., Turk, C. L., & Heimberg, R. G. (2002). 
Distinct and overlapping features of rumination and worry: The relationship of 
cognitive production to negative affective states. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 
26(2), 179-188. doi: 10.1016/s0005-7967(00)00113-3. 
228 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Fritz, H. L. The role of rumination in adjustment to a first coronary event. (Order No. 
9918568, Carnegie Mellon University). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, 77-77 p. 
Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/304425302?accountid=13552. 
(304425302)  
Garnefski, N., Legerstee, J., Kraaij, V., van den Kommer, T., & Teerds, J. (2002). Cognitive 
coping strategies and symptoms of depression and anxiety: A comparison between 
adolescents and adults. Journal of Adolescence, 25(6), 603-611. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jado.2002.0507 
Gaudiano, B. A. (2009). Öst's (2008) Methodological Comparison of Clinical Trials of 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy versus Cognitive Behavior Therapy: Matching 
Apples with Oranges? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 47(12), 1066-1070. doi: 
10.1016/j.brat.2009.07.020 
Gaudiano, B. A. (2010). Evaluating acceptance and commitment therapy: An analysis of a 
recent critique. International Journal of Behavioral Consultation and Therapy, 5(3-4), 
311-329. doi: 10.1176/appi.ajp.2008.08050721 
Gervais, M. J., & Dugas, N. J. (2008) Generalised Anxiety Disorder. In John Hunsley & Eric 
J. Mash (Eds.), Assessments that Work. New York, New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gillanders, D. T., Bolderston, H., Bond, F. W., Dempster, M., Flaxman, P. E., Campbell, L., 
Kerr, S., Tansey, L., Noel, P., Ferenbach, C., Masley, S., Roach, L., Lloyd, J., May, 
L., Clarke, S., Remington, R. (in press) The development and initial validation of The 
Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire. Behavior Therapy, DOI: 10.1016/j.beth.2013.09.001 
Giorgio, J. M., Sanflippo, J., Kleiman, E., Reilly, D., Bender, R. E., Wagner, C. A., . . . 
Alloy, L. B. (2010). An experiential avoidance conceptualization of depressive 
229 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
rumination: Three tests of the model. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48(10), 1021-
1031. doi: 10.1016/0272-7358(88)90050-5 
Glaser N, Blackledge, J., Shepherd, L., & Deane, F. (2008). Brief Group ACT for Anxiety. In 
J. Blackledge, J. Ciarrochi & F. Deane (Eds.), Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: 
Contemporary Theory Research and Practice. Bowen Hills, QLD, Australia: 
Australian Academic Press. 
Goldney, R. (2004). Review of Depressive rumination: Nature, theory and treatment. 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 38(8), 655-656. doi: 
10.1037/0022-006x.69.2.305 
Goldney, R. (2004). Review of Depressive rumination: Nature, theory and treatment. 
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 38(8), 655-656. doi: 
10.1037/0022-006x.69.2.305 
Goring, H. J., & Papageorgiou, C. (2008). Rumination and worry: Factor analysis of self-
report measures in depressed participants. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 32(4), 
554-566. doi: 10.1016/0005-7967(83)90121-3 
Gracie, J., Newton, J., Norton, M., Baker, C., & Freeston, M. (2006). Exploring the role of 
psychological factors in determining response to treatment in neurocardiogenic 
(vasovagal) syncope. European Journal of Pacing, Arrhythmias and Cardiac 
Electrophysiology, 8, 636–643.  
Greenberg, L., & Johnson, S. (1988). Emotionally Focused Therapy for Couples. New York: 
Guilford. 
Grube, J. W., Morgan, M., & Kearney, K. A. (1989). Using self-generated identification 
codes to match questionnaires in panel studies of adolescent substance abuse. 
Addictive Behaviors, 14(2), 159-171. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/617624315?accountid=13552 
230 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Haddock, G., Slade, P. D., Bentall, R. P., Reid, D., & Faragher, E. B. (1998). A comparison 
of the long-term effectiveness of distraction and focusing in the treatment of auditory 
hallucinations. British Journal of Medical Psychology, 71(3), 339-349. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8341.1998.tb00996.x 
Harris, R. (2006). Embracing You Demons: An Overview of Acceptance and Commitment 
Therapy. Psychotherapy in Australia, 12(4), 2-8.  
Harvey, A., Watkins, E., Mansell, W., & Shafran, R. (2004). Cognitive behavioural processes 
across psychological disorders: a transdiagnostic approach to research and 
treatment. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Hayes, L., Boyd, C. P., & Sewell, J. (2011). Acceptance and commitment therapy for the 
treatment of adolescent depression: A pilot study in a psychiatric outpatient setting. 
Mindfulness, 2(2), 86-94. doi: 10.1097/00004583-200111000-00015 
Hayes, S. C. (1993). Analytic goals and the varieties of scientific contextualism Varieties of 
scientific contextualism. (pp. 11-27). Reno, NV, US: Context Press, Reno, NV. 
Hayes, S. C. (2008). Climbing our hills: A beginning conversation on the comparison of 
acceptance and commitment therapy and traditional cognitive behavioral therapy. 
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 15(4), 286-295. doi: 10.1037/1076-
8998.5.1.156 
Hayes, S. C., Brownstein, A. J., Haas, J. R., & Greenway, D. E. (1986). Instructions, Multiple 
Schedules, and Extinction: Distinguishing Rule-Governed from Scheduled-Controlled 
Behavior. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behaviour, 46(2), 137-147. 
10.1901/jeab.1986.46-137 
Hayes, S. C., Hayes, L. J., & Reese, H. W. (1988). Finding the philosophical core: A review 
of Stephen C. Pepper's World Hypotheses. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of 
Behavior, 50, 97-111. doi:  10.1901/jeab.1988.50-97 
231 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Hayes, S. C., Levin, M. E., Plumb-Vilardaga, J., Villatte, J. L., & Pistorello, J. (2013). 
Acceptance and commitment therapy and contextual behavioral science: Examining 
the progress of a distinctive model of behavioral and cognitive therapy. Behavior 
Therapy, 44(2), 180-198. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1372056432?accountid=13552 
Hayes, S. C., Luoma, J. B., Bond, F. W., Masuda, A., & Lillis, J. (2006). Acceptance and 
commitment therapy: Model, processes and outcomes. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 44(1), 1-25. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2005.06.006 
Hayes, S. C., Masuda, A., Bissett, R., Luoma, J., & Guerrero, L. F. (2004). DBT, FAR and 
ACT: How empirically oriented are the new behavior therapy technologies? Behavior 
Therapy, 35(1), 35-54. doi: 10.1016/s0005-7894(04)80003-0 
Hayes, S. C., Masuda, A., & De Mey, H. (2003). Acceptance and commitment therapy: Een 
derde-generatie gedragstherapie. Gedragstherapie, 36(2), 69-96. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/620266515?accountid=13552 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., Bunting, K., Twohig, M., & Wilson, K. G. (2004). What is 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy? In H. S. C & S. K. D (Eds.), A practical guide 
to Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (pp. 1-30). New York: Springer. 
Hayes, S. C., Strosahl, K. D., & Wilson, K. G. (1999). Acceptance and commitment therapy: 
An experiential approach to behavior change. New York, NY, US: Guilford Press, 
New York, NY. 
Heimberg, R. G., & Ritter, M. R. (2008). Cognitive behavioral therapy and acceptance and 
commitment therapy for the anxiety disorders: Two approaches with much to offer. 
Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 15(4), 296-298. doi: 
10.1017.s0048577201393198 
232 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Henry, J. D., & Crawford, J. R. (2005). The 21-item version of the Depression Anxiety Stress 
Scales (DASS–21): Normative data and psychometric evaluation in a large non-
clinical sample. British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 44, 227–239. Retrieved from 
http://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/dass/pub.htm 
Hilt, L. M., & Pollak, S. D. (2013). Characterizing the ruminative process in young 
adolescents. Journal of Clinical Child and Adolescent Psychology, 42(4), 519-530. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15374416.2013.764825 
Himadi, B., Osteen, F., Kaiser, A. J., & Daniel, K. (1991). Assessment of delusional beliefs 
during the modification of delusional verbalizations. Behavioral Residential 
Treatment, 6(5), 355-366. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bin.2360060505 
Hofmann, S. G. (2008). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: New Wave or Morita 
Therapy? Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 15, 280-285. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2850.2008.00138.x 
Holaway, R. M., Rodebaugh, T. L., & Heimberg, R. G. (2006). The epidemiology of worry 
and generalized anxiety disorder. In D. G. C. L & W. A (Eds.), Worry and its 
Psychological Disorders: Theory, Assessment & Treatment (pp. 3-20). London: John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd. 
Holeva, V., Tarrier, N., & Wells, A. (2001). Prevalence and predictors of acute stress 
disorder and PTSD following road traffic accidents: Thought control strategies and 
social support. Behavior Therapy, 32(1), 65-83. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-
7894(01)80044-7 
Hollingworth, S. A., Burgess, P. M., & Whiteford, H. A. (2010). Affective and anxiety 
disorders: prevalence, treatment and antidepressant medication use. Australian and 
New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 44, 513-519. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/754044846?accountid=13552 
233 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Hong, R. Y. (2007). Worry and rumination: Differential associations with anxious and 
depressive symptoms and coping behavior. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(2), 
277-290. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2006.03.006 
Horowitz, M., Wilner, N., & Alvarez, W. (1979). The impact of event scale: A measure of 
subjective stress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 41, 209–218. Retrieved from 
http://www.psychosomaticmedicine.org/content/41/3/209.full.pdf 
Horowitz, M. J. (1986). Stress response syndromes (2nd ed.). Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson. 
Howitt D (2010). Introduction to qualitative methods in psychology. Prentice Hall 
Hoyer, J., Beesdo, K., Gloster, A. T., Runge, J., Höfler, M., & Becker, E. S. (2009). Worry 
exposure versus applied relaxation in the treatment of generalized anxiety disorder. 
Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 78(2), 106-115. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.99.1.20 
10.1159/000201936 
Hughes, M. E., Alloy, L. B., & Cogswell, A. (2008). Repetitive thought in psychopathology: 
The relation of rumination and worry to depression and anxiety symptoms. Journal of 
Cognitive Psychotherapy, 22(3), 271-288. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0889-
8391.22.3.271 
Hunt, C., Issakidis, C., & Andrews, G. (2002). DSM-IV generalized anxiety disorder in the 
Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being. Psychological 
Medicine, 32, 649-659. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/204510478?accountid=13552 
Ingram, R. E. (1990). Self-focused attention in clinical disorders: Review and a conceptual 
model. Psychological Bulletin, 107(2), 156-176. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.107.2.156 
Ireland, S. J., McMahon, R. C., Malow, R. M., & Kouzekanani, K. (1994). Coping style as a 
predictor of relapse to cocaine abuse. In H. L. S (Ed.), Problems of Drug Dependence, 
234 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
1993: Proceedings of the 55th Annual Scientific Meeting, National Institute of Drug 
Abuse Monograph Series no 141 (pp. 159). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office. 
Jacobson, N. S. (1992). Behavioral couple therapy: A new beginning. Behavior Therapy, 
23(4), 493-506. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7894(05)80218-7 
Jacobson, N. S., Martell, C. R., & Dimidjian, S. (2001). Behavioral activation treatment for 
depression: Returning to contextual roots. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 
8(3), 255-270. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/clipsy/8.3.255 
Just, N., & Alloy, L. B. (1997). The response styles theory of depression: Tests and an 
extension of the theory. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 106(2), 221-229. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.106.2.221 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1990). Full Catastrophe Living: Using the Wisdom of your Mind to Face 
Stress, Pain and Illness. New York: Dell Publishing. 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (2005). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to 
face stress, pain, and illness (15th anniversary ed.). New York, NY, US: Delta Trade 
Paperback/Bantam Dell, New York, NY. 
Kalton, G., & Kasprzyk, D. (1982). Imputing for missing survey responses. Proceedings of 
the section on Survey Research Methods. Washington, DC: American Statistical 
Association. 
Kanter, J. W., Baruch, D. E., & Gaynor, S. T. (2006). Acceptance and commitment therapy 
and behavioral activation for the treatment of depression: Description and 
comparison. The Behavior Analyst, 29(2), 161-185. doi: 10.1016/ s0005-
7894(96)80047-5.1997-03675-00710.1016/s0005-7894(96)80047-5 
Kazdin, A. (2010). Single-Case Research Designs: Methods for Clinical and Applied Settings 
(2nd ed.). USA: Oxford University Press 
235 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Khodarahimi, S., & Pole, N. (2010). Cognitive behavior therapy and worry reduction in an 
outpatient with generalized anxiety disorder. Clinical Case Studies, 9(1), 53-62. doi: 
10.1177/1534650109351306 
King, L. A., Emmons, R. A., & Woodley, S. (1992). The structure of inhibition. Journal of 
Research in Personality, 26(1), 85-102. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0092-
6566(92)90061-8 
Kingdon, D., Turkington, D., & John, C. (1994). Cognitive behaviour therapy of 
schizophrenia: The amenability of delusions and hallucinations to reasoning. The 
British Journal of Psychiatry, 164(5), 581-587. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjp.164.5.581 
Koerner, K., Jacobson, N. S., & Christensen, A. (1994). Emotional acceptance in integrative 
behavioural couple therapy. In S. C. Hayes, N. S. Jacobson, V. M. Folette & M. J. 
Dougher (Eds.), Acceptance and change: Content and context in psychotherapy (pp. 
109-118). Reno, NV: Context Press. 
Kuehner, C., & Weber, I. (1999). Responses to depression in unipolar depressed patients: An 
investigation of Nolen-Hoeksema's response styles theory. Psychological Medicine, 
29(6), 1323-1333. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0033291799001282 
Kuhl, J. (1981). Motivational and functional helplessness: The moderating effect of state 
versus action orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40(1), 155-
170. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.40.1.155 
Ladouceur, R., Blais, F., Freeston, M. H., & Dugas, M. J. (1998). Problem solving and 
problem orientation in generalized anxiety disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 
12(2), 139-152. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/619303983?accountid=1355 
236 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Ladouceur, R., Dugas, M. J., Freeston, M. H., Rhéaume, J., Blais, F., Boisvert, J., . . . 
Thibodeau, N. (1999). Specificity of generalized anxiety disorder symptoms and 
processes. Behavior Therapy, 30(2), 191-207. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-
7894(99)80003-3 
Lappalainen, R., Lehtonen, T., Skarp, E., Taubert, E., Ojanen, M., & Hayes, S. C. (2007). 
The impact of CBT and ACT models using psychology trainee therapists: A 
preliminary controlled effectiveness trial. Behavior Modification, 31(4), 488-511. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0145445506298436 
Lavender, A., & Watkins, E. (2004). Rumination and future thinking in depression. British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology, 43(2), 129-142. 
Leigh, E., & Hirsch, C. R. (2011). Worry in imagery and verbal form: Effect on residual 
working memory capacity. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 49(2), 99-105. doi: 
10.1016/s00057967(98)00027-81998-10076-00810.1016/s0005-7967(98)00027-8 
Leitenberg, H., Greenwald, E., & Cado, S. (1992). A retrospective study of long-term 
methods of coping with having been sexually abused during childhood. Child Abuse 
and Neglect, 16, 399-407. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/618175499?accountid=13552 
Leon, A. C., Shear, M. K., Portera, L., & Klerman, G. L. (1992). Assessing impairment in 
patients with panic disorder: The sheehan disability scale. Social Psychiatry and 
Psychiatric Epidemiology, 27(2), 78-82. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/618144239?accountid=13552 
Levin, M., & Hayes, S. C. (2009). Is Acceptance and Commitment Therapy superior to 
established treatment comparisons? Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, 78(6), 380-
380. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000235978 
237 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Linehan, M. M. (1993). Skills Training Manual for Treatment of Borderline Personality 
Disorder. New York Guilford Press. 
López, F. J. C. (2000). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) in panic disorder with 
agoraphobia: A case study. Psychology in Spain, 4(1), 120-128. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/619882788?accountid=13552 
López, F. J. C., & Salas, S. V. (2009). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) in the 
treatment of panic disorder: Some considerations from the research on basic 
processes. International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy, 9(3), 299-
315. doi: 10.1016/s0272-7358(00)00057-x 
Lovibond, S.H. & Lovibond, P.F. (1995).  Manual for the Depression Anxiety Stress Scales. 
(2nd. Ed.) Sydney: Psychology Foundation.  ISBN 7334-1423-0 
Luminet, O., Rime, B., & Wagner, H. (submitted). Intrusive thoughts in the laboratory and 
their long-lasting consequences.  
Lyubomirsky, S., Boehm, J., Kasri, F., & Zehm, K. (2007). The cognitive and hedonic costs 
of unwarranted dwelling. Manuscript submitted for publication 
Lyubomirsky, S., Caldwell, N., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1998). Effects of ruminative and 
distracting responses to depressed mood on retrieval of autobiographical memories. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 166-177. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.1.166  
Lyubomirsky, S., Kasri, F., & Zehm, K. (2003). Dysphoric Rumination Impairs 
Concentration on Academic Tasks. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(3), 309-330. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1023918517378 
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1993). Self-perpetuating properties of dysphoric 
rumination. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(2), 339-349. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.2.339 
238 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Lyubomirsky, S., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1995). Effects of self-focused rumination on 
negative thinking and interpersonal problem solving. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 69(1), 176-190. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.69.1.176 
Lyubomirsky, S., Tucker, K. L., Caldwell, N. D., & Berg, K. (1999). Why ruminators are 
poor problem solvers: Clues from the phenomenology of dysphoric rumination. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(5), 1041-1060. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.5.1041 
Maarsingh, M., Korrelboom, K., & Huijbrechts, I. (2010). Competitive Memory Training 
(COMET) voor een negatief zelfbeeld als aa nvullende behandeling bij depressieve 
patiënten; een pilot studie. Directieve Therapy, 30, 94-112. Retrieved from 
http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2FBF03096226 
Markanday, S., Data-Franco, J., Dyson, L., Murrant, S., Arbuckle, C., McGillvray, J., & 
Berk, M. (2012). Acceptance and commitment therapy for treatment-resistant 
depression. Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry, 46(12), 1198-1199. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0004867412446491 
Martell, C. R., Addis, M. E., & Jacobson, N. S. (2001). Depression in context: Strategies for 
guided action W W Norton & Co, New York, NY. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/619606731?accountid=13552 
Martin, L. L., & Tesser, A. (1996). Some Ruminative Thoughts. (pp. 1-47): Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Mayou, R. A., Ehlers, A., & Bryant, B. (2002). Posttraumatic stress disorder after motor 
vehicle accidents: 3-year follow-up of a prospective longitudinal study. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 40(6), 665-675. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-
7967(01)00069-9 
239 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
McHugh, L. (2011). A new approach in psychotherapy: ACT (acceptance and commitment 
therapy). The World Journal of Biological Psychiatry, 12 (1), 76-79. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/923954378?accountid=13552 
McLaughlin, K., Sibrava, N., Behar, E., & Borkovec, T. (in press). Recurrent negative 
thinking in emotional disorders: Worry, depressive rumination, and trauma recall. In 
G. R. In S. Sassaroli, & R. Lorenzini (Ed.), Worry, need of control, and other core 
cognitive constructs in anxiety and eating disorders. Milan: Raphael Cortina. 
McLaughlin, K. A., Borkovec, T. D., & Sibrava, N. J. (2007). The effects of worry and 
rumination on affect states and cognitive activity. Behavior Therapy, 38(1), 23-38. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2006.03.003 
Meuret, A. E., Twohig, M. P., Rosenfield, D., Hayes, S. C., & Craske, M. G. (2012). Brief 
acceptance and commitment therapy and exposure for panic disorder: A pilot study. 
Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 19(4), 606-618. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cbpra.2012.05.004 
Meyer, T. J., Miller, M. L., Metzger, R. L., & Borkovec, T. D. (1990). Development and 
validation of the Penn State Worry Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 
28(6), 487-495. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(90)90135-6 
Michalak, J., Hölz, A., & Teismann, T. (2011). Rumination as a predictor of relapse in 
mindfulness-based cognitive therapy for depression. Psychology and Psychotherapy: 
Theory, Research and Practice, 84(2), 230-236. doi: 10.1037/0021-843x.112.3.488 
Mineka, S., Watson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1998). Comorbidity of anxiety and unipolar mood 
disorders. Annual Review of Psychology, 49, 377-412. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.377 
240 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Molina, S., & Borkovec, T. D. (1994). The Penn State Worry Questionnaire: Psychometric 
properties and associated characteristics Worrying: Perspectives on theory, 
assessment and treatment. (pp. 265-283): John Wiley & Sons, Oxford. 
Morrow, J., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (1990). Effects of responses to depression on the 
remediation of depressive affect. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
58(3), 519-527. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.58.3.519 
Muris, P., Roelofs, J., Meesters, C., & Boomsma, P. (2004). Rumination and worry in 
nonclinical adolescents. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28(4), 539-554. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/B:COTR.0000045563.66060.3e 
Murray, J., Ehlers, A., & Mayou, R. A. (2002). Dissociation and post-traumatic stress 
disorder: Two prospective studies of road traffic accident survivors. The British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 180(4), 363-368. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjp.180.4.363 
Murrell, A. R., Rogers, L. J., & Johnson, L. (2009). From shy lamb to roaring lion: An 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) case study. Behavior and Social Issues, 
18(1), 1-18. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/622110260?accountid=13552 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2000). The role of rumination in depressive disorders and mixed 
anxiety/depressive symptoms. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 109(3), 504-511. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.109.3.504 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Davis, C. G. (1999). "Thanks for sharing that": Ruminators and their 
social support networks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(4), 801-
814. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.4.801 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Harrell, Z. A. (2002). Rumination, depression, and alcohol use: Tests 
of gender differences. Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 16(4), 391-403. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/jcop.16.4.391.52526 
241 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Larson, J., & Grayson, C. (1999). Explaining the gender difference in 
depressive symptoms. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(5), 1061-
1072. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.77.5.1061 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., McBride, A., & Larson, J. (1997). Rumination and psychological 
distress among bereaved partners. Journal of personality and social psychology, 
72(4), 855. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1991). A prospective study of depression and post-
traumatic stress symptoms following a natural disaster: the 1989 Loma Prieta 
earthquake. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 115-121. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.61.1.115 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., & Morrow, J. (1993). Effects of rumination and distraction on naturally 
occurring depressed mood. Cognition and Emotion, 7(6), 561-570. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02699939308409206 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Morrow, J., & Fredrickson, B. L. (1993). Response styles and the 
duration of episodes of depressed mood. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 102(1), 
20-28. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.102.1.20 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Parker, L. E., & Larson, J. (1994). Ruminative coping with depressed 
mood following loss. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(1), 92-104. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.1.92 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Stice, E., Wade, E., & Bohon, C. (2007). Reciprocal relations between 
rumination and bulimic, substance abuse, and depressive symptoms in female 
adolescents. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 116(1), 198-207. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.116.1.198 
242 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Nolen-Hoeksema, S., Wisco, B. E., & Lyubomirsky, S. (2008). Rethinking rumination. 
Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(5), 400-424. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00088.x 
Olij, R. J. B., Korrelboom, C. W., Huijbrechts, I. P. A. M., de Jong, M., Cloin, P. A., 
Maarsingh, M., & Paumen, B. N. W. (2006). De module zelfbeeld in een groep: 
werkwijze en eerste bevindingen (Treating low self-esteem in a group: procedure and 
first results). Directieve Therapie, 26, 307-325. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0016742 
Orsillo, S. M., & Batten, S. V. (2005). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy in the 
Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder. Behavior Modification, 29(1), 95-129. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0145445504270876 
Ossman, W. A., Wilson, K. G., Storaasli, R. D., & McNeill, J. W. (2006). A preliminary 
investigation of the use of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy in a group treatment 
for social phobia. International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy, 
6(3), 397-416. doi: 10.1037/0022-006x.70.5.11291236296310.1037/0022-
006x.70.5.11292002-18226-007 
Ossman, W. A., Wilson, K. G., Storaasli, R. D., & McNeill, J. W. (2006). A preliminary 
investigation of the use of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy in a group treatment 
for social phobia. International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy, 
6(3), 397-416. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/621601192?accountid=13552 
Öst, L.-G. (2008). Efficacy of the third wave of behavioral therapies: A systematic review 
and meta-analysis. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 46(3), 296-321. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2007.12.005 
243 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Papageorgiou, C. (2006). Worry and Rumination: Styles of Persistent Negative Thinking in 
Anxiety and Depression Worry and its psychological disorders: Theory, assessment 
and treatment. (pp. 21-40): Wiley Publishing, Hoboken, NJ. 
Papageorgiou, C., & Siegle, G. J. (2003). Rumination and Depression: Advances in Theory 
and Research. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(3), 243-245. doi: 10.1037/0033-
2909.101.2.259 
Papageorgiou, C., & Wells, A. (2001). Metacognitive beliefs about rumination in recurrent 
major depression. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 8(2), 160-164. doi: 
10.1016/s0005-7967(98)00070-9. 
Peterson, B. D., Eifert, G. H., Feingold, T., & Davidson, S. (2009). Using acceptance and 
commitment therapy to treat distressed couples: A case study with two couples. 
Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 16(4), 430-442. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cbpra.2008.12.009 
Plumb, J. C., & Vilardaga, R. (2010). Assessing treatment integrity in acceptance and 
commitment therapy: Strategies and suggestions. International Journal of Behavioral 
Consultation and Therapy, 6(3), 263-295. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/883434029?accountid=13552 
Powers, M. B., & Emmelkamp, P. M. G. (2009). Response to 'Is Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy superior to established treatment comparisons?’ Psychotherapy 
and Psychosomatics, 78(6), 380-381. doi: 10.1159/000235979 
Powers, M. B., Sigmarsson, S. R., & Emmelkamp, P. M. G. (2008). A meta-analytic review 
of psychological treatments for social anxiety disorder. International Journal of 
Cognitive Therapy, 1(2), 94-113. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/ijct.2008.1.2.94 
244 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Powers, M. B., Zum Vörde Sive Vörding, M. B., & Emmelkamp, P. M. G. (2009). 
Acceptance and commitment therapy: A meta-analytic review. Psychotherapy and 
Psychosomatics, 78(2), 73-80. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1159/000190790 
Pull, C. B. (2009). Current empirical status of acceptance and commitment therapy. Current 
Opinion in Psychiatry, 22(1), 55-60. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/YCO.0b013e32831a6e9d 
Purdon, C., & Harrington, J. (2006). Worry in Psychopathology Worry and its psychological 
disorders: Theory, assessment and treatment. (pp. 41-50): Wiley Publishing, 
Hoboken, NJ. 
Raes, F., Hermans, D., Williams, J. M. G., Beyers, W., Eelen, P., & Brunfaut, E. (2006). 
Reduced autobiographical memory specificity and rumination in predicting the course 
of depression. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 115(4), 699.Rapee, R. M., & 
Heimberg, R. G. (1997). A cognitive-behavioral model of anxiety in social phobia. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 35(8), 741-756. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(97)00022-3 
Rector, N. A. (2011). Acceptance and commitment therapy: Empirical considerations. 
Behavior Therapy (0005-7894, 0005-7894). doi: 10.1016/j.beth.2010.07.007 
Rector, N. A., & Roger, D. (1996). Cognitive style and well-being: A prospective 
examination. Personality and individual Differences, 21(5), 663-674. 
Rippere, V. (1977). What’s the thing to do when you’re feeling depressed?: A pilot study. 
Behavior Research and Therapy, 15, 185-191. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-
7967(77)90104-8 
Robinson, E. L. (1989). The relative effectiveness of cognitive restructuring and coping 
desensitization in the treatment of self-reported worry. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 
3(4), 197-207. doi: 10.1016/0887-6185(89)90014-5 
245 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Roemer, L., & Orsillo, S. M. (2007). An open trial of an acceptance-based behavior therapy 
for generalized anxiety disorder. Behavior Therapy, 38(1), 72-85. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.beth.2006.04.004 
Roemer, L., Salters-Pedneault, K., & Orsillo, S. M. (2006). Incorporating Mindfulness- and 
Acceptance-Based Strategies in the Treatment of Generalized Anxiety Disorder 
Mindfulness-based treatment approaches: Clinician's guide to evidence base and 
applications. (pp. 51-74): Elsevier Academic Press, San Diego, CA. 
Roger, D., & Najarian, B. (1989). The construction and validation of a new scale for 
measuring emotion control. Personality and Individual Differences, 10(8), 845-853. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(89)90020-2 
Rohan, K. J., Sigmon, S. T., & Dorhofer, D. M. (2003). Cognitive-behavioral factors in 
seasonal affective disorder. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 71(1), 22. 
Ruiz, F. J. (2010). A review of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) empirical 
evidence: Correlational, experimental psychopathology, component and outcome 
studies. International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy, 10(1), 125-
162. doi: 10.1037/0022-006x.70.5.11291236296310.1037/0022-006x.70.5.11292002-
18226-007 
Ruiz, F. J. (2012). Acceptance and commitment therapy versus traditional cognitive 
behavioral therapy: A systematic review and meta-analysis of current empirical 
evidence. International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy, 12(3), 333-
357.  
Ruscio, A. M., & Borkovec, T. D. (2004). Experience and appraisal of worry among high 
worriers with and without generalized anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 42(12), 1469-1482. doi: 10.1037/0021-843x.110.1.49.2001-17627-
00610.1037/0021-843X.110.1.49 
246 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Ruscio, A. M., Borkovec, T. D., & Ruscio, J. (2001). A taxometric investigation of the latent 
structure of worry. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 110(3), 413-422. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.110.3.413 
Santanello, A. W., & Gardner, F. L. (2007). The role of experiential avoidance in the 
relationship between maladaptive perfectionism and worry. Cognitive Therapy and 
Research, 31(3), 319-332. doi: 10.1037/0022-3514.51.6.1173380635410.1037/0022-
3514.51.6.11731987-13085-001 
Schwartz, J. A. J., & Koenig, L. J. (1996). Response styles & negative affect among 
adolescents. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20(1), 13-36. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02229241 
Segerstrom, S. C., Tsao, J. C. I., Alden, L. E., & Craske, M. G. (2000). Worry and 
rumination: Repetitive thought as a concomitant and predictor of negative mood. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 24(6), 671-688. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1005587311498 
Sensky, T., Turkington, D., Kingdon, D., Scott, J. L., Scott, J., Siddle, R., O’Carroll, M., & 
Barnes, T. R. (2000). A randomized controlled trial of cognitive-behavioral therapy 
for persistent symptoms in schizophrenia resistant to medication. Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 57(2), 165-172. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.57.2.165 
Sexton, K. A., & Dugas, M. J. (2009). An investigation of factors associated with cognitive 
avoidance in worry. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 33(2), 150-162. doi: 
10.1016/s0005-7967(97)10027-4 
Sharp, K. (2012). A review of acceptance and commitment therapy with anxiety disorders. 
International Journal of Psychology & Psychological Therapy, 12(3), 359-372.  
Siegle, G. J., Moore, P. M., & Thase, M. E. (2004). Rumination: One Construct, Many 
Features in Healthy Individuals, Depressed Individuals, and Individuals with Lupus. 
247 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 28(5), 645-668. doi: 
10.1023/B:COTR.0000045570.62733.9f 
Smout, M. F., Hayes, L., Atkins, P. W. B., Klausen, J., & Duguid, J. E. (2012). The 
empirically supported status of acceptance and commitment therapy: An update. 
Clinical Psychologist, 16(3), 97-109. doi: 10.1002/14651858. CD007407.pub2. 
Somers, J. M., Goldner, E. M., Waraich, P., & Hsu, L. (2006). Prevalence and Incidence 
Studies of Anxiety Disorders: A Systematic Review of the Literature. Canadian 
Journal of Psychiatry, 51(2), 100-113.  
Soo, C., Tate, R. L., & Lane-Brown, A. (2011). A systematic review of Acceptance and 
Commitment Therapy (ACT) for managing anxiety: Applicability for people with 
acquired brain injury? Brain Impairment, 12(1), 54-70. doi: 10.1375/brim.12.1.54 
Spasojević, J., & Alloy, L. B. (2001). Rumination as a common mechanism relating 
depressive risk factors to depression. Emotion, 1(1), 25-37. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/1528-3542.1.1.25 
Spielberger, C. D. (1983). Manual for the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (Form Y) 
 Palo Alto, CA: Mind Garden. 
Starcevic, V. (1995). Pathological worry in major depression: A preliminary report. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(1), 55-56. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-
7967(93)E0028-4 
Startup, H. M., & Erickson, T. M. (2006). The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) 
Worry and its psychological disorders: Theory, assessment and treatment. (pp. 101-
119): Wiley Publishing, Hoboken, NJ. 
Strosahl, K., Hayes, S., Wilson, K., & Gifford, E. (2005). An ACT Primer: Core Therapy 
Processes, Intervention Strategies, and Therapist Competencies. In S. Hayes & K. 
248 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Strosahl (Eds.). A Practical Guide to Acceptance and Commitment Therapy. (pp. 31-
58). New York, NY: Springer Science + Business Media.  
Sugiura, Y. (2004). Detached mindfulness and worry: A meta-cognitive analysis. Personality 
and Individual Differences, 37(1), 169-179. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.08.009 
Szabó, M., & Lovibond, P. F. (2002). The cognitive content of naturally occurring worry 
episodes. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 26(2), 167-177. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1014565602111 
Tallis, F., Davey, G. C. L., & Bond, A. (1994). The Worry Domains Questionnaire. In by G. 
C. Davey & F. Tallis (Eds.). Worrying: Perspectives on theory, assessment and 
treatment. (pp. 285-297): John Wiley & Sons, Oxford. 
Tallis, F., Davey, G. C. L., & Capuzzo, N. (1994). The phenomenology of non-pathological 
worry: A preliminary investigation. In by G. C. Davey & F. Tallis (Eds.). Worrying: 
Perspectives on theory, assessment and treatment. (pp. 61-89): John Wiley & Sons, 
Oxford. 
Tallis, F., & de Silva, P. (1992). Worry and obsessional symptoms: A correlational analysis. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30(2), 103-105. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(92)90132-Z 
Tarrier, N., Sommerfield, C., Pilgrim, H., & Faragher, B. (2000). Factors associated with 
outcome of cognitive-behavioural treatment of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder. 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(2), 191-191-202. doi: 10.1016/s0005-
7967(99)00030-3 
Tarrier, N., Sommerfield, C., Pilgrim, H., & Faragher, B. (2000). Factors associated with 
outcome of cognitive-behavioural treatment of chronic post-traumatic stress disorder. 
249 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Behaviour Research and Therapy, 38(2), 191-191-202. doi: 10.1016/s0005-
7967(99)00030-3 
Teasdale, J. D., Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., Ridgeway, V. A., Soulsby, J. M., & Lau, M. 
A. (2000). Prevention of relapse/recurrence in major depression by mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 68(4), 615-623. 
doi: 10.1037/0022-006x.67.3.285 
Teasdale, J. D., Segal, Z. V., Williams, J. M. G., Ridgeway, V. A., Soulsby, J. M., & Lau, M. 
A. (2000). Prevention of relapse/recurrence in major depression by mindfulness-based 
cognitive therapy. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 68(4), 615-623. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.68.4.615 
Tolin, D. F. (2009). Alphabet soup: ERP, CT, and ACT for OCD. Cognitive and Behavioral 
Practice, 16(1), 40-48. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cbpra.2008.07.001 
Topper, M., Emmelkamp, P. M., & Ehring, T. (2010). Improving prevention of depression 
and anxiety disorders: Repetitive negative thinking as a promising target. Applied and 
Preventive Psychology, 14, 57-71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.appsy.2012.03.001 
Tremblay, I., Beaulieu, Y., Bernier, A., Crombez, G., Laliberté, S., Thibault, P., . . . Sullivan, 
M. J. L. (2008). Pain catastrophizing scale for francophone adolescents: A 
preliminary validation. Pain Research & Management, 13(1), 19-24. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/622158296?accountid=13552 
Treynor, W., Gonzalez, R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (2003). Rumination Reconsidered: A 
Psychometric Analysis. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(3), 247-259. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1023910315561 
Twohig, M. P. (2007). A randomized clinical trial of acceptance and commitment therapy 
versus progressive relaxation training in the treatment of obsessive compulsive 
disorder. Psychology Ph.D., Psychology, United States -- Nevada. Retrieved from 
250 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/304842950?accountid=13552 ProQuest 
Dissertations & Theses (PQDT) database.  
Twohig, M. P. (2009). Acceptance and commitment therapy for treatment-resistant 
posttraumatic stress disorder: A case study. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 16(3), 
243-252. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cbpra.2008.10.002 
Twohig, M. P. (2009). The application of acceptance and commitment therapy to obsessive-
compulsive disorder. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 16(1), 18-28. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cbpra.2008.02.008 
Twohig, M. P. (2012). Acceptance and commitment therapy: Introduction. Cognitive and 
Behavioral Practice, 19(4), 499-507.  
Twohig, M. P., Hayes, S. C., & Masuda, A. (2006). Increasing Willingness to Experience 
Obsessions: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy as a Treatment for Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorder. Behavior Therapy, 37(1), 3-13. doi: 
10.1016/j.beth.2005.02.001 
Watkins, E. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive ruminative self-focus during emotional 
processing. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 42(9), 1037-1052. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2004.01.009 
Watkins, E. R. (2008). Constructive and unconstructive repetitive thought. Psychological 
Bulletin, 134(2), 163-206. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.134.2.163 
Watkins, E., Moulds, M., & Mackintosh, B. (2005). Comparisons between rumination and 
worry in a non-clinical population. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 43(12), 1577-
1585. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2004.11.008 
Watkins, E., Scott, J., Wingrove, J., Rimes, K., Bathurst, N., Steiner, H., . . . Malliaris, Y. 
(2007). Rumination-focused cognitive behaviour therapy for residual depression: A 
251 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
case series. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(9), 2144-2154. doi: 10.1037/0022-
006x.49.2.193.1981-22019-00110.1037/0022-006x.49.2.193 
Watkins, E., Scott, J., Wingrove, J., Rimes, K., Bathurst, N., Steiner, H., . . . Malliaris, Y. 
(2007). Rumination-focused cognitive behaviour therapy for residual depression: A 
case series. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45(9), 2144-2154. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.brat.2006.09.018 
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2001). Rumination and overgeneral memory in depression: 
effects of self-focus and analytic thinking. Journal of abnormal psychology, 110(2), 
353. 
Watkins, E., & Teasdale, J. D. (2004). Adaptive and maladaptive self-focus in depression. 
Journal of Affective Disorders, 82(1), 1-8. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jad.2003.10.006 
Watson, D. (2005). Rethinking the mood and anxiety disorders: a quantitative hierarchical 
model for DSM-V. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 114(4), 522-536. Retrieved 
from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16351375 
Wegner, D. M., & Zanakos, S. (1994). Chronic thought suppression. Journal of Personality, 
62(4), 615-640. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1994.tb00311.x 
Wells, A. (1994). A multidimensional measure of worry: Development and preliminary 
validation of the anxious thoughts inventory. Anxiety Stress and Coping, 6, 289–299. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10615809408248803 
Wells, A. (1997). Cognitive therapy of anxiety disorders: A practice manual and conceptual 
guide: John Wiley & Sons Inc, Hoboken, NJ. 
Wells, A. (2000). Emotional disorders and metacognition: Innovative cognitive therapy: John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd, New York, NY. 
252 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Wells, A. (2002). Worry, metacognition, and GAD: Nature, consequences, and treatment. 
Journal of Cognitive Psychotherapy, 16(2), 179-192. doi: 
10.1891/jcop.16.2.179.63994 
Wells, A., & Davies, M. I. (1994). The Thought Control Questionnaire: A measure of 
individual differences in the control of unwanted thoughts. Behaviour Research and 
Therapy, 32(8), 871-878. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)90168-6 
Wells, A., & King, P. (2006). Metacognitive therapy for generalized anxiety disorder: An 
open trial. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 37(3), 206-212. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2005.07.002 
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1994). Attention and emotion: A clinical perspective: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Wells, A., & Matthews, G. (1996). Modelling cognition in emotional disorder: The S-REF 
model. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 34(11-12), 881-888. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0005-7967(96)00050-2 
Wells, A., & Papageorgiou, C. (1995). Worry and the incubation of intrusive images 
following stress. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 33(5), 579-583. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(94)00087-Z 
Wells, A., Welford, M., King, P., Papageorgiou, C., Wisely, J., & Mendel, E. (2010). A pilot 
randomized trial of metacognitive therapy versus applied relaxation in the treatment 
of adults with generalized anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 48, 
429–434. http://dx.doi.org/doi: 10.1016/j.brat.2009.11.013 
Wenzlaff, R. M., & Luxton, D. D. (2003). The Role of Thought Suppression in Depressive 
Rumination. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 27(3), 293-308. doi: 10.1037/ 0022-
3514.56.2.267. 
253 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Wenzlaff, R. M., Wegner, D. M., & Roper, D. W. (1988). Depression and mental control: 
The resurgence of unwanted negative thoughts. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 55(6), 882-892. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.6.882 
Wetherell, J. L., Afari, N., Ayers, C. R., Stoddard, J. A., Ruberg, J., Sorrell, J. T., . . . 
Patterson, T. L. (2011). Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for generalized anxiety 
disorder in older adults: A preliminary report. Behavior Therapy, 42(1), 127-134. doi: 
10.1037/0882-7974.22.1.8 
Wethington, H. R., Hahn, R. A., Fuqua-Whitley, D. S., Sipe, T. A., Crosby, A. E., Johnson, 
R. L., . . . Chattopadhyay, S. K. (2008). The effectiveness of interventions to reduce 
psychological harm from traumatic events among children and adolescents: A 
systematic review. American Journal of Preventive Medicine, 35(3), 287-287-313. 
doi: 10.1016/j.amepre.2008.06.024 
Wilhelm, S., Steketee, G., Reilly-Harrington, N. A., & Deckersbach, T. (2005). Effectiveness 
of Cognitive Therapy for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder: An Open Trial. Journal of 
Cognitive Psychotherapy, 19(2), 173-173-179. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/jcop.19.2.173.66792 
Williams, L., Jacka, F., Pasco, J., Henry, M., Dodd, S., Nicholson, G., . . . Berk, M. (2010). 
The prevalence of mood and anxiety disorders in Australian women. Australian 
Psychiatry, 18(3), 250-255. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3109/10398561003731155 
Wilson, K. G., Sandoz, E. K., Kitchens, J., & Roberts, M. (2010). The valued living 
questionnaire: Defining and measuring valued action within a behavioral framework. 
The Psychological Record, 60(2), 249-272. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/742975441?accountid=13552 
254 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
Wykes, T., Parr, A.-M., & Landau, S. (1999). Group treatment of auditory hallucinations: 
Exploratory study of effectiveness. The British Journal of Psychiatry, 175, 180-185. 
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/bjp.175.2.180 
York, D., Borkovec, T. D., Vasey, M., & Stern, R. (1987). Effects of worry and somatic 
anxiety induction on thoughts, emotion and physiological activity. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 25(6), 523-526. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0005-
7967(87)90060-X 
Zanarini M.C., Skodol, A.E., Bender, D., Dolan, R., Sanislow, C., Schaefer, E.… Gunderson 
JG. The Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders Study: reliability of axis I 
and II diagnoses. Journal of Personality Disorders, 14(4),291-9 
Zettle, R. D. (2007). ACT for depression: A clinician's guide to using acceptance and 
commitment therapy in treating depression: New Harbinger Publications, Oakland, 
CA. 
Zettle, R. D., & Rains, J. C. (1989). Group cognitive and contextual therapies in treatment of 
depression. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 45(3), 436-445. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/1097-4679(198905)45:3<436::AID-
JCLP2270450314>3.0.CO;2-L 
Zettle, R. D., Rains, J. C., & Hayes, S. C. (2011). Processes of change in acceptance and 
commitment therapy and cognitive therapy for depression: A mediation reanalysis of 
Zettle and Rains. Behavior Modification, 35(3), 265-283. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-
2850.2008.00137.x10.1111/j.1468-2850.2008.00137.x2008-15506-001 
Zhang, Q., Wang, S.-J., & Zhu, Z.-H. (2012). Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT): 
Psychopathological model and processes of change. Chinese Mental Health Journal, 
26(5), 377-381. Retrieved from 
http://search.proquest.com/docview/1317828412?accountid=13552 
255 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
  
256 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES  
257 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
  
258 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A. 
QUESTIONAIRE PACKAGE 
  
259 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
260 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
 
261 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
  
262 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
263 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
  
264 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
 
 
  
265 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
 
266 
ACT FOR WORRY AND RUMINATION 
 
 
 
AAQ-II 
 
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a 
number next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
never 
 true 
very seldom 
true 
seldom  
true 
sometimes  
true 
frequently  
true 
almost always 
true 
always  
true 
       
1. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult for me to live a life that I 
would value. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I’m afraid of my feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I worry about not being able to control my worries and feelings. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My painful memories prevent me from having a fulfilling life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. Emotions cause problems in my life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. It seems like most people are handling their lives better than I am. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. Worries get in the way of my success. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX B. 
STUDY ONE RMIT ETHICS APPROVAL LETTER 
 
 
 
 
Human Research Ethics Committee (HREC) 
Research and Innovation office 
 
 
Notice of Approval 
 
Date:    12 April 2011 
 
Project number:   62/10 
 
Project title: Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) for rumination and worry 
in individuals with anxiety and depression: A randomised control trial 
 
Risk classification:   More than low risk 
 
Investigator:   Monique Slevison & Sarah Bourchier 
 
Approved:  From: 12 April 2011  To: 31 December 2013 
 
 
Terms of approval: 
1. Responsibilities of investigator 
It is the responsibility of the above investigator to ensure that all other investigators and staff on a 
project are aware of the terms of approval and to ensure that the project is conducted as approved by 
HREC. Approval is only valid whilst investigator holds a position at RMIT University. 
2. Adverse events 
You should notify HREC immediately of any serious or unexpected adverse effects on participants or 
unforeseen events affecting the ethical acceptability of the project. 
3. Plain Language Statement (PLS) 
The PLS and any other material used to recruit and inform participants of the project must include the 
RMIT university logo. The PLS must contain a complaints clause including the above project number. 
4. Amendments 
To amend any approved documents or other aspects of the approved project (including changes in 
personnel) requires the submission of a request for amendment form to HREC. Amendments must not 
proceed without approval from HREC. Substantial variations may require a new application.  
5. Annual reports 
Continued approval of this project is dependent on the submission of an annual report. 
6. Final report  
A final report must be provided at the conclusion of the project. HREC must be notified if the project is 
discontinued before the expected date of completion.  
7. Monitoring 
Projects may be subject to an audit or any other form of monitoring by HREC at any time. 
8. Retention and storage of data 
The investigator is responsible for the storage and retention of original data pertaining to a project for a 
minimum period of five years. 
 
[Other optional conditions] 
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9. That the investigator/principal investigator is responsible for ensuring that permission letters [from 
external agencies] are obtained, if relevant, and a copy forwarded to RMIT HREC before any data 
collection can occur at the specified organisation. 
 
 
In any future correspondence please quote the project number and project title above.  
 
 
A/Prof Barbara Polus 
Chairperson 
RMIT HREC 
 
 
cc: Dr Peter Burke (Ethics Officer/HREC secretary), Keong Yap (Supervisor). 
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APPENDIX C. 
STUDY ONE RMIT ETHICS AMENDMENTS APPROVAL LETTER 
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APPENDIX D. 
STUDY ONE PROJECT INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN A 
RESEARCH PROJECT PROJECT 
INFORMATION STATEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in our research project, which was conducted by the Division of 
Psychology at RMIT University. The researchers would like to complete an additional phase of 
research with the individuals who participated in the Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) 
group treatment program. This information sheet describes the project in straightforward language, or 
‘plain English’.  Please read this sheet carefully and be confident that you understand its contents 
before deciding whether to participate.  If you have any questions about the project, please ask one of 
the investigators.  What this project is about and why it is being undertaken  
 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) is a new type of psychological therapy that helps people 
deal with difficult thoughts and feelings so that they can focus on doing things that are important in 
their lives. Several studies have shown that this treatment works for depression and anxiety, and we 
would also like to find out whether ACT is helpful in reducing worrying and rumination.   
 
The first round of the research involved running ACT therapy sessions in group format. We would now 
like to complete a second round of research which will involve talking to individuals who participated 
in the group treatment program about their experience of the program, their views about ACT, and the 
impact that learning ACT has had on them.  
 
What participation will involve – time, effort, resources, costs, etc. 
 
Participation in this second phase of the research involves attending one 30-60 minute interview with 
one of the researchers. If you agree to participate you will meet with the researcher one-on-one at the 
RMIT Psychology Clinic. You will be asked a range of questions about your experience of 
participating in the ACT group program, for example, which parts were most helpful/not helpful, how it 
has impacted you overall, and which skills and strategies you continue to use. You will also be asked 
to provide any general feedback regarding ACT, group treatment, or the facilitation of the groups. You 
input in the interview will be used to help the researchers to better understand the effectiveness of 
ACT for treating depression and anxiety, and the impact it has on individual participants.  
 
Participant rights and interests 
 
Your participation in this second round of the research is completely voluntary. You are under no 
obligation to agree to participate in an interview.   
 
Participant rights and interests – Privacy & Confidentiality 
 
Project Title 
Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) for rumination and worry in individuals with anxiety 
and depression  
Investigators  
Monique Slevison – Investigator 
Dr. Keong Yap – Senior supervisor 
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The interviews will be videotaped so that they can be transcribed and then analysed. All videos will be 
stored in a locked filing cabinet.  All electronic data will be stored on password protected computers.  
In accordance with the Australian Code for the Responsible Conduct of Research, all information 
(hard copy and electronic data) will be stored for a minimum of fifteen years after final publication of 
the data, after which it will be destroyed. We plan to present and publish group results in psychology 
conferences and academic journals; however all information in publications and conference 
presentations will be provided in such a way that you cannot be identified.  
 
As a participant in this project your confidentiality will be maintained at all times, except in the event 
that failure to disclose any information would place you or another person at risk. Although a very 
unlikely situation, if risk of suicide is assessed to be increased the investigators actions of referral to 
services such as a Crisis Assessment Team or the emergency department will be consistent with 
ethical guidelines published by the Australian Psychological Society (APS). If the participant does not 
provide consent to contact these services and the investigators evaluate the risk of harm to be high, it 
is consistent with the APS ethical guidelines to breach confidentiality and engage such services. 
 
Further information about the project – who to contact 
 
If you would like further information about the project, please do not hesitate to contact:  
Monique Slevison, Email: monique.slevison@student.rmit.edu.au. 
 
 
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Executive Officer, RMIT Human Research Ethics 
Committee, Research & Innovation, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001.    
Details of the complaints procedure are available at:  http://www.rmit.edu.au/rd/hrec_complaints  
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APPENDIX E. 
STUDY ONE PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
Prescribed Consent Form for Persons Participating In Research Projects Involving 
Interviews, Questionnaires or Disclosure of Personal Information 
 
 
Portfolio   
School of Health Sciences 
Name of participant:  
Project Title: Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) for 
rumination and worry in individuals with anxiety and 
depression: A randomized control trial 
Name(s) of investigators:    (1) Sarah Bourchier Phone: 99257603 
(2) Monique Slevison Phone:  99257603 
(3) Dr. Keong Yap Phone:  99256692 
 
1. I have received a statement explaining the treatment, interview and questionnaires involved in this 
project. 
 
2. I consent to participate in the above project, the particulars of which - including details of the interviews 
or questionnaires - have been explained to me. 
 
3. I authorise the investigator or his or her assistant to administer group therapy, an interview and 
questionnaires to me. 
 
4.  I consent to the group therapy sessions which i will participate in to be video recorded. 
 
5. I acknowledge that: 
 
(a) Having read Plain Language Statement, I agree to the general purpose, methods and demands 
of the study. 
(b) I have been informed that I am free to withdraw from the project at any time and to withdraw any 
unprocessed data previously supplied. 
(c) The project is for the purpose of research and/or teaching. It may not be of direct benefit to me. 
(d) The privacy of the personal information I provide will be safeguarded and only disclosed where I 
have consented to the disclosure or as required by law.   
(e) The security of the research data is assured during and after completion of the study.  The data 
collected during the study may be published, and a report of the project outcomes will be 
provided to participants upon request.  Any information which will identify me will not be used. 
 
Participant’s Consent 
 
 
Participant:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
 
Witness:  Date:  
(Signature) 
 
 
 
Participants should be given a photocopy of this consent form after it has been signed. 
Any complaints about your participation in this project may be directed to the Executive Officer, RMIT Human Research Ethics 
Committee, Research & Innovation, RMIT, GPO Box 2476V, Melbourne, 3001.  The telephone number is (03) 9925 2251.   
Details of the complaints procedure are available from the above address.   
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APPENDIX F. 
VISUAL INSPECTION INSTRUCTIONS AND CRITERIA 
 
Dear Rater,  
Thank you again for volunteering to participate as a visual inspector for this research project. 
Please find below the instructions on how to complete the visual inspection task. 
Each graph represents the participant’s scores on one variable (nine variables in total). For 
each variable, the participant has three scores, which represent their obtained score at pre-
intervention, post-intervention, and 3-month follow-up. Standard Error of Measurement 
(SEm) bars have also been included. These show the range in which we can be 95% 
confident that the participant’s true score lies. You are required to assess the level of change 
from: 
a) Pre-intervention to Post-intervention 
b) Post-intervention to Follow-up 
c) Pre-intervention to Follow-up 
Please use the criteria below to assess the level of change each participant has achieved on 
each of the variables. 
1. Substantial change – data shows that the intervention resulted in a 
significant increase or decrease in the variable (i.e., an increase towards the 
maximum possible score; decrease towards the minimum possible score). 
There is a gap between the Standard Error of Measurement bars.  
 
2. Moderate change – data shows that the intervention resulted in a clear 
increase to decrease in the variable; but the change is not sufficient to be 
considered substantial. There is a minimal overlap between the Standard 
Error of Measurement bars (i.e., the end of one SEm bar does not overlap 
past the midpoint of the other SEm).  
 
3. No change – data shows that the intervention resulted in no change in the 
variable across time. There is no significant overlap between the Standard 
Error of Measurement bars (i.e., the end of one SEm bar does overlap past 
the mid-point of the other SEm bar).  
 
Please complete the attached sheets for each variable (1-9), indicating the level of change you 
believe the data best represents. Thank you.  
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APPENDIX G. 
STUDY TWO – RMIT ETHICS APPROVAL LETTER 
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APPENDIX H. 
STUDY TWO – THE MELBOURNE CLINIC ETHICS APPROVAL LETTER 
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APPENDIX I. 
STUDY TWO PROJECT INFORMATION AND CONSENT FORM 
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